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COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 
TECHNICAL ANNEX TO THE JOINT REPORT ON SOCIAL PROTECTION AND 
SOCIAL INCLUSION 
INTRODUCTION 
This Technical Annex underpins the Joint Report on Social Protection and Social Inclusion 
with  more  detailed  analysis  of  specific  aspects  pertaining  to  social  protection  and  social 
inclusion. It was drafted under the full responsibility of the relevant Commission departments. 
It complements other inputs to the Joint Report that have been produced recently under the 
open method of coordination in the areas of social protection and social inclusion, namely the 
2006 Report on the Implementation of the 2003 2005 NAPs/Inclusion  (and update of the 
2004 2006  NAPs/Inclusion)
1  and  the  Synthesis  Report  on  Adequate  and  Sustainable 
Pensions.
2 
The first chapter analyses the situation and trends of social inclusion in the 25 Member States, 
on the basis of recently issued results for the commonly agreed indicators of poverty and 
social exclusion. The second chapter analyses social protection expenditure and receipts in the 
25  EU  Member  States,  mainly  on  the  basis  of  data  drawn  from  the  ESSPROS  database 
compiled by Eurostat. The analysis provides an overview of both the scale of expenditure on 
social protection and its evolution over recent years, highlighting differences across Member 
States and distinguishing between the various social protection functions involved and types 
of benefits. The means of financing expenditure and developments in sources of funding are 
also described. In addition, the analysis focuses on the relationship between poverty risk and 
social protection, by examining the extent to which social transfers reduce the poverty risk in 
the various Member States on the basis of available microdata. Finally, the last chapter of this 
Technical Annex analyses indicators of financial incentives to work and the effect of tax and 
benefit  systems  on  incentives  to  work  and  household  incomes  from  a  social  inclusion 
perspective.  It highlights some of the difficulties that policy makers are faced with when 
reforming tax and benefit systems in order to balance the two goals of increasing labour 
supply incentives and at the same time alleviating poverty. 
                                                 
1  Commission Staff Working Paper SEC(2006)410. 
2  Commission Staff Working Paper SEC(2006)304 of 27 February 2006. EN  5    EN 
CHAPTER  I  -  POVERTY  AND  SOCIAL  INCLUSION  IN  THE  EU:  A  MULTI-DIMENSIONAL 
ANALYSIS BASED ON THE COMMONLY AGREED INDICATORS FOR THE EU 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
Poverty  and  social  exclusion  take  complex  and  multi dimensional  forms.  They  relate  to 
income and living standards, access to good quality health services, educational and work 
opportunities.  This  chapter  aims at  giving  a  snapshot  of the  poverty  and  social  inclusion 
situation in the European Union from this multidimensional perspective, based on the set of 
indicators agreed at EU level to monitor progress in this area. 
A description of these indicators, together with background information on their adoption 
process, the methodological notes on how they  are constructed and the statistical sources 
used, is included in Box 1.1 and in Annex I. The latter also contains tables showing the results 
of the indicators on the basis of common EU sources. Unfortunately, changes in methodology 
and data sources, as described in Box 1.1 and in Annex I, do not allow analysis of recent 
trends for most of the indicators discussed in this chapter. 
This analysis will first look at the income dimension of poverty, which resonates well with 
what is commonly referred to as "poverty". Being at risk of poverty is a relative concept, it 
refers to the capacity of the individual to fully participate in the society in which she or he 
lives and the income measures of poverty are related to some extent to the overall income 
distribution at national level. 
The analysis will continue by looking at what has been identified as the best safeguard against 
social  exclusion  –  employment.  A  job  not  only  provides  the  individual  with  a  source  of 
income and better living conditions, it also facilitates social participation and allows people to 
fully realise their potential. But if employment significantly reduces the poverty risk for the 
individual, it is not always a sufficient condition to lift people out of poverty, and the chapter 
will also look at the issue of in work poverty 
Similarly, education and health are both of value in themselves and an investment to improve 
living  conditions  over  the  life  course.  The  analysis  of  the  skill  and health  dimensions  of 
poverty and social inclusion will be dealt with in the last part of the chapter. EN  6    EN 
1.1.  The income dimension of poverty and social exclusion 
Figure 1.1: At-risk-of-poverty rate by country – 2003 - percentages 
0
5
10
15
20
25
CZ
SI
DK
LU
FI
SE
HU
NL
AT
FR
BE
CY
LT
EU25
DE
LV
PL
EE
UK
IT
EL
ES
IE
PT
SK
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
s
 
Notes: provisional data for NL and SK. Data for MT not available. 
Source: Eurostat, see Box 1.1 and Annex I for more detail. 2003 survey data (referring to 2002 income year) for 
CZ. 
According to the agreed definition at EU level, individuals are considered to be at risk of 
poverty if they live in households where the household income is below 60% of the national 
equivalised median income. In 2003, the average at-risk-of-poverty rate in the EU
3 was 16% 
while  national  figures  ranged  from  8%  in  the  Czech  Republic  (2002  data)  and  10%  in 
Slovenia to 21% in Ireland, Portugal and Slovakia
4 
                                                 
3  Unless  otherwise  indicated,  "EU"  refers  to  the  "EU25",  even  for  data  covering  the  pre enlargement 
period. 
4  These figures are based on  a definition of income  that  does not include imputed rent and  mortgage 
interest payments. The imputed rent refers to the value that would be imputed to all households that do 
not report paying full rent, either because they are owner occupiers or they live in accommodation rented 
at a lower price than the market price, or because the accommodation is provided rent free. For instance, 
the full income definition of private house owners would include an estimate of the rent that the owner 
would have had to pay for his accommodation on the private market, minus the value of mortgage interest 
payments. When taking into account this more comprehensive definition of income, the at risk of poverty 
rate can change significantly for some categories of the population, notably those, like the elderly, that 
count a greater proportion of house owners. Although certain countries, such as DK, are already able to 
supply income including imputed rent, for reasons of comparability, the income definition underlying the 
calculation of indicators currently excludes imputed rent. In the statistical tables in the annex, data for DK 
is shown without and with imputed rent. Differences are particularly important for people aged 65 or 
more, the inactive other than pensioners and those living in owner occupied accommodation for which the 
at risk of poverty rate is reduced once imputed rent is taken into account. EN  7    EN 
In most countries, the at risk of poverty rate (for the population aged 16 or more) was higher 
for women, the difference reaching 5 percentage points in Germany and in Ireland, while at 
EU level the gender gap was 3 percentage points. Only in Poland and Slovakia was the at 
risk of poverty  rate  marginally  greater  for  men.  However,  when  looking  at  the  gender 
dimension,  it  is  important  to  interpret  figures  with  caution  since  they  assume  equal 
distribution of resources within the household, which might not necessarily be the case. 
The younger segment of the population is the one with the highest at risk of poverty rate, at 
20% for children aged 0 15, and 21% for the 16 24 age groups. Young adults are therefore the 
group  with  one  of  the  highest  risk  of  poverty  as  support  from  their  parental  household 
diminishes and integration into the labour market is still at its early stage. After this peak, the 
at risk of poverty rate decreases with age as individuals progress in the labour market, before 
it rises again after people retire and cannot rely anymore on income from work. The risk of 
poverty  for  the  population  group  aged  65  and  more  is  particularly  severe  in  Ireland  and 
Cyprus, where it reaches respectively 40% and 52% of the population in that age group (see 
Table 7a in the Annex). 
Figure 1.2: At-risk-of-poverty rate by age – EU – 2003. 
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Source: Eurostat, see Box 1.1 and Annex I for more detail. 
Box  1.1:  Methodological  note  on  the  data  sources  of  income-related  indicators  of  social 
exclusion and poverty used in this report 
The Report on Indicators in the field of poverty and social exclusion that was endorsed by the 
Laeken European Council in December 2001 set out an initial portfolio of 18 common indicators to 
underpin the Open Method of Coordination in the area of social inclusion. Since then, the Indicators 
Sub Group has continued to work on refining and consolidating the original list of indicators. It 
highlighted the  need  to  give  children  a  special  focus  and,  for  this  purpose,  to  have  a  standard 
breakdown by age of all the Laeken indicators, where relevant (and conditional upon statistical 
reliability) and it redefined the indicator of the share of the population living in jobless households. 
A new indicator of in work poverty was developed, together with a new breakdown of the at risk of 
poverty indicator according to the work intensity of the household. Finally, a new indicator of low EN  8    EN 
reading literacy performance of 15 year old pupils was added. 
In  order  to  maximise  cross country  comparability  of  the  EU  commonly  agreed  indicators,  the 
Laeken European Council also agreed upon common definitions as well as common data sources for 
their calculation. 
While labour market indicators were and still are to be calculated on the basis of the European 
Labour Force Survey (EU LFS), income based indicators were specified to be calculated on the 
basis of the European Community Household Panel survey (ECHP). This pioneering survey was 
developed in collaboration with Member States and was implemented on a 'gentleman’s agreement' 
basis with effect from 1994. The survey was discontinued in 2001. The reference source of statistics 
on income and social exclusion is now data collected under the European Survey on Income and 
Living  Conditions  (EU SILC)  framework  regulation  (No  1177/2003).  Technical  aspects  of  this 
instrument  are  laid  down  in  Commission  implementing  regulations,  which  are  published  in  the 
Official  Journal.  Improving  timeliness  is  one  of  the  core  objectives  of  the  new  tool.  The 
recommendations of the UN ‘Canberra Manual’ on income measurement (2001) have been followed 
as closely as possible. 
The EU SILC project was launched in 2003 in six member states (Belgium, Denmark, Greece, 
Ireland,  Luxembourg  and  Austria).  With  effect  from  the  2005  exercise  there  will  be  complete 
coverage of the EU and some neighbouring countries. Validated cross sectional microdata covering 
all EU countries are thus expected to be available in late 2006. During the transition to EU SILC, 
Eurostat  is  coordinating  data  collection  on  the  basis  of  national  sources,  harmonised  as  far  as 
possible with the EU SILC methodology. Whilst every effort is made to maximise consistency of 
definitions  and  concepts,  the  indicators  cannot  be  considered  to  be  fully  comparable,  due  to 
differences in underlying data sources. For additional information, see the Eurostat working paper 
KS CC 05 006 EN N “Continuity of indicators during the transition between ECHP and EU SILC”. 
Unless  otherwise  specified,  the  income related  data  used  in  this  report  are  those  collected  by 
Eurostat following the common methodological framework as explained above and released on the 
Eurostat free dissemination database. The reference year for the data is the income year, which in 
most cases differs from the survey year in which the data were collected. For example, 2003 data 
refer to the income situation of the population in 2003, even if the information was collected in 
2004. EU aggregates are computed as population weighted averages of available national values. 
Income poverty among children is a matter of serious concern, as it is generally recognised 
that it can affect their development and future opportunities. This is why the EU has set itself 
the  objective  of  moving  towards  the  elimination  of  social  exclusion  among  children  and 
giving them every opportunity for social integration. Children experience levels of income 
poverty  that  are  higher  than  those  for  adults,  except  in  Cyprus,  Finland,  Slovenia  and 
Denmark, where the at risk of poverty rate for children reaches its lowest level at 9% in the 
latter two Member States. At the other end of the scale, Italy and Slovakia have the highest 
incidence of poverty risk for children at 26% and 30% respectively. EN  9    EN 
Figure 1.3: At-risk-of-poverty rate for children (aged 0-15) and for the population aged 
16 and over – 2003 – percentages. 
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Notes: provisional data for NL and SK. Data for MT not available. 
Source: Eurostat, see Box 1.1 and Annex I for more detail. 2003 survey data (referring to 2002 income year) for 
CZ. 
The comparative analysis of the national thresholds helps to illustrate the relative dimension 
of the poverty measure that is being used. This comparison is important to an understanding 
of  the  different  level  of  economic  well being  across  countries,  whereby,  for  example, 
individuals with similar real incomes are classified as being at risk of poverty in one Member 
States but would not be in another. The following graph presents the illustrative values of the 
at-risk-of-poverty thresholds for a single adult household, expressed in purchasing power 
parities. Member States with the lowest at risk of poverty threshold include all new Eastern 
European Member States and Portugal. At the other end of the distribution, the highest at 
risk of poverty threshold is that of Luxembourg, where it is more than seven times higher 
than in Latvia. EN  10    EN 
Figure  1.4:  Illustrative  value  of  the  at-risk-of-poverty  threshold  for  a  single  adult 
households, in PPS, 2003.  
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Notes: provisional data for NL and SK. Data for MT not available. 
Source: Eurostat, see Box 1.1 and Annex I for more detail. 2003 survey data (referring to 2002 income year) for 
CZ. 
The  at risk of poverty  indicators  illustrated  so  far  measure  the  proportion  of  individuals 
below a certain threshold. These headcount figures give an indication neither of "how poor 
are the poor", nor of the proportion of national income that is absorbed by those at the bottom 
of the income distribution relative to better off groups. 
Information on the intensity of poverty can be obtained from the relative median at-risk-of-
poverty gap indicator, defined as the difference between the median equivalised income of 
people  below  the  at risk of poverty  threshold  and  the  threshold  itself,  expressed  as  a 
percentage of the at risk of poverty threshold. In other words, this indicator measures how far 
below the threshold the income of people at risk of poverty is. In 2003 the median at risk of 
poverty gap for the EU was 23%, and it was one percentage point higher for men than for 
women. 
Member  States  with  low  headcount  measures  of  poverty,  such  as  Finland,  the  Czech 
Republic, Luxembourg, Sweden and Denmark, tend to have the lowest intensity of poverty as 
well. On the other hand, countries with a high at risk of poverty headcount, such as Slovakia, 
Portugal, Spain, Greece and Italy, tend to have a relatively higher median at risk of poverty 
gap as well. This is particularly high in Slovakia, where it reaches 39% of the at risk of 
poverty threshold. A clear exception is Ireland, which, despite having (together with Portugal 
and Slovakia) the highest at risk of poverty rate in the EU, also has a median gap below the 
EU average and equal to 20% of the threshold. EN  11    EN 
Figure  1.5:  Relative  median  at-risk-of-poverty  gap  –  total  population  –  2003  - 
percentages 
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Notes: provisional data for NL and SK. Data for MT not available. 
Source: Eurostat, see Box 1.1 and Annex I for more detail. 2003 survey data (referring to 2002 income year) for 
CZ. 
In relation to the gender dimension for the population aged 16 or more, it is interesting to note 
that, although the incidence of the risk of poverty, i.e. the at risk of poverty rate, is higher for 
women than for men, the opposite is true, at least in the majority of Member States, for the 
intensity of poverty, the median at risk of poverty gap. In other words, although women are 
more likely to be at risk of poverty, for people that are in that situation, the shortfall in income 
with respect to the median is greater for men. The difference between the median gap for men 
and women aged 16 or more reaches 5 percentage points in Denmark and Estonia. EN  12    EN 
Figure 1.6: Relative median at-risk-of-poverty gap by gender – population aged 16 or 
more - 2003 – percentages.  
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Notes: provisional data for NL and SK. Data for MT not available. 
Source: Eurostat, see Box 1.1 and Annex I for more detail. 2003 survey data (referring to 2002 income year) for 
CZ. 
The relative position of those at the bottom of the income distribution with respect to those at 
the top, as an indication of inequalities within Member States and of the cohesiveness of their 
societies, can be measured by the income quintile ratio. The value for this indicator was 4.8 
for the EU in 2003, which means that the ratio of total income received by the 20% of the EU 
population with the highest income (top quintile) was nearly 5 times that received by the 20% 
of the EU population with the lowest income (lowest quintile). Member States with the lowest 
income  inequality  include  Slovenia,  Hungary  and  Sweden,  which  are  also  among  the 
countries with the lowest at risk of poverty rate. Member States with the highest disparities 
between those at the top and those at the bottom of the income distribution are Portugal (with 
a ratio of more than 7 to 1), followed by Latvia and Greece. EN  13    EN 
Figure 1.7: Inequality of income: S80/S20 income quintile share ratio – 2003. 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
SI
HU
SE
CZ
DK
FI
LU
AT
BE
NL
CY
FR
DE
LT
EU25
IE
PL
ES
UK
IT
SK
EE
EL
LV
PT
 
Notes: provisional data for NL and SK. Data for MT not available. 
Source: Eurostat, see Box 1.1 and Annex I for more detail. 2003 survey data (referring to 2002 income year) for 
CZ. 
To summarise, the commonly agreed indicators for poverty and social exclusion look at the 
income dimension from three different angles: 
•  The at risk of poverty headcount or the relative size of the population at risk of 
poverty, as measured by the at risk of poverty rate, 
•  The intensity of poverty ("how poor are the poor") as measured by the relative 
median poverty risk gap, 
•  Overall income inequality, as measured by the income quintile ratio. 
The following table classifies Member States according to the aforementioned indicators of 
income poverty, where the distinction between high, medium and low is made with reference 
to the EU average. Member States with higher than average income inequality are highlighted 
in bold. As can be seen, most Member States fall in the diagonal of the table with headcount 
and intensity both classified as low, medium or high. The only exceptions are the following 
ones.  Ireland  and  the  United  Kingdom  are  countries  with  a  high  at risk of poverty 
headcount and high inequality, but relatively low poverty intensity. Germany has a medium 
at risk of  poverty  headcount,  high  at risk of  poverty  intensity  and  overall  low  income 
inequality.Estonia  has  a  high  headcount  and  inequality,  but  medium  at risk of poverty 
intensity.  All  Member  States  with  high  at risk of poverty  headcount  also  have  high 
inequality, together with Latvia and Poland in the medium headcount category. EN  14    EN 
Table 1.1: At-risk-of-poverty headcount, median poverty gap and income inequality - 
2003 
At-risk-of-poverty headcount   
Low  Medium  High 
Low  CZ, SI, DK, LU, FI, 
SE, HU, NL, AT, FR 
CY, LT  UK, IE 
Medium    BE, LV, PL  EE 
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High    DE  IT, EL, ES, PT, SK 
Notes: Member States are classified as having a medium at risk of poverty headcount (or rate) and at risk of 
poverty intensity (or gap) if the corresponding figure is respectively within +/  1 point from the EU average. 
Member States marked in bold have higher than average income inequality. 
1.2.  The labour market dimension of poverty and social exclusion 
1.2.1.  The individual perspective 
Joblessness is not only one of the main causes of poor living standards but is also in itself a 
central dimension of social exclusion, since a job is a key determinant of people's ability to 
fully participate in society, build a social network and realise their potential. Among all the 
different  types  of  joblessness,  long term  unemployment  is  certainly  one  which  is  clearly 
associated with social distress. The term covers people who have been searching for a job, but 
who have been unable to find one, for a long  period of time.  Long term unemployment
5 
represents an important loss of income for the individuals concerned, who also tend to loose 
their skills and the self esteem necessary to regain a foothold in the labour market, unless 
appropriate and timely support is provided. 
In 2004, long-term unemployment affected 4.1% of the active population, on average more 
women than men, at 4.7% and 3.1% respectively. The differences between Member States are 
considerable. Long term unemployment rates are below 1.5% in Cyprus, Austria, Sweden, 
Denmark, Luxembourg and the United Kingdom, where only 1% of the active population is 
affected, but exceed 5% in Germany, Greece and Lithuania and 10% in Poland and Slovakia. 
The  gender  gap  is  particularly  important  in  Italy,  Spain  and Greece  where  the  long term 
unemployment rates for women are respectively 2.6, 3 and 6.4 percentage points higher than 
for  men.  In  only  seven Member  States     the  United  Kingdom,  Sweden,  Ireland,  Finland, 
Hungary, Malta and Estonia   are long term unemployment rates higher for men than for 
women. 
                                                 
5  Long term unemployment is defined as the total long term (over 12 months) unemployed population 
(ILO definition) as a proportion of the total active population aged 15 years or more. EN  15    EN 
Figure 1.8: Long-term unemployment rate by country and gender – 2004. 
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Source: Eurostat, Labour Force Survey, annual averages, based on 1990 census.  
Long term unemployment has remained broadly unchanged in the five year period between 
1999 and 2004 for the EU as a whole. Member States where the long term unemployment rate 
decreased by more than 2 percentage points are Spain, Italy, and Latvia, while it increased by 
3.8 percentage points in Slovakia and 4.4 in Poland. EN  16    EN 
Figure 1.9: Long-term unemployment rates by country – percentage point changes 
between 1999 and 2004. 
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Notes: for MT and CY percentage point changes between 2000 and 2004. 
Source: Eurostat, Labour Force Survey, annual averages, based on 1990 census. 
1.2.2.  The household perspective 
The term "at risk of poverty" refers to those individuals whose household income is below a 
certain  threshold,  since  economic  well being  depends  on  the  sum  of  all  the  resources 
contributed by all members of the household. Therefore, joblessness is even more problematic 
when  it  concerns  not  only  one  individual,  but  all  the  members  of  his  or  her  household. 
Furthermore, the potentially negative impact of living in a jobless household goes beyond the 
lack of work income, as it extends to the lack of contact with the labour market.  
In the EU, the percentage of people aged 18 59 and living in households where no one works 
was 10.2% in 2005. This proportion ranged from just over 5% in Cyprus and Portugal, to 
13.5% in Belgium and 15.3% in Poland. It is interesting to note that even Member States with 
relatively high employment rates, such as Finland, Germany and the United Kingdom, also 
have above the average rates of people living in jobless households, pointing to a greater 
polarisation between "job poor" and "job rich" households in these countries.  
In the EU, the proportion of women living in jobless households at 11.2% is two percentage 
points higher than for men, and this gap is more than 3 percentage points in Luxembourg, the 
Czech  Republic,  Malta,  the  United  Kingdom,  Belgium  and  Greece,  where  it  reaches  4.3 
percentage points. EN  17    EN 
Figure 1.10: People aged 18-59 living in jobless households by country and gender, 2005. 
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Notes: Students aged 18 24 who live in households composed solely of students of the same age class are not 
counted in either numerator or denominator. Data for SE not available. Provisional data for DK, DE, LU and FI.  
Source: Eurostat, Labour Force Survey   Spring results (except DK and FI: annual average) 
Between 2001 and 2005, the proportion of prime age adults living in jobless households has 
remained essentially unchanged in the EU. Only in the Baltic States there has been a marked 
decrease  in  the  proportion  of  people  living  in  jobless  households  equal  to  more  than  2.5 
percentage points, while in Poland the figure increased by 1.5 percentage points.  EN  18    EN 
Figure 1.11: People living in jobless households, 18-59 year old, 2001 and 2005. 
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Notes: Students aged 18 24 who live in households composed solely of students of the same age class are not 
counted in either numerator or denominator. Data for SE not available. Provisional data for DK, DE, LU and FI.  
Source: Eurostat, Labour Force Survey   Spring results (except DK and FI: annual average). First figure refers to 
2002 data for DK and 2003 for FI. 
Children are a particularly vulnerable group with a risk of poverty rate higher than for any 
other age group. Particular concerns are raised when children are growing up in a jobless 
household, as the absence of a working adult as a role model could be a factor affecting the 
educational and future labour market achievement of children.  In 2005, the proportion of 
children  living  in  jobless  households  was  slightly  higher  than  that  of  prime age  adults 
(9.6%), but variations across Member States are more marked, ranging from 2.7% in Slovenia 
to 16.5% in the UK.  
In the past five years, the proportion of children living in jobless households has not changed 
in the EU, but has decreased by over 2 percentage points in the Baltic States and increased by 
the same amount in Austria and Germany and 4.5 percentage points in Slovakia. In all other 
Member States it has remained constant or changed by only 1 percentage point. EN  19    EN 
Figure 1.12: Children living in jobless households, 2001 and 2005.  
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Notes:Data for the EU estimated; 2005 provisional data for DK, DE, LU and FI; first column refers to 2002 data 
for DK and LT; 2003 data for FI; PL and SE not available. 
Source: Eurostat, Labour Force Survey   Spring results (except DK and FI: annual average).  
1.2.3.  Income and employment 
Joblessness is a key determinant of income poverty and that is why the 2000 Lisbon Council 
identified employment as the best safeguard against social exclusion. In the EU as a whole, 
the incidence of poverty risk is nearly 2.5 times greater for those who are not in work than for 
those in work. Policies aimed at facilitating and promoting labour market participation and 
employment  are  therefore  particularly  effective  to  combat  poverty  and  social  exclusion. 
Country  differences  are  particularly  marked,  and  the  at risk of poverty  rate  for  those  not 
working is particularly high (above 30%) in Cyprus, Spain, the United Kingdom and Ireland, 
where it stands at 36%. 
Within the non working population, the poverty risk is particularly high for the unemployed, 
followed by the inactives (who are not retired) and then by the pensioners. In the EU as a 
whole the figures for the at risk of poverty rates for the three groups just mentioned are 42%, 
26% and 16% respectively (see table 7a in the annex for detailed figures by gender and by 
Member State).  
However, the at risk of poverty rate is still relatively high even for those in work. In the EU it 
stands at 9%, ranging from 3% in the Czech Republic and 4% in Slovenia, Belgium and 
Finland to 13% in Greece and Portugal and 15% in Slovakia. Furthermore, the proportion of 
those  working  within  the  income poor  population  aged  16  or  more  is  a  significant  27%. 
Therefore, in order to achieve the objective stated by the Barcelona European Council of 
significantly reducing the number of people at risk of poverty and social exclusion by 2010, 
the problem of in work poverty has to be addressed. EN  20    EN 
Figure 1.13: At-risk-of-poverty rate by labour force status – individuals aged 16 and 
over - 2003. 
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Notes: provisional data for NL and SK. Data for MT not available. 
Source: Eurostat, see Box 1.1 and Annex I for more detail. 2003 survey data (referring to 2002 income year) for 
CZ. 
The link between being at risk of poverty and the employment status of individuals highlights 
the necessary policy mix to fight against social exclusion. "Employment is the best safeguard 
against social exclusion"
6. But in work poverty is a reality that affects a large number of 
people in the European Union. It is linked to low pay, low skills, precarious and often part 
time employment
7, but also to the characteristics of the household in which the individual 
lives, in terms of the number of dependants and the work intensity of the household.  
Quality employment is essential to lift individuals out of poverty and "in order to promote [it] 
it  is  necessary  to  develop  employability,  in  particular  through  policies  to  promote  the 
acquisition  of  skills  and  life long  learning".  It  is  also  necessary  to  put  in  place  sound 
macroeconomic  policies  to  facilitate  employment  creation  and  a  stable  economic  climate 
conducive to higher investment in human capital on the part of employers. 
For those who cannot work, an adequate safety net is an essential element to combat poverty 
and social exclusion since almost a quarter of those not in work are at risk of poverty. That is 
why  "social  protection  systems  also  play  a  key  role.  In  this  context,  the  national  social 
                                                 
6  Quotes in this paragraph and in the following one are taken from Council of the European Union, 2002, 
"Fight against poverty and social exclusion: common objectives for the second round of National Action 
Plans", SOC 508. 
7  See Bardone L. and A. Guio, 2005,"In work poverty", Statistics in Focus 2/2005, Eurostat. EN  21    EN 
assistance  and  minimum  income  schemes  are  important  instruments  in  social  protection 
policy"
8. 
As already pointed out, poverty risks are associated not only with the employment situation of 
individuals but also with the household type in which they live and with the economic status 
of those with whom they share the household. This relationship is presented in the table below 
that  illustrates  poverty  risk  in  connection  with  the  work  intensity  of  the  household. 
Households are classified by their composition (presence of dependent children or not) as 
well as by their work intensity (WI). WI = 0 corresponds to jobless households; WI = 1 to 
full year work for all working age adults in the households; 0 < WI < 1 corresponds to either 
less than full year work for some or all members of the household or only some of the adults 
in the households being at work. 
                                                 
8  See also Chapters 2 and 3 on this topic. EN  22    EN 
Table 1.2: Incidence and distribution of the poverty risk of household members by the 
work intensity of their households, EU-15, 2003 income year (percentages) 
EU15 BE DK DE EL ES FR IE IT LU NL AT PT FI SE
WI = 0 32 30 21 37 29 48 26 62 27 13 28 20 32 25 18
0 < WI < 1 12 7 7 13 14 15 10 10 12 9 6 10 15 9 14
WI = 1 5 3 5 6 10 7 3 5 4 6 4 6 9 5 5
WI = 0 68 70 40 78 52 68 71 80 66 27 64 39 58 42 42
0 < WI < 0.5 44 28 7 45 46 57 40 35 51 28 45 44 41 29 26
0.5 <= WI < 1 18 14 9 13 22 26 13 16 24 17 19 13 27 9 10
WI = 1 7 4 5 8 11 11 5 4 6 7 6 6 10 3 6
WI = 0 : 11 9 : 8 7 9 6 11 7 10 8 6 8 5
0 < WI < 1 : 15 11 : 23 20 12 15 19 12 10 18 18 17 13
WI = 1 : 15 23 : 13 13 16 12 14 17 23 18 13 19 22
WI = 0 : 6 3 : 2 3 4 7 4 2 4 2 2 2 3
0 < WI < 0.5 : 4 1 : 3 5 4 4 7 4 1 4 4 3 3
0.5 <= WI < 1 : 20 13 : 27 33 21 31 26 31 15 25 24 22 15
WI = 1 : 30 40 : 25 20 34 26 21 28 36 26 33 29 39
WI = 0 : 24 24 : 13 14 19 21 15 7 22 14 11 23 10
0 < WI < 1 : 7 10 : 17 13 10 8 12 10 4 16 15 16 19
WI = 1 : 3 14 : 7 4 4 3 3 8 8 10 6 9 10
WI = 0 : 30 14 : 7 8 21 28 14 5 22 6 7 11 12
0 < WI < 0.5 : 9 1 : 9 14 11 7 17 10 3 14 9 10 7
0.5 <= WI < 1 : 20 15 : 33 38 22 26 33 44 23 28 35 20 16
WI = 1 : 8 23 : 15 10 14 6 7 17 18 13 18 10 26
Notes: provisional data for NL.
Source: Eurostat, see Box 1 and Statistical Annex for more detail.
Households with no dependent children
Households with dependent children
A. Incidence
B. Distribution of the total reference population
Households with dependent children
Households with no dependent children
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The incidence of poverty risk is broadly similar for households with or without children when 
all  working  age  members  of  the  household  are  in  full time  work.  This fact  points  to  the 
importance of adequate and affordable childcare facilities for households with children in 
order to increase the labour market attachment of the adult members and reduce their poverty 
risk (see chapter III). 
However, the combination of care responsibilities and exclusion from the labour market for 
all household members
9 produces the highest risk of poverty, where as many as 68% of those 
living in jobless households with dependent children are at risk of poverty in the EU15. This 
percentage rises to just over 70% in Belgium and France, to 78% in Germany and 80% in 
Ireland. 
Limited  labour  market  attachment  can  also  be  insufficient  to  safeguard  individuals  from 
poverty, especially in the case of households with dependent children. Households with a 
work intensity of less than 0.5 and dependent children have a particularly high incidence of 
poverty risk in Italy (51%) and Spain (57%). 
                                                 
9  Of course, not only the presence of children is important but also the household size. EN  23    EN 
1.2.4.  Regional cohesion and labour market outcomes 
All  the  indicators  that  have  been  examined  so  far  are  calculated  at  national  level.  Yet 
territorial differences matter not only across but also within countries. A clear understanding 
of the nature and situation of poverty and social exclusion at sub national level is important 
for  the  design  and  implementation  of  effective  policies  to  combat  them.  Unfortunately, 
however, considerations of statistical reliability hinder the breakdown by region of most of 
the EU commonly agreed indicators. 
A  proxy  measure  of  social  cohesion  across  regions  is  represented  by  the  dispersion 
(coefficient of variation) of employment rates at NUTS2 level. Regional cohesion is lowest 
in Italy, with a coefficient of variation which is seven times greater than the best performing 
country. Although regional cohesion tends to be greater in smaller countries, such as the 
Netherlands, Austria and Portugal, as might be expected, the correlation between regional 
cohesion and country size is not a perfect one; some of the bigger Member States, such as the 
UK and Germany, perform relatively better than some smaller countries. The gender gap is 
particularly marked in southern countries, including Greece, Spain and Italy, where it is 17 
percentage points. 
Since  1999,  regional  cohesion  has  increased  slightly  in  the  EU  as  a  whole,  with  more 
consistent  and  substantial  progress  in  Spain.  Between  2003  and  2004  regional  cohesion 
worsened in a number of Member States, including Belgium, Greece, Hungary, Austria and 
Slovakia, with a significant improvement only in Italy and Poland. EN  24    EN 
Figure 1.14: Dispersion of regional employment rates – 2004. 
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Notes: the dispersion of regional employment rates is measured by the Coefficient of variation of employment 
rates (of the age group 15 64) across regions (NUTS 2 level) within countries. Data for DK, IE, EE, CY, LV, 
LT, LU, MT and SL not applicable. EU average includes all countries.  
Source: Eurostat   Labour Force Survey, Annual averages. 
1.3.  The skills and health dimensions  
The lack of basic competencies and qualifications is a major barrier to inclusion in society. 
This is even more the case in an increasingly knowledge based society and economy. There is 
thus a growing danger of new cleavages in society being created between those who have 
access to lifelong learning to enhance their employability and adaptability and to facilitate 
their personal development and active citizenship, and those who remain excluded. 
Those without adequate skills are more likely to spend long periods out of work and if they do 
work they are more likely to be in low paid jobs. Young people have to face the important 
challenge of entering the labour market and finding a quality job, but without appropriate 
skills  or  the  opportunity  to  acquire  them  it  is  increasingly  difficult  to  compete  for  the 
available jobs in today's labour market. Better educated people are also more likely to benefit 
from training opportunities over their life course and this is why a solid skill base is necessary 
for young cohorts. 
However, in the EU almost 15% of young people aged 18 24 have at most lower secondary 
education and are not in further education or training (this group will be referred to as 'early 
school leavers'). This percentage reaches 31% in Spain, 39% in Portugal and almost 45% in 
Malta. On the other hand, countries with the lowest proportion of early school leavers include 
Slovakia, Poland and Slovenia, where the figures are below 6%. In all Member States, the 
percentage of early school leavers is higher for young men, except in Germany, the Czech 
Republic and Luxembourg where they are broadly similar. EN  25    EN 
Figure 1.15: Early school leavers (% of the total population aged 18-24 who have at most 
lower secondary education and are not in further education or training) – 2005. 
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Notes: data for SI and gender breakdown for EE and LV lack reliability due to low sample size; provisional data 
for IE, LU, MT, FI, SE and UK. In CY, the reference population (denominator) excludes students abroad. In DE 
(2004), participation to personnel interest courses is excluded. 
Source: Eurostat, Labour Force Survey   Quarter 2 results (except FI Q1); 2004 data for DE. 
The  "early  school  leavers"  indicator  focuses  on  the  young  segment  of  the  population.  A 
similar indicator measures the proportion of individuals aged 25 or more whose highest level 
of education or training corresponds to at most lower secondary education. The detailed table 
with the age breakdown can be found in the Annex I. The value of this indicator increases 
with progressively older cohorts from 22% for those aged 25 34 to 66% for those aged 65 and 
over, pointing to improved educational attainment for younger cohorts. 
The two indicators are highly correlated. Participation in education and training leading to a 
recognised qualification for those aged 25 and more – and in particular for the low qualified 
in this age group – is still very limited. Therefore the skill base of adults reflects very much 
the levels of qualification attained  when the individuals were  younger. Member States in 
which educational attainment is low both for young people and adults include Cyprus, Italy, 
Spain and especially Portugal and Malta. 
A second group of countries has a higher than average score for low educational attainment 
among of adults, but also has a relatively low percentage of early school leavers. This will 
lead to future improvement of the skill base of adults as the younger and better educated 
cohort  becomes  older.  This  group  of  countries  comprises  France,  Belgium,  Ireland, 
Luxembourg and Greece. The remaining Member States have a relatively low percentage of 
both  early  school  leavers  and  adults  with  low  educational  attainment.EN  26    EN 
Figure 1.16: Low educational attainment of individuals aged 25-65 and early school 
leavers aged 15-24 – 2005 – percentages 
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Notes: CY: students usually living in the country but studying abroad are not yet covered by the survey. DE, LU, 
FI 2005: 2004 data. IE, provisional. 
Source: Eurostat, Labour Force Survey   Quarter 2 results (except FR: Q1 for the low educational attainment 
indicator and FI 2004 and 2005: Q1, AT 1999: Q1 for the early school leaving indicator) 
The level of the education attained – used in the 'early school leavers' and 'low educational 
attainment' indicators – gives only a broad indication of the actual competences acquired. 
Much more detailed measures of the individual skills can be obtained from the Programme for 
International Student Assessment (PISA) conducted by the OECD every 3 years. In particular, 
one indicator has been adopted at the EU level: the share of 15 year old pupils who are at 
level 1 or below of the PISA combined reading literacy score. 
At the EU level, there was no improvement between 2000 and 2003, and the percentage of 
low  achievers  in  reading  performance  remained  just  below  20%.  Finland  has  the  lowest 
proportion of low performers at 5.7% (less than one third of the EU average), while Greece 
has  the  highest  proportion  (25.2%).  Countries  which  performed  poorly  in  the  first  PISA 
round, namely Latvia, Portugal and Poland have improved in 2003. By contrast, Italy and 
Austria performed significantly worse than the 2000 result. The reasons for Italy are unclear, 
while in Austria this result has to do with a different weighting for vocational schools. EN  27    EN 
Figure 1.17: Share of 15-year-old pupils who are at level 1 or below of the PISA 
combined reading literacy scale 
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Source: OECD, PISA Survey 
An indicator in the area of health that can be seen as expressing the health status as well as the 
general well being of nations is life expectancy (see Annex I). This is a complex indicator 
reflecting several dimensions including access to health services and wider socio economic 
factors, and therefore it cannot be strictly considered as a specific health indicator
10. The EU 
typically has high life  expectancy  at birth. Concerning men, national figures are between 
around 66 years in Estonia and Latvia to over 78 in Sweden, with an EU average of just 
below 75. Life expectancy for women is around 6 years higher, ranging from just under 77 in 
Estonia and Hungary to 83.8 in France and Spain. 
                                                 
10  Further indicators in the health domain are being developed, namely an indicator on access to healthcare 
services by socioeconomic status and other factors, based on the relevant variables in EU SILC. EN  28    EN 
CHAPTER II:  SOCIAL PROTECTION EXPENDITURE AND FINANCING IN THE EU 
2.  THE SCALE OF SOCIAL PROTECTION EXPENDITURE 
Average gross spending on social protection in the Union in 2003 represented 28% of GDP 
(Figure 2.1, Panel A), translating into a figure of average spending per head of population of 
around 6012 PPS (Figure 2.1, Panel B). Taking account of differences in price levels between 
countries, expenditure varied between around 1300 PPS units or less in Latvia, Estonia and 
Lithuania and over 10000 PPS units per capita in Luxembourg
11; in Denmark and Sweden, 
social protection expenditure is also high, above 8000 PPS units per head and 30% of GDP, 
with Germany and France joining the higher ranks in terms of the latter measure. 
                                                 
11  The peculiar structural composition of the labour force in Luxembourg explains why its social protection 
expenditure per head greatly exceeds that of any other EU country. Cross border workers represent a 
large share of the labour force (36% in 2001) and of benefit recipients in Luxembourg. They contribute to 
increase the nominator of the ratio but are not taken into account in the denominator, as only the resident 
population is considered. EN  29    EN 
Figure 2.1  The scale of social protection expenditure in 2003  
Panel A.  Social protection expenditure as a % of GDP 
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1)  Luxembourg has to be considered as an outlier given that cross border workers constitute a large share 
of the country's labour force and benefit recipients but they are not counted in the denominator of the ratio as 
only the resident population is considered. 
2)  Countries are ranked in ascending order by level of GDP per capita in PPS. 
Source: Eurostat   ESSPROS and structural indicators databases. Data for Cyprus refer to 2002. 
Besides the generosity of the social protection system (both in terms of levels and coverage), 
some of the factors that influence the level of social protection spending and developments 
thereof in the Member States are the demographic structure of the population, particularly in 
terms of age, the level of unemployment/non employment, the role of private social services, 
the  economic  situation  and  technological  developments  (particularly  in  the  area  of  health 
care). In general, there is a positive relationship between expenditure on social protection and 
the level of prosperity as measured by GDP per capita in each country. This is to be expected 
given the greater capacity of the more prosperous countries to finance social protection. The 
variation in social expenditure per head, however, is greater than that of GDP per head: when 
excluding Luxembourg from the observation, the ratio between the lowest (Latvia) and the EN  30    EN 
highest (Sweden) social protection spending per head was around seven to one in 2003, as 
compared with a gap of just above three to one in respect of GDP per capita. This suggests 
that the countries tend to spend proportionately more on social welfare as their resources 
increase. 
Nevertheless, this tendency is not systematic. In Cyprus, Spain and especially Ireland, social 
protection expenditure per head was significantly lower than would have been expected given 
the level of GDP per head in these countries. In the case of Ireland, this has partly to do with 
measurement problems: on the one hand, private pensions and private provision for health 
care are only partly covered in the ESSPROS data; on the other hand, GNP would be a better 
measure than GDP to assess the scope of social protection expenditure for this country, since 
the  former  excludes  profits  earned  by  foreign owned  companies  which  are  not  wholly 
available to finance social protection spending. By contrast, in Germany, France and Sweden, 
as well as Poland, social protection expenditure per head was higher than would have been 
expected given their comparative levels of GDP per head. The observation of the structure of 
social protection expenditure, namely by function, allows a better understanding of why some 
countries spend more than others. EN  31    EN 
Box 2.1 - The European System of Social Protection Statistics 
The  data  on  social  protection  expenditure  and  receipts  that  are  used  in  this  analysis  have  been 
compiled  by  Eurostat  in  accordance  with the  methodology  of  the  European  System  of  Integrated 
Social Protection Statistics "ESSPROS Manual 1996". Social protection is defined as encompassing 
"all interventions from public and private bodies intended to relieve households and individuals of the 
burden of a defined set of risks or needs, provided that there is neither a simultaneous reciprocal nor 
an individual arrangement involved". As such, the field of observation of the ESSPROS goes beyond 
that of social security (i.e. social protection offered or imposed by government) to include benefits 
provided by private social protection schemes, in so far as they have similar effects to social security 
for the beneficiary. Social protection expenditure includes social benefits, classified by function (see 
Box 2.2), and administrative and other costs incurred by social protection schemes. 
The ESSPROS is designed to provide comparable information on the scale of expenditure and receipts 
in the EU Member States together with developments over time. However, because of the marked 
differences in social protection systems across the Union and the difficulties of allowing for them, the 
data  cannot  be  considered  fully  comparable  between  Member  States.  There  are  limits  to  data 
comparability as regards both the overall scale of social protection expenditure and its composition by 
function. 
With regard to the overall scale of expenditure, two issues need to be highlighted. First, social benefits 
are recorded gross, without deduction of taxes or other compulsory levies payable on benefit income; 
furthermore, fiscal advantages granted to households as part of social protection are excluded. As is 
shown in this analysis, the contribution of the tax system to social protection varies considerably 
across countries. Second, the borderline between social protection and other areas of social policy or 
services is not always clear cut and is established differently across Member States according to the 
various  national  contexts:  so  for  example  there  are  variations  in  the  borderline  between  social 
protection  and  education,  in  the  case  of  childcare  services,  and  in  the  distinction  between  social 
protection and private expenditure in the case of private health care expenditure.  
As for the division of spending between functions, and their comparability across countries, there are a 
number of difficulties. Specifically, in most Member States old age, survivors' and disability benefits 
are part of a coherent group set up as one system. ESSPROS rules classify these benefits under their 
respective functions, but the strong interdependence between them may make it difficult for some 
countries to implement the rules.  
The ESSPROS system has so far been compiled on the basis of a 'gentleman's agreement' by the EU 
Member States and EFTA countries. A draft Framework Regulation (COM(2006)0011), providing the 
methodological framework for compiling statistics on social protection on a comparable basis and 
setting  time  limits  for  their  transmission  by  the  Member  States,  has  now  been  proposed  by  the 
Commission for adoption by the Council and the Parliament. The Framework Regulation will be 
implemented through Commission Regulations. This will give the European Statistical System the 
opportunity to revise the ESSPROS methodology either where it has proved too difficult to implement 
or in order to reflect new developments in social protection.  
Comparisons of gross social protection expenditure across countries, as well as analysis of 
trends over time, can be misleading if account is not taken of the contribution of the tax 
system. Net social protection expenditure, after  direct taxes are  accounted for, provides  a 
clearer indication of the proportion of an economy's output that is reallocated to individuals or EN  32    EN 
households facing social risks or needs. Estimates of the scale of taxes and social charges 
levied on benefits, on the one hand, and tax breaks for social purposes, on the other, are 
regularly carried out by the OECD for a selection of countries. Because these estimates are 
often  derived  from  micro data  sets  and  micro simulation  models,  they  inevitably  involve 
some  degree  of  uncertainty  and  should  therefore  be  interpreted  with  caution.  Figure  2.2 
suggests that, in 2001, in most EU countries for which data are available, direct taxes and/or 
social charges levied on social transfers were more important than fiscal advantages provided 
for social purposes (namely, tax credits for dependent children), resulting in a negative net 
contribution of the tax system to total social spending. By contrast, in the Czech and Slovak 
Republics, social benefits were largely exempt from direct taxes and social contributions, 
whereas  tax  advantages  to  families  were  worth  around  0.5%  of  GDP,  thus  contributing 
positively to net expenditure. 
Figure 2.2  The effect of the tax system on gross social protection spending in selected 
EU Member States, 2001 
Percentage point change in the share of total spending in GDP allowed by the tax system 
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1)  Account is taken, on the one hand, of the government "claw back" on social spending through direct 
taxation and social security contributions of benefit income; and, on the other hand, of tax advantages for social 
purposes. Only tax breaks for social purposes which mirror the effect of cash benefits (namely, in support of 
families) are included; tax breaks aimed at stimulating take up of private social benefits, whether current or 
future (i.e. pensions), are not included. Indirect taxation is not taken into account.  
The OECD database of social spending (SOCX) underlying these results differs from the ESSPROS database, 
however the scale of total gross expenditure and the underlying definition do not greatly differ.  
Source: author's calculation based on Adema, W. and Ladaique, M. (2005), "Net Social Protection Expenditure, 
2005 Edition – More comprehensive measures of social support", Social Employment and Migration Working 
Paper No. 29, OECD, Paris. For Germany: national submission. 
Thus, accounting for the impact of the tax system on social expenditure has an equalising 
effect on the levels of social effort across countries: in 2001, the highest spending countries in EN  33    EN 
gross  terms  were  also  those  where  expenditure  was  reduced  most  by  the  tax  system.  In 
particular, in Denmark and Sweden, direct taxation of benefit income amounting to around 
4.5% of GDP in 2001 resulted in a significant reduction of net social expenditure. But, again, 
this tendency is not systematic. In the relatively high spending France, extensive use of fiscal 
advantages for families with dependent children restrained the negative impact of the tax 
system on net social expenditure. By contrast, in Spain and Ireland, use of tax breaks for 
social purposes was relatively limited and the tax system did not contribute to improving the 
relative position of these countries in terms of overall net social protection spending. 
Fiscal advantages for social purposes that are taken into account in the calculations shown in 
Figure 2.2 are those that can be seen as replacing cash benefits, normally concerning support 
for  families.  Governments  sometimes  also  use the  tax  system  to  stimulate  the  take up  of 
private social insurance coverage by individuals and/or employment related plans. These tax 
breaks are not included in the estimates of net social protection expenditure so as to avoid 
double counting. They are categorised by the OECD in two groups. First, there are tax breaks 
towards current private
12 social benefits, i.e. favourable tax treatment aimed at stimulating the 
provision  of  private  social  benefits  in  the  current  year  such  as  voluntary  private 
unemployment  coverage  or  private  health  insurance.  This  type  of  fiscal  advantage  is 
important in Germany where a large share of the population is covered by private health 
insurance.  Second,  there are  tax  breaks  towards the  take up  of  private  pensions.  Reliable 
comparable data for the value of such tax breaks are not available; OECD estimates for 2001 
indicate that it was relatively high (at just above 1% of GDP) in  Ireland and the United 
Kingdom. 
2.1.  The structure of social protection expenditure 
Expenditure in cash and in kind 
Benefits in cash are the predominant form of benefit expenditure in the EU – almost 68% in 
2003 (Figure 2.3). They are paid out either regularly (e.g. pensions) or as lump sums: indeed, 
almost two thirds of cash benefit expenditure is classified under the "old age" and "survivors" 
functions (see Box 2.2 on the functions of social protection), and takes the form of pension 
payments. The share of cash benefits in total benefits is highest in Poland and Italy, reflecting 
the  predominance  of  old  age  spending  in  total  expenditure.  Benefits  in  kind  are  benefits 
granted in the form of goods and services and may be provided by way of reimbursement or 
directly. Health care typically comprises the provision of goods (pharmaceutical products) 
and services (in patient and out patient health care, rehabilitation services), and accounts for 
75% of total benefits in kind. The share of benefits in kind in total benefit expenditure is 
highest in Ireland, followed by Sweden, the United Kingdom and Denmark, reflecting greater 
use of services and provision of goods across all the protection functions. 
                                                 
12  In the OECD classification, the distinction between public and private social expenditure is on the basis 
of whoever controls the relevant financial flows; public institutions or private bodies. Social benefits are 
regarded as public when general government controls the relevant financial flows.  EN  34    EN 
Figure 2.3  Benefits in cash and in kind, 2003 
As a % of total benefit expenditure 
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Source: Eurostat – ESSPROS database. Data for Cyprus refer to 2002.  
Means-tested expenditure 
In 2003, one tenth of total benefit expenditure in the EU was means tested, that is, conditional 
upon  the  beneficiary's  income  and/or  wealth  falling  below  a  specified  level  determined 
according to standards laid down by the public authorities. In principle, means tested benefits 
may be  granted for any function. They are particularly common, however, in the area of 
housing and social exclusion, but it is the family function that accounts for the largest share of 
means tested expenditure. There is great variation across countries in the extent to which 
Member  States  use  means tests  to  grant  benefits:  expenditure  subject  to  means testing 
amounted to around 26% of total benefits in Ireland, followed by Malta (19%) and the United 
Kingdom (16%), whereas it was very limited – accounting for 3% or below – in Latvia, 
Estonia, Denmark and Sweden (Figure 2.4).  EN  35    EN 
Figure 2.4  Means-tested benefits, 2003 
As a % of total benefit expenditure 
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Source: Eurostat – ESSPROS database. Data for Cyprus refer to 2002.  
These figures give only a partial picture of the extent to which social benefits are directed to 
the lower income groups across the Union. They leave out of the account fiscal measures 
taken to claw back some of the benefit amounts paid to higher income groups, as well as 
fiscal  advantages  for  social  purposes  that  benefit  proportionally  more  the  lower  income 
groups. As noted above, the revenue yielded by taxes and contributions levied on benefits is 
relatively large in Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden, countries in which the extent of 
means testing  is  below  the  Union  average.  Furthermore,  social  protection  can  benefit 
proportionally  more  the most  vulnerable  sections  of  the  population without  being  means 
tested, for example through the use of categorical benefits or of flat rate benefit minima or 
universal benefits. EN  36    EN 
Expenditure by social protection function 
Table 2.1  The structure of social protection benefit expenditure by groups of 
functions, 2003 
Share of each group of functions in total benefit expenditure 
Old age 
and 
survivors
Sickness 
and 
health 
care
Disability Family
Unemploy
ment
Housing 
and 
social 
exclusion
EU 45.7 28.3 8.0 8.0 6.6 3.5
Belgium 44.5 27.0 6.6 7.8 12.4 1.7
Czech Republic 41.3 35.6 8.2 7.5 3.9 3.5
Denmark 37.2 20.5 13.5 13.2 9.8 5.7
Germany 42.9 27.7 7.8 10.5 8.6 2.5
Estonia 44.8 31.8 9.3 10.0 1.8 2.2
Greece 50.8 26.5 5.1 7.3 5.7 4.6
Spain 43.8 30.7 7.4 3.0 13.3 1.7
France 43.3 30.5 4.8 9.0 7.9 4.5
Ireland 23.2 41.8 5.1 16.0 8.4 5.6
Italy 61.8 25.7 6.4 4.1 1.8 0.2
Cyprus 49.4 25.2 3.8 8.0 5.7 7.9
Latvia 53.1 22.9 8.5 10.8 3.2 1.5
Lithuania 47.4 29.8 9.7 7.9 1.8 3.3
Luxembourg 37.2 24.8 13.4 17.7 4.2 2.8
Hungary 41.3 29.7 10.3 13.0 2.8 2.9
Malta 52.3 26.0 6.5 5.6 6.7 2.9
Netherlands 40.3 31.4 11.1 4.9 6.2 6.2
Austira 48.2 24.8 8.6 10.8 6.0 1.7
Poland 58.5 20.5 12.2 4.7 4.0 0.2
Portugal 46.2 28.8 11.5 6.5 5.5 1.6
Slovenia 45.0 32.4 8.2 8.6 3.1 2.6
Slovak Republic 39.4 32.8 8.9 8.3 5.8 4.9
Finland 37.0 25.1 13.3 11.5 9.9 3.3
Sweden  40.1 26.3 14.2 9.5 5.9 4.0
United Kingdom 44.9 29.6 9.4 6.9 2.7 6.5 
Source: Eurostat   ESSPROS database. Data for Cyprus refer to 2002.  
Spending on old age and survivors remains the largest component of total social protection 
benefit spending across the Union in 2003. In the EU as a whole, it accounted for some 46% 
of the total, or over 12% of GDP (see Table 2.1 and Table 4 in Annex I). Except in Ireland, it 
was by far the largest spending component in all Member States, reaching over half of total 
outlays in Greece, Italy, Latvia, Malta and Poland. Given the different levels of overall social 
protection spending in these countries, old age and survivors' benefits account for widely 
different shares of GDP, ranging from less than 7% in Latvia to almost 16% of GDP in 
Italy.
13 The Irish exception, with just 23% of total benefits or 3½% of GDP, reflects the 
                                                 
13  The Italian figure for old age spending includes expenditure on the severance pay (Trattamento di Fine 
Rapporto   TFR). The inclusion of this item in the old age function is questionable. First, the TFR can be 
granted to employees at any age upon the termination of an employment relationship; in this respect, 
spending on this benefit should partially be considered under other functions (namely, unemployment). EN  37    EN 
comparatively small proportion of people above retirement age but also the higher weight of 
private funds in the pension system, which are only partly covered in the Irish data. Denmark, 
Luxembourg, Slovakia and Finland also devote a lower share of social benefit spending to old 
age and survivors' benefits, at less than 40% of total spending.  
Old age and survivors' pensions represent the largest spending component in the total for 
old age and survivors – more than 90% on average in the EU and in most countries (Figure 
2.5). In Sweden, Denmark, Finland and Ireland, benefits in kind in the form of social services 
to the elderly (e.g. accommodation, assistance in carrying out daily tasks and reductions in 
fares and prices enabling older people to take part in leisure and cultural life) represent 9% or 
more of total expenditure. These benefits are normally means tested. 
Figure 2.5  The components of old age and survivors' benefit expenditure, 2003 
Percentage share of total 
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For Italy, see footnote 15. 
Source: Eurostat   ESSPROS database. Data for Cyprus refer to 2002.  
The use of means testing in order to provide minimum guaranteed incomes to older people 
who  have  not  accrued  sufficient  pension  entitlements  in  the  contributory  schemes  is  not 
widespread: in some countries, basic, flat rate pensions are based on residency regardless of 
individual  contributions,  such  as  in  Denmark  and  the  Netherlands;  in  a  number  of  other 
countries, the minimum guarantee is tested only against income from the statutory earnings 
related pension scheme (for example, in Italy, Finland and Sweden); in other countries, tighter 
means tests  only  apply  to  top up  benefits  in  order  to  raise  incomes  to  the  guaranteed 
minimum  levels.  As  a  consequence,  the  share  of  means tested  benefits  in  total  benefit 
                                                                                                                                                          
Secondly,  and  more  importantly,  such  payments  could  be  considered  as  enforced  saving  or  deferred 
wages rather than as social protection. Expenditure on the TFR accounted for around 1.5% of GDP in 
2003; without it, benefit spending on old age and survivors would account for 14.5% of GDP, still the 
highest in the EU.  EN  38    EN 
spending on old age/survivors is generally quite low, with the exception of Ireland, Finland, 
Spain  and  the  United  Kingdom,  where  it  represented  10%  or  more  of  total  benefit 
expenditure.
14 
Box 2.2 - The functions of social protection in the ESSPROS 
The broad functions or areas of need distinguished in the ESSPROS classification system are defined 
as follows: 
Sickness/health care: income maintenance and support in cash in connection with physical or mental 
illness, excluding disability. Health care intended to maintain, restore or improve health irrespective of 
the  origin  of  the  ailment,  includes,  inter  alia,  paid  sick  leave,  medical  care  and  the  supply  of 
pharmaceutical products. 
Disability: income maintenance and support in cash or kind (except health care) in connection with the 
inability of people with physical or mental disabilities to engage in economic and social activities, 
includes, inter alia, disability pensions and the provision of goods and services (other than medical 
care) to the disabled. 
Old age: income maintenance and support in cash or kind (except health care) in connection with old 
age, includes, inter alia, old age pensions and the provision of goods and services (other than medical 
care) to the elderly. 
Survivors: income maintenance and support in cash or kind in connection with the death of a family 
member (e.g. survivor's pensions). 
Family/children:  support  in  cash  or  kind  (except  health  care)  in  connection  with  the  costs  of 
pregnancy, childbirth and adoption, bringing up children and caring for other family members. 
Unemployment: income maintenance and support in cash or kind in connection with unemployment, 
includes, inter alia, unemployment benefits and vocational training financed by public agencies. 
Housing:  help  towards  the  cost  of  housing,  includes  interventions  by  public  authorities  to  help 
households meet the cost of housing. 
Social exclusion not elsewhere classified: benefits in cash or kind (except health care) specifically 
intended to combat social exclusion where they are not covered by one of the other functions, includes 
income support  benefits,  rehabilitation  of  alcoholics  and  drug  addicts,  and  various  other  benefits 
(other than medical care). 
Sickness and health care represent the second largest component of total expenditure on 
social protection at EU level as well as in all Member States, except for Ireland where it is the 
largest. In 2003, it accounted for 28% of total spending, or almost 8% of GDP for the Union 
as a whole. The share was lowest, at around 20%, in Denmark and Poland, representing 6% 
and 4% of GDP respectively. For Denmark, this is not so much a reflection of a low level of 
spending but of a clearer distinction than elsewhere between the provision of long term care 
                                                 
14  For more details on minimum guaranteed income benefits to older people, see the Commission Staff 
working paper: Synthesis Report on Adequate and Sustainable Pensions (SEC(2006)304 of 27 February 
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for the elderly (included under old age) and health care as such. Health care and other benefits 
in kind accounted for over 80% of total expenditure for this function in all countries except 
Sweden, where sick leave payments represent almost 30% of expenditure, mainly due to the 
very  high  number  of  working  days  lost  due  to  sickness  in  this  country.  Means tested 
expenditure for this function is negligible expect in Ireland and Malta (above 10% of total 
expenditure). 
In 2001, disability represented just under 8% of total expenditure in the EU as a whole, or 2% 
of GDP. The Nordic countries, Luxembourg and Poland devoted 12% or more of their total 
benefit expenditure to this function. As explained in more detail in Box 2.1, differences across 
countries in the relative share of this spending category reflect to some extent a different 
demarcation between functions, as disability pensions paid to people above retirement age 
should, in principle, be included under old age but this has not always been possible.  
The family function covers a variety of benefits like maternity benefits, family allowances, 
parental leave benefits and some services like child care and home help. There is great variety 
in the share of total benefit expenditure that is devoted to this function, ranging from below 
5%  in  Spain,  Italy,  the  Netherlands  and  Poland  to  13%  or  more  in  Denmark,  Ireland, 
Luxembourg and Hungary. Around 27% of expenditure for this function was means tested, 
and 73% was paid out as cash benefits. Comparability of this category of expenditure across 
countries is limited by the fact that transfers to families are often paid out in the form of fiscal 
advantages, which are not accounted for in ESSPROS, and by the fact that in some countries 
some  social  services  for  families  with  dependent  children  may  be  considered  part  of  the 
education system and are therefore not included in the scope of social protection expenditure. 
Fiscal support for families (Figure 2.2) is significant in France and Germany, and, to a lesser 
extent, in Belgium, the Czech Republic, the Netherlands and the Slovak Republic. It is low in 
Spain and Italy, thus leaving these countries further behind in terms of support for families. 
As concerns the borderline between education and social protection, a notable problem is the 
treatment of the “pre school” system (after nurseries and before primary school): in some 
countries (e.g. France) the “pre school “system is considered wholly as part of the national 
education system and outside ESSPROS, whereas in others attempts are made to distinguish 
between education expenditure proper (outside ESSPROS) and social protection expenditure 
(child day care after school hours). Methodological discussions to try and solve this issue are 
ongoing in the context of the revision of the ESSPROS methodological framework. 
Unemployment is the most variable category of expenditure, given the cyclical nature of the 
risk  it  covers.  Expenditure  on  this  function  reflects,  obviously,  the  unemployment  to 
population ratio in each country. However, other factors play a role, namely the generosity of 
the benefit system (i.e.  coverage, level and duration of benefits) but also the structure of 
unemployment     for  example,  if  unemployment  is  concentrated  among  young  people  and 
women  with  low  employment  records,  or  the  long term  unemployed,  expenditure  per 
unemployed person will tend to be lower. Furthermore, comparability of expenditure data in 
this function may be affected by differences in the extent to which assistance given to the 
unemployed to find a job or increase their employability or early retirement programmes for 
older workers due to labour market problems are taken into account. In 2003, social transfers 
under  the  unemployment  function  (including  unemployment  benefits  but  also  directly 
provided labour market programmes) absorbed less than 7% of total benefit expenditure or 
1.8% of GDP in the EU. In Belgium and Spain, their share was much higher, above 12%, EN  40    EN 
whereas Italy, Estonia and Lithuania spent less than 2% of total benefits: clearly, there is little 
relationship  across  countries  between  the  relative  effort  devoted  by  Governments  and  the 
social partners to protection against the unemployment risk and the extent of unemployment 
in the Member States. This relationship is no stronger over time within countries, as, in the 
recent period 2000 to 2003, in some countries expenditure on this function declined relative to 
the number of the unemployed and in other countries it increased.  
In the EU, less than one fifth of unemployment expenditure was means tested, but in Ireland 
and the Netherlands this share was more than one third and in Malta means tested benefits 
largely predominated.  
Finally, benefits under the housing and social exclusion functions accounted for just 3.5% of 
total benefit expenditure or 1% of GDP in 2003. With a share of less than 0.3% in total 
spending, this group of benefits appears largely underdeveloped in Italy and Poland. In Italy, 
there is no general minimum guaranteed income: a minimum insertion income was introduced 
in 2000 on an experimental and decentralised basis in some 300 municipalities (out of 8000 
for the whole country), but was terminated in 2004.
15 For Poland, this figure must be seen in 
conjunction with the information provided in Chapter III of this Technical annex showing that 
social assistance in this country appears to be  capable of lifting the net incomes of their 
recipients just above the national at risk of poverty threshold. Combined with the very low 
figures for overall spending on this type of benefits, this suggests that coverage of social 
assistance schemes is very low.
16 Benefits in support of housing are by definition means 
tested, since the purpose of more general housing support measures goes beyond that of social 
protection  (such  measures  may  be  aimed  at  encouraging  the  building  industry  or  home 
ownership). Benefits for the socially excluded are normally means tested. However, not all 
the benefits included in this function require a means test. Sometimes, a lack of adequate 
resources is implicit, as is for example the case of refugees. In other cases, the benefits are 
provided regardless of the financial situation of the beneficiary, for example for drug addicts. 
Therefore, although more than 90% of expenditure for the social exclusion function in the EU 
is means tested, in Latvia, Greece, Austria, Sweden and the United Kingdom only half or less 
of this expenditure is means tested. 
2.2.  Recent trends in social protection expenditure 
The analysis of social protection expenditure in the Technical Annex to last year's edition of 
the  Joint  Report  of  Social  Protection  and  Social  Inclusion  showed  that  social  protection 
expenditure grew continuously over the past decades in most countries for which data were 
available for a long time series. This steady growth reflected increases in benefit levels and 
coverage, the growing proportion of elderly people, increasing costs associated with health 
care  and  care  for  the  elderly  and  the  gradual  extension  of  welfare  support  to  people  not 
eligible for social insurance on the basis of their employment records. 
                                                 
15  After this experiment, the Government had foreseen the introduction of a new programme – the Last 
Resort Income  , fully administered at regional level and co funded by the State and the regions, but there 
has been no application of it. 
16  This explanation seems to be confirmed in European Commission (2003), Social Protection in the 13 
Candidate Countries: a comparative analysis, DG Employment and Social Affairs, Brussels. EN  41    EN 
This  section  concentrates  on  more  recent  trends,  from  the  mid '90s,  for  which  data  are 
available  for  most  countries,  until  2003  (Table  2.2).  The  pick up  in  expenditure  that  had 
already been noted last year on the basis of data up to 2001/2002 has continued and between 
2002 and 2003 most countries recorded annual real growth rates above the average for the 
period under observation. A notable exception is the Slovak Republic where real expenditure 
even fell by 2.7% over the year. Following a major overhaul of the welfare system, the fall in 
real expenditure in this country was spread across all the functions except unemployment. In 
Germany, Italy, Portugal and Slovenia, too, real expenditure per capita has grown by a mere 
1% or less. On the other hand, in Estonia, Cyprus, Lithuania and Hungary the annual growth 
rate has been above 8.5%. 
Over the whole period 1996 2003, the highest real growth rates, above 6% per year, were 
recorded in Greece and Ireland and most of all Hungary (almost 8% per annum, but data for 
the latter country are only available from 1999). Between 2000 and 2003, real expenditure in 
the EU as a whole grew at an annual average rate of 2.7%, and went from just below 27% to 
28% of GDP, reflecting faster growth in social protection expenditure than in GDP, which 
slowed down considerably (for the EU as a whole, the average growth rate of GDP was of 
1.4% per annum, as against an average rate of 3.3% per year in the period from 1997 to 
2000). EN  42    EN 
Table 2.2  Real growth of social protection expenditure per capita, 1996-2003 
Average annual percentage growth 
1996-99 1999-2002
1  2002-2003
2 1996-2003
3
EU : 2.3 3.5 2.7
BE 1.6 2.4 4.5 2.4
CZ 3.9 5.1 3.5 4.4
DK 0.6 1.2 3.8 1.3
DE 1.4 1.6 0.1 1.3
EE : 3.1 10.7 5.5
EL 7.5 5.4 3.7 6.1
ES 1.2 1.6 3.2 1.7
FR 2.4 2.3 2.7 2.4
IE 4.0 9.5 5.2 6.5
IT 2.4 2.4 1.0 2.2
CY : : 8.7 :
LV : 2.8 5.6 3.7
LT :  0.1 8.7 2.8
LU 4.0 4.2 7.5 4.6
HU : 7.2 10.0 7.9
MT  0.5 3.2 4.2 1.7
NL 0.9 2.7 1.4 1.7
AT 2.2 1.6 1.6 1.9
PL : 5.6 2.1 4.4
PT 6.9 2.5 0.4 4.1
SI 5.8 3.5 0.1 4.0
SK 3.4 1.1  2.7 1.5
FI  0.9 0.9 4.8 0.7
SE 1.3 2.8 4.4 2.4
UK 1.1 3.4 4.3 2.5  
1) 2000 2002 for Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and the EU average (excluding Cyprus). 
2) 2001 2002 for Cyprus. 
3) 1999 2003 for Hungary and 2000 2003 for Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and the EU average (excluding 
Cyprus). 
Source: Eurostat – ESSPROS database 
Over the last two decades, social protection expenditure in the various Member States has 
shown a tendency to converge to the EU average. Recent trends seem to point to a departure 
from this trend, as the gap (calculated as a ratio) between the lowest and the highest share 
increased between 2000 and 2003, from 2.2 to 2.5 in terms of share in GDP, and from 8.2 to 
9.2 in terms of PPS per capita. 
The changes observed in total expenditure are the results of social benefits developing at 
different speeds in respect of the different functions. Table 2.3 shows that there is a wide 
range of variation in the average rate of increase of benefits for each function and in each 
country, as well as in the pace at which such developments occurred within the period 1996 
2003. Below, the main developments are only briefly summarised.  
EN  43     EN 
Table 2.3  Growth of social benefit expenditure by function in real terms, 1996-2003 
EU
1,4 BE
2  CZ DK DE EE
1,4 GR ES FR IE IT CY
3 LV
1,4 LT
1,4 LU HU
4 MT NL AT PL
1,4 PT SI SK FI SE UK
Total
1996-1999 : 1.9 3.8 1.0 1.5 : 8.3 1.6 2.7 5.0 2.4 : : : 5.6 : 0.2 1.3 2.4 : 6.4 5.6 3.6 -0.5 1.3 1.6
1999-2002
1  2.7 3.0 4.9 1.5 1.7 2.7 6.0 2.8 2.5 11.4 2.5 : 2.1 -0.5 5.9 7.0 4.6 3.3 1.9 5.6 4.7 3.7 1.1 1.0 2.4 3.7
2002-2003
2  3.8 5.3 3.6 4.1 0.1 10.3 3.4 5.0 3.4 6.9 1.9 10.0 5.0 7.9 8.5 9.6 5.1 1.8 2.0 2.7 2.5 0.3 -2.6 5.0 4.8 4.8
1996-2003
3  3.1 2.8 4.2 1.7 1.4 5.2 6.6 2.6 2.7 8.0 2.4 : 3.1 2.2 6.1 7.6 2.8 2.2 2.1 4.6 5.1 4.0 1.6 0.9 2.2 2.9
Sickness and health care
1996-1999 : 1.5 0.0 4.3 -0.1 : 7.4 2.4 2.7 9.6 2.9 : : : 5.2 : 1.3 3.2 4.2 : 7.4 5.5 0.4 1.9 5.9 3.8
1999-2002
1  4.5 2.2 7.0 3.8 1.5 1.1 8.4 3.8 4.7 12.9 6.0 : 11.5 -0.1 5.3 7.6 6.7 5.1 0.6 7.1 3.1 4.3 1.3 3.7 5.0 7.6
2002-2003
2  4.7 19.2 3.9 2.1 -1.0 12.9 4.5 5.8 5.2 7.3 0.4 4.1 23.1 7.0 6.0 16.6 7.4 4.0 0.1 1.5 -4.5 3.9 -6.8 6.0 1.1 8.7
1996-2003
3  4.6 4.2 3.5 3.8 0.4 4.9 7.4 3.5 3.9 10.6 3.9 : 15.2 2.2 5.3 9.8 4.5 4.1 2.0 5.2 3.8 4.8 -0.3 3.2 4.8 6.1
Disability
1996-1999 : 3.3 3.3 5.2 4.2 : 8.4 2.5 2.3 4.7 -1.9 : : : 9.9 : 2.5 0.3 0.7 : 5.1 7.0 5.7 -1.7 3.8 -1.0
1999-2002
1  2.6 3.9 3.3 3.6 1.3 19.3 8.7 1.3 -3.8 11.7 1.9 : -0.6 3.5 4.8 8.6 6.1 1.4 0.5 0.5 3.3 2.3 10.4 -0.9 5.5 3.2
2002-2003
2  2.9 -25.5 5.4 8.9 1.0 15.1 1.0 3.3 3.5 7.9 5.1 13.1 -4.1 15.3 4.3 11.0 13.7 0.7 3.4 -1.1 0.7 -3.0 -2.0 3.8 8.1 2.4
1996-2003
3  2.7 -1.2 3.6 5.0 2.5 17.9 7.4 2.1 -0.2 8.1 0.7 : -1.8 7.3 6.9 9.2 5.6 0.8 1.0 -0.1 3.7 3.5 6.5 -0.6 5.1 1.3
Old age and survivors
1996-1999 : 3.1 6.7 0.2 1.9 : 7.5 2.1 3.1 4.2 3.0 : : : 2.7 : 0.5 3.2 2.6 : 6.8 4.9 3.7 0.9 1.5 3.3
1999-2002
1  1.7 3.6 3.9 1.2 2.0 2.1 4.9 2.1 2.1 9.0 1.2 : 0.3 -0.9 3.4 8.7 5.4 3.1 2.5 6.8 5.2 4.7 2.8 2.6 2.4 2.8
2002-2003
2  3.4 4.5 2.1 2.9 0.8 10.2 3.9 3.4 2.5 5.4 1.7 15.8 -1.0 7.8 8.0 4.9 3.4 -1.5 1.3 5.4 4.2 -3.0 -0.2 5.3 6.6 3.9
1996-2003
3  2.2 3.5 4.9 1.0 1.8 4.7 5.9 2.3 2.6 6.4 2.0 : -0.1 1.9 3.7 7.7 3.0 2.5 2.3 6.3 5.7 3.6 2.7 2.2 2.6 3.2
Family
1996-1999 : 2.7 -3.8 2.5 4.8 : 3.2 4.6 2.6 6.1 4.3 : : : 12.0 : -7.3 0.3 -0.2 : 5.7 6.6 -4.0 0.2 -3.2 -2.5
1999-2002
1  2.4 0.4 2.1 2.4 2.7 0.3 3.6 2.2 0.5 17.5 4.4 : 2.1 -4.0 8.4 5.0 -5.2 6.7 3.5 3.5 13.1 3.0 -5.4 -1.8 2.8 -0.6
2002-2003
2  3.2 -0.4 -2.5 3.2 -1.2 -3.3 8.1 27.1 0.6 7.8 6.1 6.9 9.8 4.4 14.6 14.0 -5.6 5.6 4.8 -5.2 2.7 1.1 -0.1 2.9 4.2 3.7
1996-2003
3  2.6 1.3 -1.1 2.6 3.0 -0.9 4.1 6.5 1.4 11.1 4.6 : 4.6 -1.3 10.8 7.2 -6.2 3.7 2.1 0.5 8.4 4.2 -4.0 -0.3 0.4 -0.8
Unemployment
1996-1999 : 0.0 15.9 -6.0 0.1 : 20.3 -3.1 0.1 -6.2 -6.4 : : : 1.8 : 6.8 -14.6 -1.1 : -8.1 10.0 29.7 -7.4 -5.0 -10.0
1999-2002
1  3.3 2.7 2.2 -4.7 0.7 -5.0 9.6 4.6 3.5 2.5 -4.1 : -7.9 -0.8 12.5 -7.3 5.0 -1.4 2.6 1.3 6.5 -10.0 -14.4 -3.6 -9.3 -2.3
2002-2003
2  6.8 8.9 19.7 11.0 1.5 82.4 -6.8 5.1 7.4 4.5 6.2 -6.9 9.2 9.2 26.1 4.3 6.5 20.8 10.8 -5.6 43.2 -1.9 36.5 5.8 4.9 0.7
1996-2003
3  4.5 2.4 10.3 -3.2 0.6 18.1 11.4 1.3 2.5 -1.0 -3.7 : -2.5 2.4 9.5 -4.6 6.0 -4.5 2.1 -1.1 4.3 -0.7 9.3 -4.0 -5.5 -5.3
Housing and social exclusion
1996-1999 : -14.7 38.6 -0.9 -1.5 : 19.9 0.3 4.2 4.7 11.2 : : : 2.2 : -4.3 4.7 10.6 : 61.7 : 20.1 -0.3 -5.9 -1.2
1999-2002
1  2.4 7.5 8.7 0.7 -0.4 1.2 0.9 -1.9 3.0 11.5 13.4 : 4.8 0.9 48.9 0.8 -2.9 1.4 0.0 : 3.6 : 2.5 -2.4 -2.7 2.5
2002-2003
2  0.4 0.2 11.6 0.2 -0.6 -7.1 1.3 9.0 -1.0 10.1 13.3 12.4 7.7 4.2 2.6 -3.0 20.0 -3.9 0.4 : -0.3 : -24.2 4.1 2.9 0.0
1996-2003
3  1.7 -3.6 21.1 0.0 -0.9 -1.7 8.7 0.6 2.9 8.3 12.4 : 5.8 2.0 20.2 -0.2 -0.5 2.0 4.5 : 24.7 : 5.1 -0.6 -3.3 0.5  
1) 2000 2002 for Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and the EU average (excluding Cyprus). 
2) For Belgium, there is a break in the series for the disability function between 2002 and 2003, due to a change in methodology. 
3) 2001 2002 for Cyprus. 
4) 1999 2003 for Hungary and 2000 2003 for Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and the EU average (excluding Cyprus). 
Source: Eurostat – ESSPROS database  
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The  highest  rate  of  growth  in  expenditure  in  the  EU  over  the  recent  period  2000 2003 
occurred in sickness/health care and in unemployment – in both cases, the annual growth rate 
in real terms was between 4 and 5%, well above the average for total benefit expenditure 
(3.1%). Benefit expenditure on sickness and health care has grown at a faster rate than total 
benefit  expenditure  in  all  countries  except  the  Czech  Republic,  Germany,  Greece, 
Luxembourg, Portugal and Slovakia. In most countries, growth of benefit spending for this 
function reflected increased spending on health care. For unemployment benefits, the picture 
is more mixed, with some countries recording annual growth rates above 10% (the Czech 
Republic and Greece between 1996 and 2003 and Estonia between 2000 and 2003) and others 
recording a decrease of more than 5% a year (Sweden and the United Kingdom, 1996 2003). 
Spending on housing and social exclusion recorded the lowest growth rate – 1.7% in the EU 
between 2000 and 2003. Again, the picture is mixed, with the Czech Republic, Greece, Italy, 
Luxembourg and Portugal recording high growth rates. In the case of Portugal, this reflects 
the development of the minimum income guaranteed scheme in the mid '90s. In Italy, which 
started from a negligible level of benefit spending on this group of functions, real growth 
reflects locally administered housing support and the pilot experiments with the Minimum 
Insertion Income, discontinued in 2004 (see footnote 14). 
As regards old age and survivors, the average growth rate over the whole period has been 
relatively moderate both in the EU and in individual countries, except Ireland and Hungary 
(annual growth rates of 6.4% between 1996 and 2003 and 7.7% between 1999 and 2003 
respectively). Furthermore, in Belgium, Denmark, Spain, Luxembourg, Finland and Sweden, 
real growth, albeit moderate overall, appears to have accelerated over the period 1996 2003. 
In the light of the considerations above, it appears that the recent growth of social protection 
expenditure cannot be attributed exclusively to countercyclical factors (i.e. as the increase in 
unemployment  and  the  general  deterioration  in  economic  conditions  trigger  higher 
expenditure on unemployment benefits, social assistance, early retirement pensions or even 
sickness cash benefits and housing payments). In particular, the rise in health care expenditure 
seems to be driven by structural factors. 
The different trends in expenditure by function have resulted in a change of the structure of 
social benefits by functions. The relative importance of the sickness/health care function has 
increased  everywhere  except  in  the  Czech  Republic,  Luxembourg,  Germany,  Austria, 
Portugal and the Slovak Republic. In Ireland, followed by the Netherlands, Finland, Sweden 
and the United Kingdom, the share of this function in total benefit spending has increased 
considerably, by 3.7 percentage points or more. The share of old age/survivors has remained 
virtually  stable  or  decreased  in  many  countries,  particularly  in  Luxembourg  (down  6.6 
percentage  points,  which  have  been  shifted  to  the  family/maternity  and  housing/social 
exclusion  functions),  but  has  increased  by  around  3  percentage  points  in  Slovakia  and 
Finland.  
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2.3.  The age orientation of social protection expenditure 
The  changes  observed  in  the  above  section  may  be  the  result  of  changing  needs  and 
demographic developments as much as a reflection of social protection reforms. The analysis 
that follows represents an attempt to throw light on the relationship between transfers and 
recipients for two types of social expenditure – expenditure geared to the elderly, on the one 
hand, and spending on families and children, on the other – by using estimates of the number 
of people potentially eligible for benefits, in the sense that they fall into the category of those 
at risk or in need. It must be emphasised from the outset that, given the lack of appropriate 
data on the number of people in receipt of benefits under the headings examined, this analysis 
is tentative and at best only indicative of the determinants of social protection expenditure. 
In Panel A of Figure 2.6, spending on the elderly is considered in the light of evidence of the 
age structure of the population, thus attempting to differentiate between the generosity of 
benefits for this population group and the relative numbers of people of (effective) retirement 
age – taken as those aged 60 years and over in all countries. In addition to spending on the old 
age  function,  all  expenditure  (in  cash  and  in  kind)  on  survivors'
17  and  early  retirement 
benefits
18 is considered as spending geared towards the elderly. 
Box 2.3 : Age-related expenditure projections 
In 2003, the ECOFIN Council gave the Economic Policy Committee (EPC) the mandate to produce a 
new  set  of  age related  public  expenditure  projections  for  all  twenty five  Member  States  covering 
pensions,  health  care,  long term  care,  education,  unemployment  transfers  and,  where  possible, 
contributions to pensions/social security systems. The projections are intended to provide an indication 
on the potential timing and scale of budgetary challenges that could result from ageing population.  
The  projections  were  carried  out  by  the  Ageing  Working  Group  of  the  EPC  and  the  European 
Commission's Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs. They are made on the basis of 
a  common  population  and  labour  force  projections  and  agreed  common  underlying  economic 
assumptions  and  assuming  "no  policy  change"  –  i.e.  they  only  reflect  enacted  legislation  but  no 
possible future policy changes (although account is taken of provisions in enacted legislation that enter 
into force over time). They are also made on the basis of the current behaviour of economic agents, 
without  assuming  any  future  change  in  behaviour  over  time:  for  example,  the  assumptions  on 
participation rates are based on the most recently observed trends by age and gender. 
                                                 
17  Part of expenditure on survivors goes to younger people (orphans and young widow(er)s). However, it 
can  reasonably  be  expected  that  the  large  majority  of  this  expenditure  goes  to  the  elderly  and  it  is 
therefore included here. It is worth reminding that in the ESSPROS system, disability pensions paid after 
standard retirement age are in principle included under the old age function (see Box 2.1). Where it has 
been possible to implement this rule, the spending on the elderly considered in this exercise also includes 
disability pensions paid to them. 
18  In the ESSPROS system, early retirement benefits are included under the disability function, when they 
are paid out to "older workers who retire before reaching standard retirement age … as a result of reduced 
ability to work", and under the unemployment function, when they are paid out "due to unemployment or 
to job reduction caused by economic measures."  
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Compared to the previous exercise of public spending projections, carried out in 2001, this pension 
projection exercise is broader, going beyond public pensions to include statutory private pensions and, 
in some cases, occupational pensions as well as contributions and pension assets. Social security and 
other public pensions are broken down into two categories: old age and early retirement pensions (also 
including, in principle, disability and widow's pensions paid out to persons over retirement age); and 
other pensions (e.g. disability and survivors' pensions without any lower age limit). 
The figures on pensions for the base year 2004 were collected on an ad hoc basis through the national 
authorities, following common guidelines. As such, they are not directly comparable with ESSPROS 
figures, mainly because they do not include all occupational pension expenditure. The projections 
based on these figures were carried out by the Member States. 
As for health and long term care, the figures on public expenditure for the base year 2004 were 
collected from Member States but the projections were made by Commission services. They are based 
on the current institutional provision of services and on a prudent scenario taking account of the effect 
of ageing on the health status of elderly people and of the income elasticity of demand.  
Overall, ageing populations are projected to lead to significant increases in public spending in most 
Member  States  by  2050.  On  the  basis  of  current  policies,  total  age related  public  expenditure  is 
projected to increase by 3.4 percentage points of GDP, while expenditure on pensions, health and 
long term  care  alone  is  projected  to  increase  by  4.4  percentage  points  for  the  EU  and  over  10 
percentage points in some Member States
19. 
                                                 
19  See  Economic  Policy  Committee/European  Commission  (2006):  The  impact  of  ageing  on  public 
expenditure: projections for the EU25 Member States on pensions, health care, long term care, education 
and unemployment transfers (2004 2050), European Economy, Special Report 1/2006, available under: 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/european_economy/2006/eespecialreport0106_
en.htm.  
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Projected changes in public expenditure for pensions, health care and long-term care between 
2004 and 2030/50 (% of GDP) 
Level* Level* Level*
2004 2030 2050 2004 2030 2050 2004 2030 2050
BE 10.4 4.3 5.1 6.2 0.9 1.4 0.9 0.4 1
DK 9.5 3.3 3.3 6.9 0.8 1 1.1 0.6 1.1
DE 11.4 0.9 1.7 6 0.9 1.2 1 0.4 1
EL 5.1 0.8 1.7
ES 8.6 3.3 7.1 6.1 1.2 2.2 0.5 0 0.2
FR 12.8 1.5 2 7.7 1.2 1.8
IE 4.7 3.1 6.4 5.3 1.2 2 0.6 0.1 0.6
IT 14.2 0.8 0.4 5.8 0.9 1.3 1.5 0.2 0.7
LU 10 5 7.4 5,1 0.8 1.2 0.9 0.2 0.6
NL 7.7 2.9 3.5 6.1 1 1.3 0.5 0.3 0.6
AT 13.4 0.6 -1.2 5.3 1 1.6 0.6 0.3 0.9
PT 11.1 4.9 9.7 6.7 -0.1 0.5
FI 10.7 3.3 3.1 5.6 1.1 1.4 1.7 1.2 1.8
SE 10.6 0.4 0.6 6.7 0.7 1 3.8 1.1 1.7
UK 6.6 1.3 2 7 1.1 1.9 1 0.3 0.8
CY 6.9 5.3 12.9 2.9 0.7 1.1
CZ 8.5 1.1 5.6 6.4 1.4 2 0.3 0.2 0.4
EE 6.7 -1.9 -2.5 5.4 0.8 1.1
HU 10.4 3.1 6.7 5.5 0.8 1
LT 6.7 1.2 1.8 3.7 0.7 0.9 0.5 0.2 0.4
LV 6.8 -1.2 -1.2 5.1 0.8 1.1 0.4 0.1 0.3
MT 7.4 1.7 -0.4 4.2 1.3 1.8 0.9 0.2 0.2
PL 13.9 -4.7 -5.9 4.1 1 1.4 0.1 0 0.1
SK 7.2 0.5 1.8 4.4 1.3 1.9 0.7 0.2 0.6
Sl 11 3.4 7.3 6.4 1.2 1.6 0.9 0.5 1.2
EU-25 10.6 1.3 2.2 6.4 1 1.6 0.9 0.2 0.6
Pensions Health care Long-term care
Change from 2004  Change from 2004  Change from 2004 
 
NB: The EU25 averages are calculated excluding countries for which data were not available. 
Source: See footnote19 
As is to be expected, given that old age involves by definition a social protection need and 
reflecting the income replacement role of pensions, the elderly receive a higher share of social 
protection expenditure than the rest of the population. Spending per capita on the elderly, 
adjusted by the share of the elderly in total population, is more than twice that on the total 
population, with Cyprus, Malta and Poland recording much higher values – three times or 
more. Differences across countries reflect wide variations in effective retirement ages, the 
coverage  and  replacement  rates  offered  by  pension  systems,  as  well  as  the  time  spent 
receiving an old age pension. Where the old age orientation of social spending is very high, 
high pension and other old age related spending takes its toll on spending directed at other 
groups of the population, namely children and those with insufficient resources. 
The age orientation of social spending on the elderly has fallen between 2000 and 2003 in 
almost all countries, with the exception of Belgium and Portugal, the Slovak Republic and 
Poland. This certainly reflects the increase in employment rates of older workers (aged 55 64 
years) in recent years, which in the EU went from 36.6% in 2000 to 41% in 2004, partly as a 
result of reforms to pension systems.  
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Figure 2.6  The age orientation of social protection expenditure, 2000 and 2003 
Panel A.  Relative spending on old age
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1)  Social spending on old age, survivors' and early retirement benefits as a share of total social benefit 
spending, divided by the share of the elderly (aged 60 or more) in total population. 
Panel B.  Relative spending on children aged 0-14
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2)  Benefit spending on the family/children function as a share of total social benefit spending, divided by 
the share of people aged 0 14 years in total population.  
Source: Eurostat   ESSPROS database and demographic statistics. Data for Cyprus refer to 2002 instead of 2002. 
In Panel B of Figure 2.6, the generosity of benefits in the family/children function is assessed 
against the relative numbers of children (aged 0 14 years) in the total population. Benefit  
EN  49    EN 
spending  on  family/children,  adjusted  by  the  proportion  of  young  children  in  the  total 
population, is everywhere lower than social spending on the overall population; in 2003, in 
Spain, the Netherlands, Poland, Italy and Malta, it was even 30% or less of such expenditure, 
having increased only slightly since 2000 or even decreased in Poland and Malta. By contrast, 
Ireland,  Hungary  and  Luxembourg  devote  a  relatively  high  share  of  social  protection 
expenditure to children. Most countries, and particularly Portugal, Latvia and Ireland, have 
recorded an increase in the orientation of social protection expenditure towards children, no 
doubt as a result of improvements in family allowances and childbirth assistance benefits. 
This is reflection of the fact that the promotion of birth, help for families most in need and 
facilitating reconciliation of work and family life are becoming a central issue in national 
legislation policies. For the latter purpose, there is a growing concern in the Member States to 
encourage applications for childcare benefits from certain categories of parents, either through 
direct assistance or tax credits. For the reason mentioned in Box 2.1, however, this latter type 
of  measures  may  not  be  fully  taken  into  account  in  the  ESSPROS  database  (and,  more 
generally, in interpreting Figure 2.6 account needs to be taken of the comparability problems 
for the family/children function highlighted in section 2.2). 
Obviously, it is the education system that plays the most fundamental social role with regard 
to children, and the assumption inherent in social protection systems is that children's main 
resource is their parents' earnings from work. For these reasons, childhood is identified as a 
social  protection  risk  as  such  to  a  limited  extent  and  intervention  mainly  takes  place  to 
support families financially or through child care provision for small children not yet in the 
education system, primarily in order to encourage reconciliation of work and family life. 
2.4.  The poverty reduction function of social protection 
A high level of social protection expenditure alone cannot in general be taken to indicate a 
high  degree  of  social  protection.  A  more  in depth  quality  analysis  of  social  services  and 
delivery  systems  is  necessary  in  order  to  assess  the  extent  to  which  resources  are  used 
efficiently and social benefits perform their key redistributive functions. It is also necessary to 
take into account the role of private resources and services/benefits, and of informal solidarity 
links in ensuring adequate protection, in addition to those provided by public systems. 
In  particular,  the  extent  to  which  social  protection  systems  perform  social  redistribution 
towards low income groups, thus helping to reduce poverty risk, depends on the structure of 
social protection expenditure, including the degree to which it is (implicitly or explicitly) 
targeted on the most vulnerable sections of the population. This section attempts to explore 
the relationship between social protection expenditure and the poverty risk rate on the basis of 
the available evidence drawn from microdata. 
A  comparison  between  the  standard  at risk of poverty  rate  and  the  hypothetical  situation 
where social transfers are absent ceteris paribus shows that such transfers have an important 
redistributive effect that helps reduce the number of people who are at risk of poverty. In the 
absence of all social transfers, the average poverty risk for EU Member States would be 
considerably higher than it is in reality, by the order of 25 percentage points (average pre 
transfer risk rate of 42% instead of the post transfer value of 16%   see Chapter I and Annex 
I). The status of pensions is however rather different from that of other transfers, as their 
primary role is not only to redistribute resources across income groups but also, or primarily,  
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over  the  life cycle  of  individuals  and/or  across  generations.  If,  therefore,  pensions  are 
considered as primary income rather than social transfers, the pre transfer poverty risk rate 
would be 26% on average in the EU. 
Figure 2.7 shows the percentage drop (in absolute value) of the at risk of poverty rate allowed 
by social transfers, both excluding and including pensions from the notion of "social cash 
transfers".
20  
Figure 2.7  The impact of social transfers (including and excluding pensions) on the 
at-risk-of-poverty rate, 2003
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1) Czech Republic: 2002. Data for Slovakia are provisional. 
Countries are ranked by the % drop of the at risk of poverty rate allowed by social transfers other than 
pensions. 
Source: Eurostat. See Chapter I and Annex I for more detail. 
The  poverty reducing  effect  of  social  transfers,  both  with  and  without  taking  account  of 
pensions, is particularly evident in the Czech Republic, Finland, Sweden and Denmark, where 
all social transfers reduce poverty by three fourths or more. In the remaining countries, the 
poverty risk reducing impact of social transfers depends on whether pensions are considered 
as  social  transfers  or  primary  income.  In  Greece  and  Italy,  there  is  a  marked  difference 
between the two situations: when pensions are considered as primary income, social transfers 
reduce the number of those with an income below the poverty risk threshold by less than 
20%.  By  contrast,  in  Ireland,  pensions  do  not  appear  to  have  a  decisive  impact  on  the 
reduction of poverty. To some extent, these patterns reflect the emphasis that Member States 
                                                 
20  In each country, these rates are calculated with the same threshold, namely the nationally defined 60% 
threshold calculated on the basis of total household income, i.e. including all social transfers.  
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place on the various functions of social protection, as reflected in the structure of expenditure 
(Table 2.2): in Italy and, to a lesser extent, Greece, expenditure on old age takes its toll on 
other forms of social expenditure, whereas in Ireland old age and survivors represented, in 
2003, less than one fourth of total expenditure. 
The impact of social cash transfers on the poverty risk rate differs across age groups. Figure 
2.8 illustrates the percentage drop in the poverty risk rate for children aged 0 15 years allowed 
by social transfers (excluding pensions). In the Nordic countries, the drop in the poverty risk 
rate for children allowed for by social transfers other than pensions was as high as 65% or 
more; on the other hand, in Greece, Spain and Italy, children are the group who benefit least 
from poverty relief allowed by social benefits (the percentage drop was of less than 20%). 
Figure 2.8  The impact of social transfers on the at-risk-of-poverty rate for children, 
2003
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1) Czech Republic: 2002. Data for Slovakia are provisional. 
Source: Eurostat. See Chapter I and Annex I for more detail. 
The indicator of poverty risk before social transfers must be interpreted with caution for a 
number of reasons. First, no account is taken of interventions that, like social cash transfers, 
can have the effect of raising the disposable incomes of households and individuals, namely 
transfers in kind as well as tax credits and tax allowances. Second, the pre transfer poverty 
risk is compared to the post transfer risk keeping all other things equal – namely, assuming 
unchanged  household  and  labour  market  structures,  thus  disregarding  any  possible 
behavioural changes that the situation of absence of social transfers would involve. Finally, 
social protection can provide relief from poverty but does not in itself help individuals and 
families durably elude poverty. If they are to be effective in combating poverty and social 
exclusion, social transfers in cash must be accompanied by adequate health care, education, 
social services and measures facilitating integration into the labour market for those capable 
of working. This is why  many Member States are increasingly focusing their policies on 
promoting  individual  self sufficiency  through  an  employment friendly  social  protection 
system that fosters participation in the labour market.  
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2.5.  Sources of finance 
Across the EU, social protection spending is to a large extent financed through contributions 
from wages paid by employers and employees, plus contributions paid by benefit recipients 
on benefit income. In 2003, social contributions accounted for 60% of all social protection 
receipts (Figure 2.9); general Government contributions financed through taxes represented 
37% of the total. The EU average masks large national differences in the structure of social 
protection  funding.  Denmark,  Ireland  and  Cyprus  finance  social  spending mainly  through 
general taxes; in the remaining countries, social contributions (either paid by employers or by 
employees) play a far more important role, up to more than 70% of total receipts in Latvia, 
Belgium, the Czech Republic and Estonia. Other receipts are relatively more important, with a 
share of 9% in the total or more, in Cyprus, Portugal, Greece and the Netherlands. 
Over the period 2000 to 2003, in the EU as a whole, the share of social contributions in total 
receipts has continued to decline, from 61% in 2000 to 60% in 2003. This fall was particularly 
evident  in  Ireland,  Poland  and  the  United  Kingdom.  On  the  other  hand,  the  relative 
importance of contributions increased over the period by more than 2 percentage points in 
Luxembourg, where it was counterbalanced by a decrease in the share of general Government 
contributions. 
Figure 2.9  The structure of social protection financing by source, 2003 
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Countries are ranked in ascending order by share of social contributions in total receipts. 
Source: Eurostat, ESSPROS database. Data for Cyprus refer to 2003.  
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CHAPTER III: FINANCIAL INCENTIVES TO WORK: A SOCIAL INCLUSION PERSPECTIVE 
3.  INTRODUCTION 
One of the key areas of reform aimed at supporting the general objective of the renewed 
Lisbon strategy to attract more people in the labour market is to ensure that work pays and 
that  the  underlying  incentive  structure  in  the  tax  and  benefit  systems  is  supportive  to 
employment. In Integrated Guideline No 19, Member States are asked to conduct a "continual 
review of the incentives and disincentives resulting from the tax and benefit systems, including 
the management and conditionality of benefits and a significant reduction of high marginal 
effective tax rates, notably for those on low incomes, whilst ensuring adequate levels of social 
protection". 
Indeed, strengthening incentives and support for labour market participation continues to be 
the main driver of many welfare and tax reforms in the Member States. The concern is to 
reduce reliance on social protection and increase self sufficiency by supporting labour market 
participation and "making work pay", that is, making work an economically attractive option 
relative to welfare. While of interest from a work incentive perspective, the design of welfare 
and  tax  systems  is  also  crucial from  a  social  inclusion  perspective.  In  reviewing  tax  and 
benefit  systems,  Member  States  also  need  to  make  sure  that  social  transfers  and  income 
support schemes for those who remain out of the labour market are effective in relieving 
poverty. Balancing the two goals of increasing labour supply incentives and at the same time 
alleviating poverty is a challenge for policy makers, who also have to take account of the 
budgetary costs that any tax and benefit reform may involve. 
It is therefore important to regularly assess both the financial consequences of labour market 
transitions and the degree of protection from poverty risk related to situations of joblessness. 
Indicators of financial incentives to work have been developed with the aim of identifying any 
adverse effect of taxes and social transfers on people's work decisions and conducting a prior 
assessment of the impact of ‘making work pay’ policies on household incomes, as well as the 
potential for further reform. The analysis that follows reflects on the use of such indicators in 
a  social  inclusion  perspective.  It  highlights  the  income  adequacy  aspects  related  to  these 
indicators  and  discusses  some  of  the  contextual  information  that  needs  to  be  taken  into 
account when interpreting them. 
3.1.  The scope of the analysis 
The evidence reviewed in this chapter looks at the impact of individual earnings' changes 
following employment transitions on total household incomes, in order to assess the financial 
gains resulting from these transitions. Three different types of transitions are considered: from 
unemployment to work; from inactivity to work; and a change in working hours or work 
effort  for  those  already  in  employment.  The  situations  where  these  transitions  are 
characterised  by  low  or  even  negative  financial  returns  are  commonly  referred  to  as  the 
unemployment trap, the inactivity trap and the low wage trap. Specifically: 
–  the term unemployment trap refers to the situation where out of work income for the 
unemployed (and their families), as provided by the tax benefit system, is high relative to 
net in work earnings;  
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–  the inactivity trap is a situation similar to the unemployment trap except that it applies to 
jobless people who are not or no longer eligible for unemployment benefit but receive 
social assistance and other income tested benefits. A situation where work does not pay 
may be brought about by minimum income or other income related benefits which are 
withdrawn upon taking up paid work; 
–  the low-wage trap is related not to a transition into work but to the financial consequences 
of increasing working hours or work effort for those already in work. The “trap” refers to a 
situation where an increase in gross earnings fails to translate into a net income increase 
that can be felt by the individual to be a sufficient return for the additional effort. 
Only  transitions  to  work  in  the  formal  economy  are  considered:  in  reality,  under  certain 
conditions, for individuals who are inactive or unemployed or are working only a limited 
number  of  hours,  the  choice  is  not  only  between  work  and  non work,  but  between  non 
employment, work in the formal economy, either part time or full time, undeclared work and 
a combination of these. 
The indicators are calculated as marginal effective tax rates (METRs), showing the share of a 
change  in  gross  earnings  following  a  labour  status  transition
21  that  is  taxed  away  by  the 
combined operation of taxes, social security contributions and withdrawal of social benefits 
(see Box 3.1). They are derived from a joint OECD EC project aiming to provide tools for 
assessing the impact of social transfers and fiscal policies on the incomes of employees and 
non employed working age individuals and their families and thus on financial incentives to 
work.  Model  results  are  used  for  calculating  relevant  policy  indicators  monitoring 
employment, social and fiscal policy developments across countries and to evaluate reform 
options. 
The impact of financial disincentives on labour supply – that is, the extent to which potential 
traps are actual ones – is an empirical question that is not discussed in this chapter. It is just 
worth mentioning here that the elasticity of labour supply to changes in the tax and benefit 
systems, as far as it can be determined, appears to vary between Member States and, within 
Member  States,  across  different  population  groups  depending  on  a  multitude  of  factors 
ranging from access to and availability of services to the conditions of national and local 
labour markets. Thus, financial incentives, as measured by the trap indicators, only partly 
explain labour market outcomes. Furthermore, to be effective in bringing more people into the 
labour  market,  policies  aimed  at  reducing  financial  disincentives  to  work  must  be  firmly 
embedded in a coherent and comprehensive policy package that acts on both the supply and 
demand side of the labour market. 
3.2.  Does work pay? An analysis of the evidence 
The text that follows focuses on individuals with low incomes and low wage potential. This is 
the  group  for  whom  decisions  on  the  most  appropriate  tax benefit  rules  raise  the  hardest 
policy dilemmas. If, on the one hand, low income individuals can potentially gain most from 
financially rewarding their entry to employment, measures to do so risk aggravating their 
economic hardship if labour demand for this segment of workers remains weak. 
                                                 
21  For all three traps examined in this chapter, the observed changes in net incomes are induced by jumps in 
earnings and not to marginal changes – ie. from 0 earnings to the specified level of earnings (expressed as 
a share of the APW level) in the unemployment and inactivity traps and from a low level of earnings to a 
higher one in the case of the low wage trap (with earnings changing by 33 p.p. of the APW) .  
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Box 3.1. Reading Tables 3.1 to 3.4 and Figures 3.1 to 3.4: methodological notes 
Marginal Effective Tax Rates measure the percentage share of any additional earnings following a 
labour status transition that is taxed away through the combined effect of any relevant tax benefit 
parameters. Formally, they are calculated as followed: 
METR = 1  ( ynet)/(  ygross) 
where  ygross are the additional gross earnings stemming from the new labour market status and  ynet is 
the change in net income obtained after taxes and benefits. 
The higher the value of the METR, the lower the financial incentive to work. Thus, for example, a 
value of 100 for the indicator shows that moving from inactivity to work leads to no additional net 
income. A value bigger than 100 indicates that net earnings in work are less than total out of work net 
income. 
The  benefits  that  are  taken  into  account  in  available  estimates  include  social  assistance, 
unemployment, housing, family and in work benefits.
22 Only cash benefits are taken into account; 
benefits in kind provided directly or by way of reimbursements, including reductions in prices or fares 
of essential services like transport, health care and culture, are not included. Where there is regional 
variation in the rates of some of the tax and benefit parameters used in the calculations, namely in 
social assistance and housing benefits, one of three alternatives has been chosen: the average of the 
different local regimes, the regime applying in a particular region which can be considered typical, or 
national guidelines. 
For the calculation of housing benefits, it is assumed that housing costs consist entirely of rent, and the 
level of rent for all family types regardless of income level and income source is 20% of the gross 
earnings of an average production worker. Albeit transparent and easy to understand, this is a very 
simple assumption and needs to be taken into account when interpreting the results. 
Any income taxes payable on unemployment benefits are determined in relation to annualised benefit 
values (i.e. monthly values multiplied by 12) even if the maximum benefit duration is shorter than 12 
months. 
The results shown in tables and figures of this analysis refer to four family types: a single person 
without dependants (which can be treated as the benchmark case), a lone parent with two children, a 
one earner couple with two children and a two earner couple with two children. Unless otherwise 
specified, children are aged 4 and 6 and neither childcare benefits nor childcare costs are included. For 
married couples, the second spouse is assumed to be inactive with 0 earnings in a one earner couple 
and to have full time earnings equal to 67% of APW in a two earner couple. In practice, in the case of 
unemployment and inactivity traps, the one earner married couple must be understood as a jobless 
household with one potential worker; the two earner married couple represents a couple with one 
worker and a potential second earner. 
                                                 
22  For a detailed methodological discussion of these indicators and the model underlying their calculation, 
see Carone, G., Salomäki, A., Immervoll, H. and Paturot, D. (2004), "Indicators of unemployment and 
low-wage traps (Marginal Effective Tax Rates on Employment Incomes)", European Economy Economic 
Papers No 197, European Commission, DG for Economic and Financial Affairs, Brussels, and OECD 
(2004), "Benefits and Wages – OECD Indicators", Paris.  
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Finally, the results shown do not take into account of existing minimum wage provisions, nor of the 
shape of the earnings distribution in each country. Results shown for people with low earnings in full 
time  employment  may  not  actually  be  relevant  if  employees  are  covered  by  minimum  wage 
legislation, whereby minimum wages are higher than the 50% or 67% of APW level. However, the 
results generally are still valid for part time workers. 
3.2.1.  The unemployment trap 
Unemployment  benefit  systems  are  intended  to  provide  income  security  during 
unemployment. By doing so, they can result in a better and more efficient match between 
workers and jobs as they allow individuals to spend more time on job searching. At the same 
time, unemployment benefits can reduce the financial incentives to return to work and thus 
lower job search intensity and result in benefit dependency if they are not carefully designed. 
In what follows, only some of the key parameters of the design of unemployment benefit 
systems, namely those determining amounts paid, are discussed; eligibility conditions are not 
discussed but it is recognised that they are key features that need to be taken into account in 
assessing making work pay strategies.  
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Table 3.1  Unemployment traps for unemployed persons returning to full-time work 
at two different wage levels
1, 2004 and changes 2001-2004 
Panel A. 2004 levels (%) 
moving to % of APW 50 67 50 67 50 67 50 67
Belgium  96% 88% 83% 79% 82% 76% 81% 77%
Czech Republic 79% 65% 71% 69% 97% 78% 78% 65%
Denmark 105% 89% 98% 89% 86% 89% 103% 92%
Germany 100% 87% 100% 93% 100% 84% 114% 98%
Greece 96% 76% 106% 83% 106% 83% 70% 56%
Spain 97% 80% 100% 79% 100% 78% 100% 81%
France 100% 82% 100% 90% 99% 90% 101% 82%
Ireland 88% 73% -3% 12% 94% 87% 59% 52%
Italy 67% 59% 63% 54% 63% 52% 84% 74%
Luxembourg 99% 85% 103% 88% 103% 104% 100% 82%
Hungary 77% 66% 86% 68% 86% 68% 80% 63%
Netherlands 93% 87% 90% 85% 92% 88% 86% 76%
Austria 87% 73% 98% 81% 100% 96% 88% 75%
Poland 99% 83% 83% 73% 100% 95% 85% 78%
Portugal 110% 87% 95% 97% 82% 82% 110% 85%
Finland 88% 80% 92% 86% 92% 94% 89% 76%
Slovak Republic 56% 43% 45% 34% 46% 31% 62% 47%
Sweden 105% 87% 103% 91% 100% 100% 105% 87%
United Kingdom 78% 71% 55% 64% 67% 73% 70% 61%
Two-earner couple, 2 
children
Single person, no 
children
Lone parent
One-earner couple, 2 
children
 
Panel B.  Percentage point changes between 2001 and 2004 
moving to % of APW 50 67 50 67 50 67 50 67
Belgium  -4 -1 -3 0 -5 0 -5 -2
Czech Republic 0 -2 -11 -1 -3 -11 -4 -9
Denmark -2 -2 3 -2 -1 -1 -3 -3
Germany 0 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Greece 9 7 9 7 9 7 -5 -3
Spain 0 1 4 1 4 -1 1 1
France -4 -5 -2 -1 -2 -1 -4 -5
Ireland 0 0 -8 -8 -1 -1 -7 -5
Italy -2 0 0 1 0 -2 4 4
Luxembourg -5 -3 -3 2 0 0 -5 -4
Hungary -7 -9 -2 -3 -2 -3 -5 -10
Netherlands 0 1 -1 -2 -1 -1 -2 -1
Austria -1 -2 -2 -1 0 -1 1 1
Poland 7 5 0 3 0 4 -7 0
Portugal -2 -1 -9 11 0 0 -2 -1
Finland -1 -1 -2 -2 -8 -5 -2 -2
Slovak Republic -37 -38 -61 -72 -60 -80 -23 -22
Sweden 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
United Kingdom -1 0 8 6 4 3 10 8
Single person, no 
children
Lone parent
One-earner couple, 2 
children
Two-earner couple, 2 
children
 
1.  Results relate to the situation of a person who has just become unemployed and receives unemployment 
benefits (following any waiting period) based on previous earnings equal to 67% of APW (full time work). 
Social assistance top ups and housing benefits are assumed to be available in either the in work or out of work 
situation where applicable. See Box 3.1. 
Source: Joint EC OECD project using OECD tax benefit models. 
Panel A of Table 3.1 shows that for an unemployed person previously employed at a wage of 
67%  of  average  national  earnings  (here  measured  as  the  average  earnings  of  a  full time  
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manual worker in the manufacturing industry – APW), taking up a new job at the same wage 
as before the unemployment spell would imply facing a marginal effective tax rate of over 
70% in almost all countries and for all four household types shown in the Table. This means 
that taking up a new job would increase net income by just 30% or less of the increase in 
gross earnings. There are notable exceptions to this pattern, and low METRs are found in 
countries  where  in work  benefits  are  in  place  (e.g.  Ireland,  the  United  Kingdom)  or  in 
countries  with  low  net  incomes  during  unemployment  (e.g.  Italy).  The  Slovak  Republic 
combines low social assistance benefits with their gradual phasing out if the recipient begins 
to earn income from work.  
With few exceptions, the financial rewards for taking up a job would be even smaller if the 
new job pays less than  before the unemployment spell: if the new job pays only half of 
average  national  earnings,  not  only  are  earnings  lower,  but  proportionally  more  of  the 
additional gross income generated by the new job would be taxed away as a result of the 
withdrawal  of  out of work  payments.  In  many  countries  –  Denmark,  Greece,  Germany, 
France, Luxembourg, Portugal, and Sweden – unemployed persons face marginal tax rates of 
100% or more – that is, entering a new job at a low wage would imply no net income gain or 
even a net income loss compared to the situation when out of work. 
Comparing across family types, the Table shows that unemployed people with a non working 
spouse and dependent children are faced with the highest METRs in several countries. This is 
due not only to the withdrawal of unemployment benefits but also to the phasing out of the 
additional social assistance payments to which this household type may be entitled to.  
Panel  B  of  Table  3.1  shows  percentage  point  changes  in  METRs  faced  by  unemployed 
persons between 2001 and 2004: for most countries the figures are negative, which shows that 
policy efforts to review tax and benefit systems to enhance financial incentives to work, as 
part of a wider policy package to make work pay, are bearing fruit. In most cases, reductions 
in METRs have been achieved through mechanisms that allow in work earnings to be topped 
up, rather than by reducing out of work incomes, notably by allowing beneficiaries to retain 
part of their benefits upon taking up work. In general, reforms of benefit systems aimed at 
getting beneficiaries into work tend to attach conditions with regard to active job search or 
participation  in  active  labour  market  programmes,  affecting  benefit  coverage  rather  than 
levels. However, in some countries, benefits have been increased by less than nominal wages, 
resulting  in  lower  replacement  rates  and  lower  METRs.  In  the  Slovak  Republic,  the 
remarkable reduction in financial disincentives to work stems in large part from the relatively 
low level of social assistance that is now offered following the welfare reform that came into 
force on 1 January 2004, together with the fact that social assistance is reduced less abruptly if 
the recipient begins to earn labour income.
23  
Figure  3.1  shows  what  happens  when  long term  unemployment  sets  in,  that  is,  when 
transitions to work occur after one year of unemployment or more. In about half the countries 
for which data are available, the 12th and 13th months of unemployment do not see any 
relevant  change  in  the  METR.  Even  after  five  years  of  unemployment,  the  financial 
disincentive to work remains considerable, with a METR above 60%, in many countries. This 
is the result of the fact that, in most Member States, unemployment and social assistance 
replace the unemployment insurance scheme after its expiry, often with more favourable tax 
                                                 
23  Brook,  A.  and  Leibfritz,  W.,  (2005) Slovakia's  introduction  of a  flat  tax  as  part  of wider  economic 
reforms, Economics Department Working Papers No 448, OECD, Paris.  
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treatment. By contrast, Greece, Italy, Hungary, Spain and Portugal see a substantial drop in 
the level of the indicator even after a short unemployment spell.  
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Figure 3.1  The unemployment trap for a single person over five years
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1)  In work  and  previous  earnings  are  equal  to  67%  of  APW.  Month  one  refers  to  a  transition  from 
unemployment to employment during the first month of benefit receipt, i.e. following any waiting period. For 
these charts, transitions from unemployment assistance have been treated as transitions from unemployment 
insurance  for  the  calculation  of  in work  income,  where  applicable.  Social  assistance  top ups  and  housing 
benefits are assumed to be available in either the out of work or in work situation where applicable. See Box 
3.1. 
Source: Joint EC OECD project using OECD tax benefit models.  
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An important assumption in the model underlying these calculations is that the unemployed 
person receives unemployment and related benefits for the maximum period to which he or 
she is legally entitled. This implies that the individual satisfies whatever requirements for 
actively seeking work are imposed throughout the period of legal entitlement. Should the 
price of refusing a job offer or discontinuing active job search be the (partial) withdrawal of 
benefits,  as  occurs  in  many  countries,  the  METR  would  obviously  decrease  by  the  same 
degree. On the other hand, long term unemployment may lead to a depreciation of skills and 
decreased employability, thus lowering the probability of re entering the labour market at the 
same wage as before the unemployment spell (as assumed in the calculations). If a lower re 
entry wage is assumed, financial incentives to work would be lower. For these reasons, the 
picture  depicted  in  Figure  3.1  is  somewhat  simplified.  However  it  provides  important 
information which allows assessing how and when financial incentives change over different 
unemployment spells. 
3.2.2.  The inactivity trap 
Table 3.2 shows the combined effect of tax and benefit systems on the financial incentives of 
entering low wage employment or part time work for inactive persons. The indicator is shown 
with respect to two entry wages (50% and 67% of APW) and four family types.  
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Table 3.2  Inactivity traps for inactive persons entering work at two different 
wage levels
1, 2004 and changes 2001-2004. 
Panel A.  2004 levels (%) 
moving to % of APW
Belgium  66% 66% 75% 66% 73% 66% 70% 67% 38% 45%
Czech Republic 66% 56% 71% 69% 97% 78% 44% 39%
Denmark 103% 88% 90% 95% 84% 90% 95% 92% 63% 61%
Germany 89% 79% 90% 85% 90% 76% 49% 49%
Greece 16% 16% 16% 16% 16% 16% 16% 16%
Spain 47% 42% 63% 52% 69% 54% 16% 19%
France 80% 58% 67% 87% 55% 81% 100% 54% 90% 28% 27%
Ireland 88% 73% -3% 45% 12% 94% 87% 30% 30%
Italy 14% 19% -10% 0% 0% -17% -4% -8% 39% 41%
Luxembourg 89% 76% 85% 83% 75% 84% 48% 40%
Hungary 51% 47% 51% 42% 51% 42% 13% 13%
Netherlands 93% 87% 83% 79% 93% 89% 40% 42%
Austria 87% 73% 98% 81% 100% 96% 22% 25%
Poland 70% 61% 54% 51% 100% 95% 47% 50%
Portugal 54% 45% 56% 55% 74% 70% 63% 50%
Finland 81% 75% 62% 63% 92% 94% 35% 36%
Slovak Republic 27% 28% 37% 35% 52% 42% 20% 22%
Sweden 98% 83% 68% 65% 100% 100% 37% 36%
United Kingdom 78% 79% 71% 55% 57% 64% 65% 67% 70% 73% 75% 60% 53%
50 67 50 67
Single person, no children Lone parent
One-earner couple, 2 
children
Two-earner couple, 2 
children
50 67 50 67
 
Panel B.  Changes 2001-2004 
moving to % of APW 50 67 50 67 50 67 50 67
Belgium  -5 -1 -2 1 -8 -2 -7 -3
Czech Republic -6 -7 -11 -1 -3 -11 3 -4
Denmark -2 -2 -1 -5 -2 -2 -4 -4
Germany 0 -1 0 0 0 0 -2 -2
Greece 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Spain -3 -1 -5 -6 -8 -10 4 4
France -3 -4 -1 -1 1 1 -6 -7
Ireland 0 0 -8 -8 -1 -1 1 1
Italy -3 0 1 2 2 -1 -5 -3
Luxembourg -3 0 -9 2 -13 -10 16 12
Hungary -4 -6 7 3 7 3 -9 -14
Netherlands 1 2 0 -1 -1 -1 5 5
Austria -1 -2 -2 -1 0 -1 2 0
Poland -2 -2 -29 -19 0 4 0 6
Portugal 3 3 0 0 19 14 26 20
Finland -5 -3 -3 -3 -8 -5 -2 -2
Slovak Republic -85 -68 -88 -86 -73 -83 -54 -39
Sweden 0 0 4 3 0 0 0 0
United Kingdom -1 0 8 6 4 3 6 5
Single person, no 
children
Lone parent
One-earner couple, 2 
children
Two-earner couple, 2 
children
 
1) Values in italics report METR values for inactive persons entering part time work at hourly earnings 
corresponding to the APW level, where they differ from METR levels faced by inactive persons entering full 
time work at 50% of APW. See Box 3.1. 
Source: Joint EC OECD project using OECD tax benefit models. 
METRs faced by inactive individuals considering taking up a job and who are not or no 
longer  entitled  to  unemployment  benefits  are  generally  lower  than  those  affecting 
unemployment to work  transitions.  This  is  to  be  expected  given  that  out of work  income 
support benefits on which these people can rely are lower than unemployment benefits. Still,  
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in many cases, the entry into a low paid job would result in an increase in net income of no 
more than 30 40% of the increase in gross terms. Greece, Italy and, to a lesser extent, Spain, 
Hungary and Portugal, are notable exceptions: in these countries, the absence or shortage of 
minimum income schemes
24 explains the very low level of METRs in these countries. In 
Ireland, METRs are also low, due to in work benefits to raise incentives to work for lone 
parents, whereas the combination of low out of work benefits and income supplements for 
workers explains the low inactivity METRs in the Slovak Republic.  
Across family types, METRs are generally higher for members of workless households with a 
dependent spouse and children (i.e. the one earner couple with two children), especially when 
entering a job that pays half the APW wage. METRs are close to or higher than 90% in 10 out 
of the 19 countries for which data are available: in these cases there is no or little pay off from 
taking up employment. This is mainly due to the withdrawal of social assistance benefits, in 
some  cases  in  combination  with  the  withdrawal  of  housing  benefits.  On  the  other  hand, 
employment, even if low paid (or, more realistically, a part time job that pays the hourly 
APW), appears to bring significant income gains to spouses whose partner is already working, 
by at least 40% of the additional gross income. 
The values in italics in Table 3.2 indicate the values of METRs for inactive people entering 
part time work, where they differ from the size of the financial disincentives related to a 
transition to a full time job paying the same monthly wage. In France and, to a lesser extent, 
Belgium, taking up a part time job that pays half the monthly rate of APW generates more 
income  than  working  full time  at  the  same  monthly  salary;  the  opposite  is  true  for  lone 
parents in Ireland, as well as in Denmark and Italy.  
Looking  at  changes  in  METRs  over  time,  between  2001  and  2004  (Table  3.2,  Panel  B), 
confirms the observations made above when looking at changes in unemployment traps, as 
virtually all countries record a reduction of METRs. The spectacular decrease of the inactivity 
traps in the Slovak Republic, already explained in the context of unemployment traps, shows 
up the strong financial disincentives to work that potential workers were faced with before 
welfare reform (in 2001, METRs for lone parents and one earner couples with children were 
above 120%).  
The case of the two earner couple with children can be seen to illustrate the case of potential 
second earners, normally women, who have to choose between staying at home and looking 
after  their  children  or  work  and  use  childcare  services.  While  the  availability  of  quality 
childcare services is essential to ensuring the participation of parents, especially mothers, in 
the labour market, childcare costs can be a major expenditure item for working parents. Such 
costs can, therefore, affect labour supply decisions of lone parents and second earners with 
low wage potential. In Table 3.3, OECD estimates of childcare fees (and benefits) have been 
incorporated  into  the  calculations  so  as  to  obtain  estimates  of  household  incomes  after 
childcare  costs,  assuming  that  households  where all  adults  are  employed  purchase  formal 
(centre based)  childcare  services  on  a  full time  basis  (whereas  families  with  at  least  one 
labour market inactive adult do not require any formal childcare). The calculations have been 
                                                 
24  In Greece, there is no universal guaranteed minimum income benefit, but a number of categorical social 
assistance benefits. In Italy, the experimental income support scheme adopted by some 300 municipalities 
out of 8000 for the whole country was terminated in 2004. In 2004, the Government had foreseen the 
introduction of a new scheme – the Last Resort Income   fully administered at regional level and co 
funded by the State and the regions. This scheme, however, has not been applied (for more details, see 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/social_inclusion/docs/2005/it_it.htm).  
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performed  with  respect  to  lone  parents  as  well  as  the  two parent  scenario.  The  available 
estimates  refer  to  2001/2002;  this is  why  the  values  of  inactivity  traps  in  the  absence  of 
childcare costs do not correspond to those shown in Table 3.3 (they are generally higher). 
Furthermore, the estimates of childcare fees depend on a large number of assumptions, and 
where fees are not uniform across institutions or regions, averages or typical fees are shown: 
they therefore need to be considered with some caution. The results shown in Table 3.3 can, 
however, usefully illustrate the important financial trade offs between work and staying at 
home faced by families with children. 
Once childcare costs are taken into account as work related expenses, taking up work pays 
consistently, and in some cases considerably, less than when they are not included in the 
calculation.  Low wage second earners in about half the countries for which estimates are 
available see more than 70% of their additional earnings consumed by childcare fees, taxes 
and reduced benefits. For lone parents, the payoff from employment can be even lower. The 
best example is Ireland, where a METR of 54% for lone parents (with two children, but with 
no childcare costs) shoots up to 131% when childcare costs are included. 
It must be kept in mind that it is assumed in the calculations that childcare services are always 
available, whenever parents decide to use them: this is unfortunately not always the case, and 
limited availability of good quality childcare services can represent a major barrier to work. 
Table 3.3  Inactivity trap at 67% of APW
1, with and without childcare costs 
Country and Year
Lone Parents, 
two children, no 
childcare
Lone Parents, 
two children, 
with childcare
Two-earner 
couple, two 
children, no 
childcare
Two-earner 
couple, two 
children, with 
childcare
Austria 2001 82% 95% 24% 63%
Belgium 2002 75% 82% 48% 73%
Denmark 2001 88% 93% 65% 85%
Finland 2001 66% 77% 38% 70%
France 2002 81% 107% 29% 59%
Germany 2001 85% 88% 51% 59%
Greece 2001 16% 21% 16% 29%
Hungary 2001 38% 67% 27% 80%
Ireland 2001 20% 131% 29% 101%
Netherlands 2001 80% 87% 38% 78%
Portugal 2001 55% 95% 30% 73%
Slovak Republic 2001 121% 141% 61% 82%
Sweden 2002 61% 64% 34% 41%
United Kingdom 2002 59% 69% 49% 82%  
1) Transitions are from non unemployment benefit recipiency to full time employment at 67% of APW. Both 
family types are assumed to have two children, aged 2 and 3, and are assumed to use, after transition, full time 
childcare in public or publicly recognised facilities, where applicable. Calculations for Finland, Hungary and the 
Slovak Republic include a benefit payable to parents who stay at home to look after their children. Information 
on childcare fees or benefits is incomplete or unavailable in Italy, Luxembourg, Spain, the Czech Republic and 
Poland. 
Source: Joint EC OECD project using OECD tax benefit models. 
3.2.3.  The low wage trap 
Supplementing workers' incomes is an obvious way to improve financial incentives to enter 
work  for  the  inactive  and  the  unemployed  without  cutting  social  benefit  levels.  Workers'  
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incomes  can  be  improved  through  the  tax benefit  system  in  a  variety  of  ways  (e.g.  by 
introducing  employment conditional  benefits,  disregarding  a  certain  level  of  earnings  or 
number of hours worked for fiscal purposes, or operating gradual benefit phase outs). The risk 
of these measures, however, is that they shift work disincentives to a higher income range. In 
fact,  due  to  the  combined  effect  of  increasing  taxes  and  withdrawing  benefits,  marginal 
effective tax rates at low earnings can be higher than at middle  and high income levels. As a 
result, for low income individuals who have a job, working longer hours or earning higher 
wages often entails little additional net income. 
In Table 3.4, the ‘low wage trap’ indicator is used to measure these disincentives for low 
income groups in the four different family types.  
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Table 3.4  Low wage traps for wage increases from two starting low wages, 2004 and 
2001-2004 
Panel A.  2004 levels (%) 
Income ranges:
Single 
person, no 
children
Lone parent
One-earner 
couple, 2 
children
Two-earner 
couple, 2 
children
Single 
person, no 
children
Lone parent
One-earner 
couple, 2 
children
Two-earner 
couple, 2 
children
Belgium  58% 57% 43% 59% 57% 57% 50% 55%
Czech Republic 33% 39% 57% 30% 28% 52% 54% 34%
Denmark 81% 72% 89% 58% 52% 62% 59% 43%
Germany 75% 86% 69% 50% 53% 52% 51% 52%
Greece 16% 16% 16% 16% 18% 16% 16% 16%
Spain 24% 18% 15% 19% 29% 26% 24% 29%
France 37% 59% 75% 22% 40% 40% 40% 32%
Ireland 47% 53% 74% 25% 30% 84% 48% 30%
Italy 29% 0% -12% 50% 42% 52% 60% 47%
Luxembourg 74% 94% 110% 14% 33% 14% 67% 20%
Hungary 32% 20% 20% 13% 39% 28% 28% 39%
Netherlands 76% 59% 79% 37% 47% 60% 64% 48%
Austria 47% 63% 92% 33% 45% 45% 45% 45%
Poland 65% 41% 91% 56% 35% 115% 47% 35%
Portugal 15% 92% 82% 12% 24% 20% 91% 23%
Finland 62% 60% 100% 32% 43% 59% 68% 43%
Slovak Republic 22% 25% 39% 31% 30% 29% 14% 30%
Sweden 66% 45% 100% 33% 36% 57% 52% 36%
United Kingdom 62% 77% 76% 51% 33% 73% 79% 33%
from 67 to 100% of APW from 33 to 67% of APW
 
Panel B.  Percentage point changes 2001-2004 
Income ranges:
Single 
person, no 
children
Lone parent
One-earner 
couple, 2 
children
Two-earner 
couple, 2 
children
Single 
person, no 
children
Lone parent
One-earner 
couple, 2 
children
Two-earner 
couple, 2 
children
Belgium  -9 -11 -9 -8 0 0 1 0
Czech Republic 6 1 23 17 -2 10 -13 3
Denmark 3 9 5 2 3 5 2 7
Germany 1 0 1 1 0 -1 4 0
Greece 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0
Spain -5 -1 8 -4 1 -4 -7 0
France 8 -6 -7 5 -3 4 4 -3
Ireland -1 5 1 0 0 -13 -8 0
Italy 0 -3 2 0 -2 3 -8 -1
Luxembourg -10 -17 0 0 3 0 -25 5
Hungary 6 -4 -4 21 1 12 12 1
Netherlands -3 8 5 0 -2 -10 -10 -3
Austria 4 2 -1 -5 -4 -2 -2 -4
Poland -9 0 -9 1 0 -57 -12 0
Portugal 0 -34 0 -1 0 -4 -40 0
Finland -5 1 -2 2 2 4 1 2
Slovak Republic 45 91 87 -9 -6 3 94 6
Sweden 0 -3 0 3 1 -1 -1 1
United Kingdom -1 -39 -25 -20 -1 2 -1 -1
from 67 to 100% of APW from 33 to 67% of APW
 
1)  Results show how much of a given rise in earnings is taken away in the form of higher tax and lower 
welfare benefits. In work benefits that depend on a transition from unemployment to work are not available since 
the person changing working hours is already in employment prior to the transition.  
Source: Joint EC OECD project using OECD tax benefit models. 
The effect of benefit withdrawal rules and their interaction with taxes can be significant for 
one earner families with children and for single parents. In several countries, on average, 
these family types are able to retain only a small share of the increase in gross earnings 
resulting from increased work effort.   
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In many countries, METRs for a jump in earnings from 33% to 67% of APW are higher than 
those  for  a  jump  in  the  higher  range,  reflecting  the  fact  that  most  income tested  social 
transfers  are  already  phased  out  in  the  higher  ranges  and  only  taxes  and  social  security 
contributions play a role. However, in countries where minimum income schemes are not in 
place or pay low amounts – i.e. Greece, Hungary, Italy and Spain – the low wage trap is low 
even in the first income range. 
The picture concerning changes in METRs between 2001 and 2004 (Table 3.4, Panel B) is far 
more mixed than in the case of unemployment and inactivity traps. This is evidence of the fact 
that accomplishing a substantial reduction of all three types of traps can prove a very hard 
task: either because the required measures would be inconsistent with other fundamental goals 
of the social protection system (namely, poverty alleviation), or because measures aimed at 
reducing one trap (e.g. through widespread use of in work benefits) could cause another type 
of trap to arise at a higher income level, not to mention the budgetary implications of such 
measures. Policy makers will have to make choices based on which goals and target groups 
are to be considered a priority and on a careful evaluation of the ensuing trade offs. In this 
context, it is important that measures to make work pay are closely monitored from both a 
labour market and a social inclusion perspective. 
In fact, this analysis has shown that, while of interest from a work incentive perspective, the 
relative  income  gain  following  a  transition  from  unemployment  or  inactivity  to  work,  or 
between two working situations, is also interesting from a social inclusion perspective. High 
METRs faced by people with low income potential, in any of the three transitions considered, 
illustrate  the  little  welfare  gain  resulting  in  taking  up  a  job  or  increasing  work  effort, 
especially if this involves having to bear costs for childcare services. Considering that for 
many of these people low paid jobs are often not a stepping stone to higher paid jobs, work 
may not appear an attractive option to them. The analysis in this chapter has also shown that 
when METRs are low, they hide low levels of protection offered to those who are out of 
work. 
3.3.  Do out-of-work benefits provide adequate incomes? 
Clearly, potential “traps” of one kind or another exist in all Member States. Does this mean 
that social benefit levels should be cut in order to improve financial incentives to work? Or 
rather, is there any scope for reducing financial disincentives to work through cuts in benefit 
levels? 
To answer this important question, the mechanics of tax benefit systems are examined relative 
to the at risk of poverty threshold, providing an additional perspective on the adequacy of 
social transfers and the payoffs from employment. Figure 3.2 compares net incomes of jobless 
households relying exclusively on social assistance benefits (and housing benefits) with the 
at risk of poverty threshold defined at 60% of the median equivalised household income, as 
measured on the basis of household surveys (see Chapter I and Annex I).  
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Figure 3.2  Net income of social assistance recipients – 2003 
As a % of the at-risk of poverty threshold for three jobless family types, including housing 
benefits. 
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Only countries where non categorical social assistance benefits are in place are considered.  
Source: Joint EC OECD project using OECD tax benefit models, and Eurostat (see Chapter I and Annex I). 
Countries differ substantially in terms of the minimum safety nets they provide to workless 
households
25,  even  when  comparing  them  relative  to  a  measure  –  the  at risk of poverty 
threshold     that  depends  on  the  living  standards  within  each  country  and  varies  itself 
considerably between Member States. Only a few countries provide workless households with 
a minimum income and related (i.e. housing) benefits that are sufficient to lift them close to or 
above the 60% of median income threshold, and this only with respect to some family types. 
So, for example, lone parents can receive benefit income at or above the poverty threshold 
level only in Poland, the United Kingdom, Germany, Denmark and the Netherlands; whereas 
in all countries but Poland, couples with two children relying on social assistance benefits 
would have disposable income levels below 60% of the median. In Hungary and Spain, all 
three family types are likely to experience deep poverty with out of work incomes below 40% 
of median income. 
As  specified  in  Box  3.1,  the  calculation  of  housing  benefits  relies  on  rather  strong 
assumptions,  which  may  be  particularly  unrealistic  in  some  countries.  For  example,  in 
Germany, housing benefits depend on the joint assessment of household characteristics and 
type  of  accommodation  rented:  the  assumption  of  a  uniform  rent  equal  to  20%  of  APW 
irrespective of the size of the household therefore looks improbable. Figure 3.3 compares net 
                                                 
25  This indicator reflects assumptions that households rely on social assistance benefits for the entire year, 
and that no other income stream (from other social protection benefits such as unemployment insurance 
or disability or from work) is available.  
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incomes  of  social  assistance  recipients  relative  to  the  poverty  threshold,  including  and 
excluding housing benefits. It refers to a married couple with two children. It shows that, if 
housing  benefits  are  excluded,  net  incomes  of  social  assistance  recipients  in  Germany, 
Sweden, Finland and the United Kingdom are much lower than if they are included. 
Figure 3.3  Net income of social assistance recipients – 2003 
as a % of the at-risk of poverty threshold for a jobless married couple with two children, 
excluding and including housing benefit. 
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Only countries where non categorical social assistance benefits are in place are considered. Countries are ranked 
by net income of social assistance as a % of the poverty risk threshold without housing benefits.  
Source: Joint EC OECD project using OECD tax benefit models, and Eurostat (see Chapter I and Annex I). 
On the other hand, even employment is not always sufficient to lift families out of poverty 
risk if it pays a low wage. In all countries except Poland and the United Kingdom, the net 
income of a one earner family with two children remains below the 60% threshold if the only 
worker holds a full time job paying the minimum wage (Figure 3.4). Lone parents holding a 
minimum wage job are in a better position in most countries but in this case childcare costs 
may greatly reduce the pay off from employment, as was shown in section 3.2. These results 
underscore the role of other measures – such as the provision of adequate childcare services 
that help ensure the participation of parents in the labour market – in minimising the poverty 
risk of workers with low wage potential. They also highlight that, in married couples with 
children, employment of both parents is essential to avoid poverty risk – even if in some cases 
(Spain, Luxembourg and the Slovak Republic) even two minimum wages are not sufficient to 
lift household members out of poverty risk.  
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Figure 3.4  Net income of minimum wage earners
1 – 2003 
as a % of the at-risk of poverty threshold for three family types with two children 
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1)  Only countries where statutory minimum wages are in place are considered. In the two earner case, 
both parents earn the statutory minimum wage. Household income is current cash income after tax and including 
child benefits, social assistance benefits and housing benefits where applicable. 
Source: Joint EC OECD project using OECD tax benefit models. For minimum wage rates: Eurostat and 
national submissions. 
These  results  are  partly  consistent  with  the  findings  derived  from  the  observation  of  the 
incidence of poverty risk by the work intensity of households, on the basis of micro data (see 
Chapter I and Annex I). People living in jobless households are clearly at a very high risk of 
poverty: on average in the EU 15 (for which data are available), the poverty risk rate for 
people in such households was as high as 68% where there were dependent children. At the 
other extreme, only 7% of individuals living in households where all working age adults are 
working a full year are at poverty risk. People living in intermediate levels of work intensity 
face intermediate risks of poverty.  
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3.4.  Context information 
The results presented in this chapter refer to a limited range of standard household types and 
earnings situations and assume full benefit coverage. But structures of household populations 
and patterns of benefit receipt vary substantially across countries. It is therefore important to 
provide contextual information that can help in the interpretation of results across countries. 
Two recent OECD reports
26 prepared in the context of the joint EC OECD project try to shed 
light on this issue. Much of the evidence discussed in this section draws from these sources. 
3.4.1.  Benefit recipients 
In the calculations, those becoming unemployed are assumed to be entitled to and in receipt of 
unemployment benefits which, in most countries, requires participation in certain job search 
activities and may depend on whether job losses qualify as involuntary. Where means tested 
benefits are included in the calculations, it is assumed that people do not have any assets that 
would make them ineligible and that they receive all the benefits to which they are entitled 
(i.e. there is full benefit take up). Clearly, coverage of the benefit system and the way it is 
operated are two crucial factors that are not captured by the trap indicators. For example, the 
imposition of sanctions can substantially modify the impact of unemployment traps in a way 
that  indicators  cannot  reflect.  Eligibility  conditions,  the  duration  of  benefits,  and  their 
coordination  with  active  labour  market  policies  (in  particular,  as  specified  in  Integrated 
Guideline No 19, job search assistance, guidance and training as part of personalised action 
plans, and early identification of needs), are very important features of the design of social 
protection benefits that need to be taken into account when interpreting the indicators. 
The  coverage  of  unemployment  and  other  benefits  varies  enormously  between  countries, 
reflecting  different  eligibility  rules  and  the  extent  to  which  eligible  individuals  apply  for 
benefits and administrative agencies grant access to them. Unfortunately, information about 
the  number  and  characteristics  of  beneficiaries  of  social  protection  benefits  is  not  easily 
available on a cross country comparable basis. Administrative records provide little or no 
information on the characteristics of benefit recipients and their households and are often not 
comparable across countries. On the other hand, survey information can suffer from under 
reporting or misclassifications. Evidence about the level of take up of welfare benefits is even 
more limited, as few  government agencies regularly  compile and publish data about how 
many eligible people take up welfare benefits. 
2004 data from Labour Force Surveys show that the coverage rates, i.e. the share of those 
reporting themselves to be unemployed and to be receiving unemployment benefits, range 
from  less  than  5%  in  Italy  to  over  70%  in  Belgium  and  Germany  (Figure  3.5).
                                                 
26  Immervoll,  H.,  Marianna,  P.  and  Mira  D'Ercole,  M.  (2004)  "Benefit  coverage  rates  and  Household 
Typologies: Scope and Limitations of Tax-Benefit Indicators", OECD Social, Employment and Migration 
Working paper No 20, Paris, and Immervoll, H., Marianna, P. and Hernanz, V., Malherbert, F., Pellizzari, 
M. (2004) "Take up of Welfare Benefits in OECD Countries: A Review of the Evidence", OECD Social, 
Employment and Migration Working paper No 17, Paris.  
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Figure 3.5  Share  of  ILO  unemployed  people  who  report  receiving 
unemployment benefits or assistance
1, 2000 and 2004 
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1) Countries differ in the exact wording of their questions relating to receipt of unemployment benefits 
or assistance. Such differences limit data comparability across countries.  
Source: EU LFS 
The pattern of benefit receipt also varies significantly by age and gender. Because of 
their shorter (or non existent) employment history, young people (aged 15 25 years of 
age) and women frequently do not have access to unemployment benefits and, when 
they do, the average amount of benefit paid to them tends to be lower. On average in 
the EU, only about 20% of the  young unemployed were receiving unemployment 
benefit in 2004, as opposed to 40% of those aged 25 years and above. Benefit receipt 
is  relatively  high  among  prime age  individuals.  The  selection  of  an  unemployed 
person who is assumed to be aged 40 and has been working without breaks from the 
age  of  18  therefore  introduces  a  generosity  bias  in  the  calculations  of  the 
unemployment trap.  
Furthermore, many individuals who receive unemployment benefits are not classified 
as unemployed in labour force surveys, but as inactive or employed (Figure 3.6). In 
some  countries  such  as  Belgium  and  Hungary,  the  proportion  of  unemployment 
benefit recipients who are classified as inactive is more than half the total number of 
recipients.  
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Figure 3.6  Share  of  persons  receiving  unemployment  benefits  or 
assistance
1 by labour force status, 2004 
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1) Countries differ in the exact wording of their questions relating to receipt of unemployment benefits 
or assistance. Such differences limit data comparability across countries. 
Source: EU LFS 
As  for  the  other  type  of  benefits  included  in  the  calculations,  household  income 
survey based evidence reviewed by Immervoll et al (2004)
27 reveals that on average 
in  the  countries  where  recent  data  are  available,  around  10%  of  non elderly 
households report having received social assistance and housing benefits where they 
exist.  Furthermore,  large  proportions  of  non elderly  households  supported  by 
unemployment related  benefits  also  receive  some  other  types  of  social  protection 
benefits  at  the  same  time.  Unemployment  benefits  are  most  often  combined  with 
housing, sickness and, to a lesser extent, social assistance benefits.
28  
3.4.2.  Representativeness of the household types 
All indicators are computed for a particular set of individuals and families whose 
characteristics, including age, previous employment record and housing costs, have 
been chosen to illustrate the most relevant mechanisms built into the tax and benefit 
systems rather than being representative of the underlying population. The particular 
circumstances  of  individuals  and  households  can  be  chosen  to  illustrate  policy 
relevant  situations,  such  as  lone  parenthood  or  low  wage  potential.  Furthermore, 
calculations based on household types that do not change over time provide a stable 
point  of  reference  and  are  therefore  an  essential  prerequisite  for  identifying  tax 
benefit  reform  priorities  (Immervoll  et  al.  2004).  However,  "stylised  household" 
calculations  cannot  be  used  to  address  essential  distributional  issues  such  as  how 
                                                 
27  Op cit, footnote 26. 
28  This analysis of  multiple benefit recipiency among  households supported by unemployment 
benefits excludes "non work related benefits" that are available on a quasi universal basis (e.g. 
family benefits)  
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many individuals are faced with particular tax benefit situations or what fraction of a 
population is likely to gain or lose from a specific policy reform, nor are they useful 
in measuring the budgetary cost of particular tax benefit reforms. 
It is useful to at least assess the degree of representativeness of the household types in 
the  calculations  of  tax benefit  indicators,  which  are:  single  persons,  lone  parents, 
married  couples  without  children  and  married  couples  with  two  children.  These 
family types cover a large share of the population in all the countries. In EU countries, 
on average, something close to 50% of non elderly households are either single or 
two adult  households,  with  or  without  children  (Table  3.5).  However,  there  are 
significant differences across countries in the relative numbers of each household type 
considered. Much the same can be said about the assumptions concerning earnings 
levels and hours of work. 
Table 3.5  The structure of private households by type, 2004 
Single 
adults, 
no 
children
- Under 
65
- 65 
years 
and 
over
Single 
parents
Two 
adults 
below 
65
Two 
adults at 
least 
one 
aged 
65+, no 
children
Two 
adults, 1 
child
Two 
adults, 2 
children
Two 
adults, 3 
or more 
children
Three or 
more 
adults
EU 28 16 12 4 16 13 9 10 3 16
BE 27 19 9 6 18 12 9 11 5 11
CZ 25 13 12 5 17 12 10 13 3 16
DK 33 27 6 4 24 11 8 10 3 7
DE 36 22 14 4 18 14 8 8 3 10
EE 25 18 7 6 15 11 11 11 3 17
EL 25 13 11 2 14 15 10 13 3 20
ES 16 7 8 2 13 14 12 13 3 29
FR 31 19 12 5 18 13 10 10 5 8
IE : : : : : : : : : :
IT 25 11 14 2 11 14 11 11 3 23
CY 15 8 7 2 15 14 10 13 8 24
LV 22 12 9 5 12 12 11 9 3 27
LT 24 11 13 5 10 11 11 11 3 25
LU 20 11 9 3 16 13 12 16 7 13
HU 25 12 14 4 15 12 10 11 4 19
MT 14 5 9 1 10 11 11 16 5 30
NL 32 21 12 3 22 11 7 10 4 12
AT 34 21 13 3 16 10 9 8 3 16
PL 19 9 9 4 12 11 12 12 5 26
PT 17 7 10 2 12 15 15 11 2 26
SI 23 11 13 3 13 13 10 10 2 25
SK 19 8 11 3 11 10 10 13 5 29
FI 34 26 8 2 20 13 7 7 4 14
SE : : : : : : : : : :
UK 31 18 13 7 19 12 7 9 4 12  
Source: EU LFS 
Given the large number of individual and household characteristics that influence tax 
and benefit liabilities and entitlements, indicators of the type presented in this analysis 
are  sensitive  to  the  choice  of  particular  circumstances.  While a  range  of  standard  
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household types does provide a good overall picture of many features of tax benefit 
policies, particular family types may be subject to other, and possibly significantly 
different, tax benefit rules. In order to be able to analyse these, it would be important 
not to concentrate on a limited number of household types and to allow for a different 
treatment of each country's particular situation. 
3.4.3.  Other  driving  forces  affecting  labour  supply  decisions  of  household 
members: long-term financial incentives and non-financial factors 
All calculations relate to current income and therefore do not take into account any 
longer term  effects  of  today's  labour  market  status  on  future  earnings,  pension 
entitlements, re qualification for unemployment insurance benefits, etc. This results in 
a rather short sighted view of the financial incentives potentially affecting the labour 
supply decisions of individuals. To the extent that individuals are aware of the future 
income implications of today's work and take them into account when considering 
their  labour  market  status,  it  would  clearly  be  desirable  to  allow  for  them  when 
considering work incentives. For example, by considering the implications of out of 
work  spells  on  future  pension  entitlements,  a  life course  perspective  of  the  trap 
indicators  could  analyse additional  aspects  of  the  financial  consequences  resulting 
from different employment patterns. Due to the difficulties inherent in implementing 
this  life course  approach,  such  an  extension  of  the  model  is  not  (yet)  foreseen. 
However,  for  groups  with  low  wage  potential  who  frequently  face  liquidity 
constraints and who may only be entitled to a minimum pension, current incomes 
may, in any case, often be the most immediate concern. 
In general, financial incentives as measured by the trap indicators examined in this 
chapter  constitute  only  one  element  in  the  labour  supply  decisions  of  individuals. 
Other important factors are at play in determining work attractiveness, such as the 
quality of work, the extent to which work and family life can be reconciled and access 
to quality childcare services. All these factors have to be considered in order to design 
a coherent and comprehensive policy package to make work pay. 
 
__________________  
 
ANNEX I  METHODOLOGICAL NOTES AND STATISTICAL TABLES  
 
ANNEX I.A.  THE  COMMONLY  AGREED  INDICATORS  OF  POVERTY  AND  SOCIAL 
EXCLUSION 
 
Background 
In December 2001, the Laeken European Council endorsed a set of 18 indicators of 
social exclusion and poverty, organised in a two level structure of primary indicators 
– consisting of 10 leading indicators covering the broad fields considered to be the 
most important elements leading to social exclusion – and 8 secondary indicators – 
intended  to  support  the  leading  indicators  and  describe  other  dimensions  of  the 
problem. 
After the Laeken European Council, the Indicators Sub Group has continued working 
with a view to refining and consolidating the original list of indicators. It highlighted 
the need to give children a special focus and, to this purpose, to have a standard 
breakdown by age of all the Laeken indicators, whenever relevant and meaningful 
(and  conditional  upon  statistical  reliability);  it  added  two  new  indicators,  in work 
poverty and reading literacy under performance of 15 year old pupils, and one new 
breakdown for the at risk of poverty rate by work intensity of the household. The ISG 
also  agreed  on  a  set  of  mandatory  guidelines  for  monitoring  the  social  inclusion 
situation of immigrants: it adopted a new indicator of employment gap of immigrants, 
whereby immigrants are defined on the basis of their "country of birth" (leaving up to 
each  Country  to  decide  whether  to  include  nationals  born  abroad  or  not,  as 
appropriate); and stipulated that this indicator needs to be supplemented by relevant 
available  national  data  covering  other  key  aspects  of  the  social  inclusion  of 
immigrants  (e.g.  in  the  form  of  breakdowns  of  other  inclusion  indicators  by 
migrant/non migrant).  
The  revised  list  of  commonly  agreed  indicators  of  social  exclusion  and  poverty, 
together with their definition and an indication of where a breakdown by age and 
gender is recommended, is included in the table below.  
  3 
The primary indicators of social exclusion and poverty 
 
  Indicat
or 
Definition  Age 
break-
down 
Gender 
break-
down 
Data 
source 
1  At risk of 
poverty 
rate  
Share of persons with an equivalised disposable income 
below 60% of the national equivalised median income. 
Equivalised median income is defined as the household's 
total disposable income divided by its "equivalent size", to 
take account of the size and composition of the household, 
and is attributed to each household member. 
Yes. 
Age 
groups: 
0 15; 
16+;   
16 24; 
25 49; 
50 64; 
65+ 
Yes 
(applying to 
people aged 
16 years and 
over). 
EU SILC/ 
Transitiona
l national 
data 
sources 
1
a 
Poverty 
risk by 
household 
type 
Poverty risk for the total population in the following 
household types: 
Households with no dependent children: 
  Single person, under 65 years old 
  Single person, 65 years and over 
  Single women 
  Single men 
  Two adults, at least one person 65 years and over 
  Two adults, both under 65 years 
  Other households 
Households with dependent children: 
  Single parent, 1 or more dependent children 
  Two adults, one dependent child 
  Two adults, two dependent children 
  Two adults, three or more dependent children 
  Three or more adults with dependent children 
Dependent children are individuals aged 0 – 15 years and 
16 – 24 years if inactive and living with at least one parent.  
Already 
specified 
in the 
typology 
of 
househol
ds. 
Already 
specified in 
the typology 
of 
households. 
EU SILC/ 
Transitiona
l national 
data 
sources  
1
b 
 
Poverty 
risk by 
the work 
intensity 
of 
household
s 
Poverty risk for the total population in different work 
intensity categories and broad household types.  
The work intensity of the household refers to the number of 
months that all working age household members have been 
working during the income reference year as a proportion 
of the total number of months that could theoretically be 
worked within the household. 
Individuals are classified into work intensity categories that 
range from WI=0 (jobless household) to WI=1 (full work 
intensity). 
No  No  EU SILC/ 
Transitiona
l national 
data 
sources  
1
c 
 
Poverty 
risk by 
most 
frequent 
activity 
status  
Poverty risk for the adult population (aged 16 years and 
over) in the following most frequent activity status groups: 
employment (broken down by wage and salary 
employment and self employment); unemployment; 
retirement; other inactivity. 
The most frequent activity status is defined as the status 
that individuals declare to have occupied for more than half 
the number of months in the calendar year. 
Yes  Yes  EU SILC/ 
Transitiona
l national 
data 
sources   
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  Indicat
or 
Definition  Age 
break-
down 
Gender 
break-
down 
Data 
source 
1
d 
Poverty 
risk by 
accommo
dation 
tenure 
status 
Poverty risk for the total population in the following 
accommodation tenure categories: 
  Owner occupied or rent free 
  Rented 
Yes  Yes 
(applying to 
people aged 
16 years and 
over). 
EU SILC/ 
Transitiona
l national 
data 
sources  
2  At risk 
of 
poverty 
threshold 
(illustrati
ve values)  
The value of the at risk of poverty threshold (60% median 
national equivalised income) in PPS, Euro and national 
currency for two illustrative household types: 
  Single person household 
  Household with 2 adults, two children 
No  No  EU SILC/ 
Transitiona
l national 
data 
sources  
3  Income 
quintile 
ratio 
(S80/S20) 
Ratio of total income received by the 20% of the country's 
population with the highest income (top quintile) to that 
received by the 20% of the country's population with the 
lowest income (lowest quintile).  
Income must be understood as equivalised disposable 
income.  
No  No  EU SILC/ 
Transitiona
l national 
data 
sources  
4  Persistent 
at risk of 
poverty 
rate 
Share of persons with an equivalised disposable income 
below the at risk of poverty threshold in the current year 
and in at least two of the preceding three years. 
Yes  Yes 
(applying to 
people aged 
16 years and 
over). 
EU SILC/ 
Transitiona
l national 
data 
sources  
5   Relative 
median 
poverty 
risk gap 
Difference between the median equivalised income of 
persons below the at risk of poverty threshold and the 
threshold itself, expressed as a percentage of the at risk of 
poverty threshold.  
Yes  Yes 
(applying to 
people aged 
16 years and 
over). 
EU SILC/ 
Transitiona
l national 
data 
sources  
6  Regional 
cohesion  
Coefficient of variation of employment rates at NUTS 
(Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics) level 2. 
Employment rates are calculated as the share of the 
population (aged 15 years or more) who are in employment 
(ILO definition).  
No  Yes  EU LFS 
7  Long 
term 
unemploy
ment rate 
Total long term unemployed population (≥12 months; ILO 
definition) as a proportion of total active population aged 
15 years or more. 
Yes  Yes  EU LFS 
8
a 
Populatio
n living in 
jobless 
household
s: 
children 
Proportion of children (aged 0 17 years) living in jobless 
households, expressed as a share of all children.  
No  No  EU LFS 
8
b 
Populatio
n living in 
jobless 
household
s: prime 
age adults 
Proportion of all people aged 18 59 years who live in a 
jobless household as a proportion of all people in the same 
age group. Students aged 18 24 years who live in 
households composed solely of students are not counted in 
neither numerator nor denominator. 
No  Yes  EU LFS  
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  Indicat
or 
Definition  Age 
break-
down 
Gender 
break-
down 
Data 
source 
9  Early 
school 
leavers 
not in 
education 
or 
training 
Share of persons aged 18 to 24 who have only lower 
secondary education (their highest level of education or 
training attained is 0, 1 or 2 according to the 1997 
International Standard Classification of Education – 
ISCED 97) and have not received education or training in 
the four weeks preceding the survey.  
No  Yes  EU LFS 
1
0 
 
Low 
reading 
literacy 
performa
nce of 
pupils 
Share of 15 years old pupils who are at level 1 or below of 
the PISA combined reading literacy scale 
No  Yes  PISA 
Survey 
OECD 
1
1 
Life 
expectanc
y  
Number of years a person aged 0, 1 and 60 may be 
expected to live. 
No  Yes  Eurostat 
demogra 
phic stat. 
1
2 
Employ 
ment gap 
of 
immigran
ts 
Employment gap of immigrants   i.e. "born abroad" (it is 
up to each Country to decide whether to include nationals 
born abroad or not, as appropriate) 
This indicator needs to be supplemented by relevant 
national data covering other key aspects of inclusion of 
immigrants.  
Possibl
y 
Yes  EU LFS 
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The Secondary Indicators of social exclusion and poverty  
 
  Indicator  Definition  Age 
breakdo
wn 
Gender 
breakdown 
Data 
source 
1
3 
Dispersio
n around 
the at 
risk of 
poverty 
threshold 
Share of persons with an equivalised disposable income 
below 40%, 50% and 70% of the national equivalised 
median income.  
Yes  Yes 
(applying to 
people aged 
16 years and 
over). 
EU SILC/ 
Transition
al national 
data 
sources  
1
4 
At risk 
of poverty 
rate 
anchored 
at a 
moment 
in time 
In year t, share of persons with an equivalised disposable 
income below the at risk of poverty threshold in year t-3, 
uprated by inflation over the three years. 
Yes  Yes 
(applying to 
people aged 
16 years and 
over). 
EU SILC/ 
Transition
al national 
data 
sources  
1
5 
At risk 
of poverty 
rate 
before 
social 
cash 
transfers 
Relative at risk of poverty rate where equivalised income is 
calculated as follows: 
  excluding all social cash transfers 
  including retirement and survivors pensions and excluding 
all other social cash transfers. 
  including all social cash transfers (= indicator 1) 
The same at risk of poverty threshold is used for the three 
statistics, and is set at 60% of the national median 
equivalised disposable income (after social cash transfers). 
Yes  Yes 
(applying to 
people aged 
16 years and 
over). 
EU SILC/ 
Transition
al national 
data 
sources  
1
6 
Gini 
coefficien
t 
Summary measure of the cumulative share of equivalised 
income accounted for by the cumulative percentages of the 
number of individuals. 
Its value ranges from 0% (complete equality) to 100% 
(complete inequality). 
No  No  EU SILC/ 
Transition
al national 
data 
sources  
1
7 
Persistent 
at risk of 
poverty 
rate (50% 
of median 
equivalise
d income) 
Share of persons with an equivalised disposable income 
below 50% of the national median equivalised income in the 
current year and in at least two of the preceding three years.  
Yes  Yes 
(applying to 
people aged 
16 years and 
over). 
EU SILC/ 
Transition
al national 
data 
sources  
1
8 
 
In work 
poverty 
risk  
Individuals who are classified as employed (distinguishing 
between wage and salary employment and self employment) 
according to the definition of most frequent activity status 
(indicator 1a) and who are at risk of poverty. 
This indicator needs to be analysed according to personal, 
job and household characteristics. 
Yes  Yes 
(applying to 
people aged 
16 years and 
over). 
EU SILC/ 
Transition
al national 
data 
sources   
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  Indicator  Definition  Age 
breakdo
wn 
Gender 
breakdown 
Data 
source 
1
9 
Long 
term 
unemploy
ment 
share 
Total long term unemployed population (≥12 months; ILO 
definition) as a proportion of the total unemployed 
population aged 15 years and over. 
Yes  Yes  EU LFS 
2
0 
Very long 
term 
unemploy
ment rate 
Total very long term unemployed population (≥24 months; 
ILO definition) as a proportion of total active population 
aged 15 years and over. 
Yes  Yes  EU LFS 
2
1 
Persons 
with low 
education
al 
attainment 
Share of the adult population (aged 25 years and over) 
whose highest level of education or training is ISCED 0, 1 
or 2. 
Yes. 
Age 
groups: 
 25 34; 
35 44; 
45 54; 
55 64; 
25 64; 
65 years 
and 
over.  
Yes  EU LFS 
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ANNEX I.B  INDICATORS OF INCOME AND LIVING CONDITIONS: DATA SOURCES 
EU-SILC 
In order to improve cross country comparability of the EU commonly agreed indicators, the 
Laeken European Council agreed upon common definitions as well as common data sources 
for their calculation. This principle has also been applied, whenever possible, to indicators in 
the area of adequate and sustainable pensions. 
The  income based  indicators  of  poverty  and  social  exclusion  as  well  as  pensions  were 
originally specified to be calculated on the basis of the European Community Household 
Panel survey (ECHP). This pioneering survey was developed in collaboration with Member 
States and was implemented on a gentleman’s agreement basis with effect from 1994; it was 
discontinued in 2001. The reference source of statistics on income and social exclusion is now 
data  collected  under  the  European  Survey  on  Income  and  Living  Conditions  (EU SILC) 
framework  regulation  (no.1177/2003).  Technical  aspects  of  this  instrument  are  developed 
through Commission implementing regulations, which are published in the Official Journal.  
The  EU SILC  project  was  launched  in  2003  in  six  Member  States  (Belgium,  Denmark, 
Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg and Austria). With effect from the 2005 exercise there will be 
complete  coverage  of  the  EU  and  some  neighbouring  countries.  Validated  cross sectional 
microdata covering all EU countries are thus expected to be available in late 2006.  
Compared to the ECHP income definition, the EU SILC total household gross and disposable 
income and the different income components were redefined to follow as closely as possible 
the international recommendations of the UN ‘Canberra Manual’. A key objective of EU 
SILC is to deliver timely, robust and comparable data on total disposable household income, 
total disposable household income before transfers, total gross income and gross income at 
component level (in the ECHP, the income components were recorded net). This objective 
will  be  reached  in  two  steps,  insofar  as  Member  States  will  be  allowed  to  postpone  the 
delivery of gross income at component level and of total household gross income data until 
after the first year of their operations. 
Although  certain  countries  (eg.  Denmark)  are  already  able  to  supply  income  including 
imputed rent   i.e. the money that one saves on full (market) rent by living in one’s own 
accommodation or in accommodation rented at a price that is lower than the market rent  , for 
reasons  of  comparability,  the  income  definition  underlying  the  calculation  of  indicators 
currently excludes imputed rent. This could have a distorting effect in comparisons between 
countries, or between population sub groups, when accommodation tenure status varies. This 
impact may be particularly apparent for the elderly who may have been able to accumulate 
wealth in the form of housing assets. In the tables of Annex III, data for Denmark are shown 
both with and without imputed rent, so as to provide an illustration of the impact of this 
income component on the results. Once imputed rent is taken into account, the at risk of 
poverty rate is reduced for people aged 65 years or more, the inactive other than pensioners 
and those living in owner occupied accommodation.  
Data sources used during the transition to EU-SILC 
During the transition to EU SILC, Eurostat is coordinating data collection on the basis of 
national  sources  for  those  countries  that  have  not  yet  launched EU SILC.  These  national 
sources have been harmonised as far  as possible with the EU SILC methodology. Whilst  
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every  effort  is  made  to  maximise  consistency  of  definitions  and  concepts,  the  resulting 
indicators cannot be considered to be fully comparable. For additional information, see the 
Eurostat working paper KS CC 05 006 EN N “Continuity of indicators during the transition 
between ECHP and EU SILC”.  
The  table  below  presents  the  different  sources  used  for  the  calculation  of  income based 
indicators of poverty and social exclusion used in this report and shown in the tables of Annex 
III. 
Country  Source  Country  Source 
BE  EU SILC 2004  LU  EU SILC 2004 
CZ
1  Microcensus 2003  HU  Household Budget Survey 2003 
DK  EU SILC 2004  MT
2 
  Household budget survey 2003  
DE  German Socio Economic Panel 
(GSOEP) 2004 
NL  Income Panel Survey 2003 
EE  Household Budget Survey 2003  AT  EU SILC 2004 
EL  EU SILC 2004  PL  Household Budget Survey 2003 
ES  EU SILC 2004  PT  EU SILC 2004 
FR  EU SILC 2004  SI  Household Budget Survey 2003 
IE  EU SILC 2004  SK  Extrapolations based on 
Microcensus 2003 
IT  EU SILC 2004  FI  EU SILC 2004 
CY  Family expenditure survey 2003  SE  EU SILC 2004 
LV  Household Budget Survey 2003  UK  Family resources survey 2003 
LT  Household Budget Survey 2003     
1) Data for the Czech Republic refer to income year 2002. 
2) The latest available data for Malta, referring to income year 2000, are shown in the statistical annex but they 
are not analysed in Chapter I of the Technical Annex.  
The reference year for the data is the year to which information on income refers (i.e., the 
"income year"), which in most cases differs from the survey year in which the data have been 
collected. Namely, 2003 data refer to the income situation of the population in 2003, even if 
the  information  has  been  collected  in  2004.  EU  aggregates  are  computed  as  population 
weighted averages of available national values.  
Limitations 
The limited sample size of certain data sources used for the collection of income data and the 
fact that data on disposable income are based on information provided by respondents, rather 
than from administrative registers or other sources, raises some concerns of data quality. This 
is particularly the case for information on income at the two ends of the income distribution. 
Furthermore,  household  surveys  do  not  cover  persons  living  in  collective  households, 
homeless persons or other difficult to reach groups.  
It must also be acknowledged that self employment income is difficult to collect, whatever 
the data source. And last but not least, it must be kept in mind that the difficulty to capture 
income  from  the  informal  economy  can  introduce  a  bias  in  the  income  distribution  as 
measured by surveys.  
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Finally, whilst it is considered to be the best basis for such analyses, income is acknowledged 
to be an imperfect measure of consumption capabilities and welfare as amongst other things it 
does  not  reflect  access  to  credit,  access  to  accumulated  savings  or  ability  to  liquidate 
accumulated  assets,  informal  community  support  arrangements,  aspects  of  non  monetary 
deprivation,  differential  pricing  and  other  aspects.  These  factors  may  be  of  particular 
relevance for persons at the lower end of the income distribution. The bottom 10 per cent of 
the income distribution should not, therefore, necessarily be interpreted as having the bottom 
10 per cent of living standards. This is why reference is made to the "at risk of poverty" rate 
rather than simply the poverty rate.  
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ANNEX IC.  STATISTICAL TABLES 
Table 1. Economic context
 
EU BE CZ DK DE EE EL ES FR IE IT CY LV LT LU HU MT NL AT PL PT SI SK FI SE UK
Growth rate of GDP at constant prices (2000)   percentage change over previous year
2004 2.4 2.6 4.7 1.9 1.6 7.8 4.7 3.1 2.3 4.5 1.1 3.9 8.5 7 4.5 4.6  1.5 1.7 2.4 5.3 1.1 4.2 5.5 3.6 3.7 3.1
2005 1.6 1.4 6 3.4 0.9 8.4 3.7 3.4 1.5 4.4 0 3.8 10.2 7.5 4.2 4.1 2.5 0.9 1.7 3.2 0.3 3.9 6 2.1 2.7 1.8
2006 f 2.1 2.1 4.4 2.3 1.2 7.2 3.4 3.2 1.8 4.8 1.5 4 7.7 6.2 4.4 3.9 0.7 2 1.9 4.3 0.8 4 5.5 3.5 3 2.3
GDP per capita in Purchasing Power Standards (PPS), (EU 25 = 100)
1995 100 120.4 68.3 122.9 119.4 33.3 70.3 86.8 113.5 97.8 116.4 80.8 29.3 33.5 174.2 48.6 : 117.2 125.9 40.4 75.1 67.7 43.7 104.1 116.5 107.7
2000 100 116.9 63.8 126.4 112.1 41.1 73.0 92.5 113.8 126.3 113.5 81.0 35.4 38.2 215.5 53.0 78.0 119.8 126.0 46.9 80.6 73.0 47.2 113.2 119.2 112.7
2004 100 118.4 70.3 121.8 108.7 51.2 82.0 97.6 109.3 137.1 105.8 82.8 42.8 47.8 226.2 60.1 69.2 124.4 122.7 48.8 72.4 79.1 51.9 112.3 117.4 116.2
2005 f 100 118.1 73.3 123.9 108.2 54.9 83.7 98.0 109.0 138.1 103.7 83.8 46.8 51.0 230.8 61.9 69.5 123.6 122.2 49.8 71.2 80.9 54.2 112.7 118.5 116.0
2006 f 100 118.1 75.0 124.3 107.5 58.0 84.7 97.9 108.3 139.5 103.1 84.6 49.6 53.2 235.0 63.3 68.4 123.4 121.6 51.0 70.0 82.6 56.1 114.2 119.3 115.9
General government debt   General government consolidated gross debt as a percentage of GDP
2000 62.9 109.1 18.2 52.3 60.2 4.7 114 61.1 56.8 38.3 111.2 61.6 12.9 23.8 5.5 55.4 56.4 55.9 67 36.8 53.3 27.4 49.9 44.6 52.8 42
2002 61.4 105.4 29.8 47.6 61.2 5.8 111.6 53.2 58.8 32.4 108.3 65.2 14.2 22.4 6.8 55.5 63.2 51.3 66.7 41.2 56.1 29.8 43.7 42.3 52.4 38.2
2003 63 100 36.8 45 64.8 6 108.8 49.4 63.2 31.5 106.8 69.8 14.6 21.4 6.7 57.4 72.8 52.6 65.1 45.3 57.7 29.4 43.1 45.2 52 39.7
2004 63.4 95.7 36.8 43.2 66.4 5.5 109.3 46.9 65.1 29.8 106.5 72 14.7 19.6 6.6 57.4 75.9 53.1 64.3 43.6 59.4 29.8 42.5 45.1 51.1 41.5
Employment growth - Annual percentage change in employed population
2002 0.5  0.2 0.8  0.2  0.6 1.3 0.1 2.4 0.7 1.8 1.8 2 2.3 4 3 0  0.7 0.5  0.1  1.9 0.5 1.6  0.5 0.9 0.1 0.8
2003 0.3  0.1 1.8  1.2  1 1.5 1.6 2.6  0.1 2 1.2 1.1 1 2.3 1.8 1.3  0.7  0.6 0.1  1.2  0.4  0.2 1.8 0  0.3 1
2004 0.6 0.6 0.1 0 0.4 0 4.1 2.6 0 3.1 0.9 1.5 1.1  0.1 2.6  0.7 1.4  1.4 0  0.3 0.1 0.4  0.3 0.3  0.5 1
2002 1.2 0.8 0.3  0.1 0.5 1.4 1.2 3.9 1.7 3.3 2.5 4.1 1.2 1.6 5.8 0.2 4.5 1.5 1.8  1.3 0.8 1.7  1.4 2.2 0.5 1.2
2003 0.7 1.2 1.6  2  0.3 1.3 2.5 4.6 0.4 2.7 1.7 2.1 0.5 1.9 10.5 2.1  0.7 0.3  0.2  1.2 0.4  0.8 1.8  0.2  0.3 0.9
2004 1.1 0.7 0.1 0.8 0.6 1.3 5.1 4.6 0.5 3.3 4.3  0.6 1.3  1.3 1.6  0.8  0.9  1 0.3  0.8 0.3 0.8  1.7 0.2  0.7 1.2
2002 0.0  0.8 1.1  0.3  1.4 1.1  0.5 1.5  0.1 0.7 1.4 0.5 3.3 6.5 1.4  0.1  2.8  0.3  1.7  2.3 0.2 1.4 0.2  0.2  0.2 0.4
2003 0.0  1 1.9  0.5  1.4 1.7 1.1 1.4  0.5 1.5 0.8  0.1 1.6 2.6  3.6 0.6  0.7  1.3 0.4  1.2  1.1 0.3 1.8 0.2  0.4 1
2004 0.1 0.5 0  0.6 0.2  1.4 3.5 1.4  0.5 2.9  1.2 3.5 1 1.1 3.2  0.6 2.4  1.7  0.3 0.2  0.1 0 0.8 0.4  0.4 0.8
f = forecast r = revised value e = estimate
Source: Eurostat, Structural indicators database
Total
Women
Men
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Table 2. Demographic context
EU BE CZ DK DE EE EL ES FR IE IT CY LV LT LU HU MT NL AT PL PT SI SK FI SE UK
Total population (in thousands)
1.1.2004 457189 10396 10212 5398 82532 1351 11041 42345 60200 4028 57888 730 2319 3446 452 10117 400 16258 8140 38191 10475 1996 5380 5220 8976 59700
1.1.2005 459488 10446 10221 5411 82501 1347 11076 43038 60561 4109 58462 749 2306 3425 455 10098 403 16306 8207 38174 10529 1998 5385 5237 9011 60035
Source: Eurostat   First demographic estimates.
Population growth rates (per 1000 population)
Average annual growth rate 1980 1990
Total increase  3.0 0.9 0.4 0.3 1.2 6.7 5.6 4.3 5.3 3.4 0.5 12.3 6.3 8.5 4.3  3.1 9.3 5.7 1.3 7.4 2.9 5.5 6.5 4.3 2.7 2.1
Natural increase  2.6 1.1 0.7  0.4  1.0 3.9 3.5 4.7 4.8 9.8 0.9 10.9 2.9 6.2 1.1  1.5 8.9 4.7 0.2 8.8 4.4 4.0 8.0 3.9 1.3 1.9
Net migration 0.3  0.1  0.2 0.7 2.2 2.8 2.1  0.4 0.5  6.4  0.3 1.4 3.4 2.3 3.2  1.6 0.4 1.0 1.1  1.4  1.5 1.4  1.4 0.4 1.4 0.2
Average annual growth rate 1990 2000
Total increase  2.8 2.9  0.8 3.8 3.9  12.6 7.7 2.9 3.8 7.7 0.4 20.6  10.7  4.9 14.3  1.5 7.9 6.5 4.7 1.6 2.0  0.4 2.1 4.0 3.9 3.8
Natural increase  1.1 1.5  1.2 1.4  1.1  3.3 0.3 0.9 4.1 6.3  0.3 8.2  4.4 0.5 4.5  3.6 6.3 4.5 1.0 2.0 1.0 0.2 2.7 2.8 1.4 2.1
Net migration 1.7 1.4 0.4 2.4 4.9  9.4 7.5 2.0  0.2 1.4 0.7 12.4  6.3  5.4 9.9 2.1 1.6 2.0 3.6  0.4 1.0  0.6  0.6 1.2 2.5 1.7
Average annual growth rate 2000 2004/5
Total increase  2.0 2.0  0.6 1.5 0.4  1.8 1.6 7.2 3.0 8.4 2.7 8.2  3.2  2.5 4.8  1.2 5.7 2.7 2.5  1.2 3.2 0.5  0.3 1.3 1.7 2.1
Natural increase  0.3 0.5  0.8 0.7  0.7  1.9 0.0 0.7 2.0 3.8  0.2 2.1  2.6  1.3 1.9  1.8 1.3 1.9 0.1 0.0 0.4  0.3 0.0 0.7 0.1 0.7
Net migration 1.7 1.5 0.2 0.8 1.1 0.0 1.6 6.5 1.0 4.6 2.8 6.1  0.6  1.2 2.9 0.6 4.5 0.9 2.4  1.2 2.8 0.8  0.3 0.5 1.5 1.4
Total fertility rate*
1970 2.3 2.3 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.2 2.4 2.9 2.5 3.9 2.4 2.5 2.0 2.4 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.6 2.3 2.2 2.8 2.1 2.4 1.8 1.9 2.4
1980 1.9 1.7 2.1 1.6 1.6 2.0 2.2 2.2 2.0 3.3 1.6 2.5 1.9 2.0 1.5 1.9 2.0 1.6 1.7 2.3 2.2 2.1 2.3 1.6 1.7 1.9
1990 1.6 1.6 1.9 1.7 1.5 2.0 1.4 1.4 1.8 2.1 1.3 2.4 2.0 2.0 1.6 1.9 2.1 1.6 1.5 2.0 1.6 1.5 2.1 1.8 2.1 1.8
2000 1.5 1.7 1.1 1.8 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.9 1.9 1.2 1.6 1.2 1.4 1.8 1.3 1.7 1.7 1.4 1.3 1.6 1.3 1.3 1.7 1.5 1.6
2004 1.5 1.6 1.2 1.8 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.9 2.0 1.3 1.5 1.2 1.3 1.7 1.3 1.4 1.7 1.4 1.2 1.4 1.2 1.3 1.8 1.8 1.7
Population structure by age (percentage of total), 2004
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
0 14 16 17 15 19 15 16 15 15 19 21 14 20 15 18 19 16 18 19 16 17 16 15 18 18 18 18
15 24 13 12 14 11 12 15 13 13 13 16 11 16 15 15 12 13 15 12 12 17 13 14 17 13 12 13
25 49 37 36 37 36 37 35 37 40 35 37 38 36 35 36 39 36 35 37 38 36 37 38 38 34 34 35
50 64 18 18 20 20 19 18 17 16 17 15 19 16 18 16 17 19 19 18 18 17 17 18 17 20 20 18
65 79 13 13 11 11 14 13 15 13 12 9 14 9 13 12 11 12 10 10 11 11 13 12 9 12 12 12
80 and over 4 4 3 4 4 3 3 4 4 3 5 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 2 4 3 2 4 5 4
* The total fertility rate is the average number of children that would be born alive to a woman during her lifetime if current fertility 
rates were to continue.
Source: Eurostat   Demographic statistics. 
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Table 2.  Demographic context (cont.) 
Average number of persons per household
2.5 2.5 2.5 2.2 2.1 2.6 2.6 2.9 2.3 : 2.6 3.0 2.8 2.9 2.7 2.6 3.1 2.3 2.4 3.0 2.8 2.6 3.1 2.3 : 2.3
2.5 2.4 2.5 2.2 2.1 2.5 2.5 2.9 2.4 : 2.5 3.0 2.7 2.9 2.7 2.6 3.1 2.3 2.3 3.0 2.8 2.7 3.1 2.3 : 2.3
Source: Eurostat   European Labour Force Survey, Spring results
Population living in private households by household type, 2005 (percentage of total population)
14.6 12.5 10.3 14.9 17.2 9.7 9.9 5.8 13.1 7.6 11.4 5.1 7.8 8.5 7.7 9.7 4.2 14.1 14.9 0.0 5.9 9.1 5.5 15.7 : 13.5
of which: :
  Single men 6.1 5.4 3.8 7.7 7.3 3.9 3.7 2.4 5.3 3.4 4.4 1.6 2.8 2.4 3.2 3.0 1.6 6.4 6.3 0.0 2.0 3.1 1.6 6.9 : 6.0
  Single women 8.5 7.1 6.5 7.2 9.8 5.8 6.1 3.4 7.8 4.2 7.1 3.5 4.9 6.2 4.5 6.7 2.6 7.8 8.6 0.0 4.0 6.0 3.9 8.9 : 7.5 :
  Under 65 8.8 7.7 5.3 12.0 10.6 6.7 5.4 2.7 7.8 4.1 5.2 2.8 4.5 3.6 4.3 4.4 1.6 9.3 9.6 0.0 2.4 4.2 2.3 12.0 : 7.9
  65 and over 5.9 4.8 5.0 2.9 6.5 3.0 4.5 3.0 5.2 3.6 6.3 2.2 3.3 4.9 3.4 5.3 2.6 4.9 5.3 0.0 3.5 4.9 3.2 3.7 : 5.6
4.5 6.6 4.6 4.9 4.4 6.4 1.6 1.9 5.3 3.4 2.0 2.1 4.8 4.2 3.3 3.8 1.8 3.5 3.8 0.0 2.5 2.3 2.4 2.4 : 8.4
14.4 14.1 13.6 21.7 16.9 11.5 10.3 9.2 14.7 11.4 9.1 10.3 9.6 6.8 12.1 11.5 7.1 18.6 13.8 0.0 8.4 8.9 7.3 17.8 : 16.7
11.5 11.3 9.6 9.7 12.9 11.0 12.5 9.3 10.9 6.6 11.0 9.5 9.2 7.2 9.7 9.4 8.3 9.7 9.2 0.0 10.3 8.8 7.1 10.3 : 10.6
14.9 10.3 13.5 6.3 9.7 11.6 20.0 23.0 7.2 25.8 19.2 15.5 17.4 11.7 9.3 14.6 21.3 10.9 14.1 0.0 19.8 21.7 17.4 13.0 : 11.3
12.4 10.5 12.5 10.2 11.5 14.3 11.2 12.2 12.4 6.8 13.3 10.6 11.0 10.7 12.6 11.4 10.1 9.2 11.0 0.0 16.7 10.9 8.7 9.6 : 9.6
17.1 16.9 20.0 17.8 14.3 16.1 18.6 17.3 18.9 10.8 17.2 16.8 10.8 15.4 23.0 15.8 18.4 16.6 14.2 0.0 15.7 17.0 15.9 13.2 : 13.8
7.4 10.0 5.5 8.2 6.1 5.5 5.4 4.1 11.0 9.9 5.2 12.3 4.9 5.8 12.5 8.1 8.5 8.3 5.9 0.0 4.0 5.0 8.7 9.0 : 7.7
12.4 7.8 10.4 6.4 7.0 13.8 10.5 17.2 6.5 17.6 11.7 17.9 24.6 29.6 9.7 15.6 20.2 9.1 13.2 0.0 16.7 16.3 27.1 9.0 : 8.4
EU aggregates based on available country data
Source: Eurostat   European Labour Force Survey 2003, Spring results. Annual averages for DK and FI.
  2 adults below 65, 
no children
  3 or more adults, no 
children
2004
2005
- Single parents
- Single adults, no 
children
  3 or more adults, 
  2 adults, at least one 
aged 65+, no children
  2 adults, 3 or more 
children
  2 adults, 1 child
  2 adults, 2 children 
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Table 3.  Labour market context 
EU BE CZ DK DE EE EL ES FR IE IT CY LV LT LU HU MT NL AT PL PT SL SK FI SE UK
Activity rates (% of population aged 15 64)
1998
Total 68 63.5 72 79.7 70.8 72.2 63.2 63 68.4 65.6 59 : 69.8 72.1 62.1 58.7 : 73 71 65.7 70.6b  68.2 69.3 72.3 76.2 75.4
Male 77.4 72.8 80 83.8 79.2 79 77.6 77.3 75.2 78.2 73.6 : 76.4 78.2 75.9 66.6 : 82.6 80.3 72.8 79.3b  72.6 77.2 75.6 79 83.2
Female 58.7 54 64 75.6 62.2 66.4 49 48.9 61.9 52.9 44.6 : 63.9 66.5 48.1 51.2 : 63.2 61.7 58.8 62.3b  63.6 61.7 69.1 73.5 67.4
2000
Total 68.7 65.1 71.3 80 71.1 70.2 63.8 65.4 68.7 68.2 60.1 69.1 67.2 70.8 64.1 60.1 58 75.2 71 65.8 71.4 67.5 69.9 74.5 77.3 75.4b 
Male 77.4 73.7 79.1 84.2 78.9 75.6 77.4 78.8 75.2 79.9 74.1 81.4 72.7 74.5 76.3 67.9 80.5 84.1 80.1 71.7 79.2 71.9 76.8 77.2 79.8 82.8b 
Female 60 56.4 63.6 75.6 63.3 65.3 50.5 52 62.4 56.3 46.3 57.7 62.1 67.3 51.6 52.7 35.2 66 62 59.9 63.9 62.9 63.2 71.9 74.8 68.2b 
2002
Total 69 64.8 70.6 79.6 71.7 69.3 64.2 66.2 69.1 68.6 61.1 71.2 68.8 69.6 65.2 59.7 58.5 76.5 71.6 64.6 72.7 67.8 69.9 74.9 77.6 75.2
Male 77.3 73.2 78.6 83.6 78.8 74.6 77.6 79.1 75.5 79.2 74.3 81.3 74.1 73.6 76.7 67.1 80.1 84.5 79.6 70.6 80 72.5 76.7 77 79.4 82.3
Female 60.7 56.3 62.7 75.5 64.4 64.4 51 53.1 63 57.8 47.9 61.8 63.9 65.8 53.6 52.7 36.7 68.3 63.7 58.7 65.6 63 63.2 72.8 75.8 68.3
2004
Total 69.7 65.9 70 80.1 72.6 70 66.5 68.7 69.5 69.5 62.7b  72.6 69.7 69.1 64.7 60.5 58.2 76.6 71.3b  64 73 69.8 69.7 74.2 77.2 75.2
Male 77.5 73.4 77.9 84 79.2 74.4 79 80.4 75.3 79.9 74.9b  83 74.3 72.8 74.8 67.2 80.2 83.9 78.5b  70.1 79.1 74.5 76.5 76.4 79.1 82
Female 62 58.2 62.2 76.2 65.8 66 54.1 56.8 63.9 59 50.6b  62.8 65.3 65.6 54.3 54 36 69.2 64.2b  57.9 67 65 63 72 75.2 68.6
Source: Eurostat   Labour Force Survey, Annual averages.
Employment rate (% of population aged 15 64)
1998
Total 61.2 57.4 67.3 75.1 63.9 64.6 56 51.3 60.2 60.6 51.9 : 59.9 62.3 60.5 53.7 : 70.2 67.9 59 66.8b  62.9 60.6 64.6 70.3 70.5
Male 70.6 67.1 76 79.9 71.9 69.6 71.7 66.8 67.4 72.1 66.8 : 65.1 66.2 74.5 60.5 : 80.2 77 66.5 75.9b  67.2 67.8 67.8 72.8 77.3
Female 51.8 47.6 58.7 70.2 55.8 60.3 40.5 35.8 53.1 49 37.3 : 55.1 58.6 46.2 47.2 : 60.1 58.8 51.7 58.2b  58.6 53.5 61.2 67.9 63.6
2000
Total 62.4 60.5 65 76.3 65.6 60.4 56.5 56.3 62.1 65.2 53.7 65.7 57.5 59.1 62.7 56.3 54.2 72.9 68.5 55 68.4 62.8 56.8 67.2 73 71.2b 
Male 71.2 69.5 73.2 80.8 72.9 64.3 71.5 71.2 69.2 76.3 68 78.7 61.5 60.5 75 63.1 75 82.1 77.3 61.2 76.5 67.2 62.2 70.1 75.1 77.8b 
Female 53.6 51.5 56.9 71.6 58.1 56.9 41.7 41.3 55.2 53.9 39.6 53.5 53.8 57.7 50.1 49.7 33.1 63.5 59.6 48.9 60.5 58.4 51.5 64.2 70.9 64.7b 
2002
Total 62.8 59.9 65.4 75.9 65.4 62 57.5 58.5 63 65.5 55.5 68.6 60.4 59.9 63.4 56.2 54.4 74.4 68.7 51.5 68.8 63.4 56.8 68.1 73.6 71.3
Male 71 68.3 73.9 80 71.8 66.5 72.2 72.6 69.5 75.4 69.1 78.9 64.3 62.7 75.1 62.9 74.7 82.4 76.4 56.9 76.5 68.2 62.4 70 74.9 77.6
Female 54.7 51.4 57 71.7 58.9 57.9 42.9 44.4 56.7 55.4 42 59.1 56.8 57.2 51.6 49.8 33.9 66.2 61.3 46.2 61.4 58.6 51.4 66.2 72.2 65.2
2004
Total 63.3 60.3 64.2 75.7 65 63 59.4 61.1 63.1 66.3 57.6b  68.9 62.3 61.2 61.6 56.8 54 73.1 67.8b  51.7 67.8 65.3 57 67.6 72.1 71.6
Male 70.9 67.9 72.3 79.7 70.8 66.4 73.7 73.8 69 75.9 70.1b  79.8 66.4 64.7 72.4 63.1 75.1 80.2 74.9b  57.2 74.2 70 63.2 69.7 73.6 77.8
Female 55.7 52.6 56 71.6 59.2 60 45.2 48.3 57.4 56.5 45.2b  58.7 58.5 57.8 50.6 50.7 32.7 65.8 60.7b  46.2 61.7 60.5 50.9 65.6 70.5 65.6
Source: Eurostat   Labour Force Survey, Annual averages.   
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Table 3.  Labour market context (cont.) 
Unemployment rate (% of labour force aged 15+)
1998
Total 9.4 9.3 6.4 4.9 8.8 9.2 10.9 15.3 11.1 7.5 11.3 : 14.3 13.2 2.7 8.4 : 3.8 4.5 10.2 5.2 7.4 12.7 11.4 8.2 6.1
Male 7.9 7.7 5 3.9 7.1 9.9 7.1 11.3 9.5 7.7 8.8 : 15.1 14.6 1.9 9 : 3 3.8 8.5 4.2 7.3 12.2 10.9 8.4 6.8
Female 11.2 11.6 8.1 6 11.1 8.3 16.7 21.9 12.9 7.3 15.4 : 13.6 11.7 4 7.8 : 5 5.4 12.2 6.4 7.5 13.4 12 8 5.3
2000
Total 8.6 6.9 8.7 4.4 7.2 12.5 11.3 11.4 9.1 4.3 10.1 5.2 13.7 16.4 2.3 6.3 6.7 2.8 3.6 16.4 4.1 6.6 18.7 9.8 5.6 5.4
Male 7.4 5.6 7.3 4.1 6 13.4 7.5 8 7.6 4.3 7.8 3.2 14.4 18.6 1.8 6.8 6.4 2.2 3.1 14.6 3.3 6.4 18.9 9.1 5.9 5.8
Female 10.2 8.5 10.3 4.8 8.7 11.5 17.2 16.8 10.9 4.3 13.6 7.8 12.9 14.1 3.1 5.6 7.4 3.6 4.3 18.6 5 6.8 18.5 10.6 5.3 4.8
2002
Total 8.8 7.3 7.3 4.6 8.2 9.5 10.3 11.5 8.9 4.3 8.6 3.9 12.6 13.5 2.8 5.6 7.7 2.8 4.2 19.8 5 6.1 18.7 9.1 4.9 5.1
Male 7.8 6.7 5.9 4.4 7.1 10.1 6.8 8.2 7.9 4.6 6.7 3 13.6 13.6 2.1 6 6.7 2.5 4 19 4.1 5.8 18.6 9.1 5.3 5.6
Female 10 8.2 9 4.7 9.4 8.9 15.6 16.4 10 3.9 11.5 4.9 11.4 13.4 3.8 5.1 9.9 3.1 4.4 20.7 6 6.5 18.9 9.1 4.6 4.5
2004
Total 9 7.9 8.3 5.4 9.5 9.2 10.5 11 9.6 4.5 8 5.2 9.8 10.9 4.8 6 7.7 4.6 4.8 18.8 6.7 6 18.2 8.8 6.3 4.7
Male 8.1 7.1 7.1 5.1 8.7 10.4 6.6 8.1 8.7 4.9 6.4 4.1 9.4 10.5 3.3 5.9 7.1 4.3 4.4 18 5.9 5.6 17.3 8.7 6.5 5
Female 10.2 8.9 9.9 5.7 10.5 8 16.2 15 10.5 4 10.5 6.5 10.1 11.2 6.8 6.1 9 4.8 5.3 19.8 7.6 6.4 19.3 8.9 6.1 4.2
2005
Total 8.7p  8.4p  7.9p  4.9p  9.4p  7.5p  : 9.2p  9.5p  4.3p  : 6.1p  9.1p  8.2p  5.3p  7.1p  7.9p  4.7p  5.2p  17.9p  7.3p  5.8p  16.5p  8.3p  6.3p  4.6p 
Male 7.8p  7.6p  6.5p  4.2p  8.8p  9p  : 7p  8.7p  4.6p  : 4.9p  9.4p  8.1p  3.8p  6.8p  7.1p  4.5p  4.8p  16.8p  6.4p  5.4p  15.7p  8.2p  6.4p  5p 
Female 9.7p  9.4p  9.8p  5.7p  10.1p  6p  : 12.2p  10.4p  3.9p  : 7.7p  8.7p  8.4p  7.5p  7.4p  9.7p  5p  5.6p  19.1p  8.3p  6.2p  17.4p  8.4p  6.3p  4.2p 
Source: Eurostat   Harmonised unemployment series, Annual average
Youth unemployment rate (% of labour force aged 15 24)
1998
Total 19.2 22.1 12.8 7.3 15 15.2 30.1 31.3 25.6 11.3 29.9 : 26.8 25.5 6.9 15 : 7.6 6.4 22.5 10.1 17.8 25.3 23.5 16.1 13.1
Male 17.4 20.2 11.5 7.1 12.3 16.7 21.7 25.1 23.3 11.6 25.4 : 27.4 30.1 6.5 16.6 : 7.4 5 20.2 8.1 16.9 26.5 22.8 16.4 14.8
Female 21.3 24.5 14.4 7.4 17.9 13.1 39.7 39.1 28.3 11 35.5 : 26 18.4 7.3 13 : 7.9 7.9 25.1 12.5 18.8 23.8 24.3 15.8 11.3
2000
Total 17.4 17 17.8 7 10.6 23.6 29.2 22.9 20.1 6.6 27 11.5 21.4 30.6 7.2 12.1 13.7 5.7 5.3 36.3 8.4 16.2 37.1 21.4 10.5 12.2
Male 16 14.7 18.5 7 9.4 23 21.6 17.6 18 6.4 23.1 7.1 21.2 32.3 6.6 13.1 14.9 4.9 4.7 34.6 6.3 14.9 39.9 21.1 11 13.3
Female 19 19.8 17 7.1 11.9 24.5 38.2 29.6 22.5 7 31.9 15.3 21.6 28.3 7.9 10.7 12.3 6.5 6 38.2 10.9 18 33.9 21.6 9.9 11.1
2002
Total 18.2 18.5 16.9 7.9 14.2 19.3 26.8 22.3 20 8 23.1 9.7 23.9 23.8 8.3 12 18.3 5 6.7 41.8 11.6 15.3 37.6 21 11.9 12.1
Male 17.3 18.9 16.6 9.3 13 15.6 19.9 18.5 18.9 8.8 19.4 9.3 22.4 22 6.8 12.6 18.4 5.2 6.4 40.9 9.7 13.8 38.8 21.2 12 13.7
Female 19.1 18 17.2 6.3 15.4 24.8 35.3 27.3 21.4 7 27.8 10 25.8 26.2 10.1 11.2 18.1 4.8 7.1 42.9 13.9 17.4 36.2 20.9 11.8 10.2
2004
Total 18.7 20.4 21.1 8.4 15.1 21.3 26.9 22.1 21.8 8.4 23.6 11.3 19.2 20.8 18.1 15.4 19 8 9.5 40 15.4 14.4 32.7 20.7 16.3 12.1
Male 18.2 18.9 22.3 8.6 15.3 21 19.1 18.7 20.8 8.9 20.7 10.3 14.9 22.1 13.6 15.4 18.8 7.9 9.3 38.8 13.6 11.7 34.4 22 15.7 13.4
Female 19.3 22.1 19.4 8.1 14.9 21.7 36.3 26.5 23 7.8 27.2 12.3 25.2 18.7 23 15.5 19.2 8.1 9.9 41.6 17.7 17.9 30.7 19.4 16.9 10.7
Source: Eurostat, Harmoonised unemployment series   Annual average 
  16 
Table 4.  Social Protection expenditure   
EU BE CZ DK DE EE EL ES FR IE IT CY LV LT LU HU MT NL AT PL PT SL SK FI SE UK
Total social protection expenditure (as a % of GDP)
1992 : 27.7 : 29.7 27.2 : 21.2 22.4 28.7 20.3 26.2 : : : 22.5 : : 31.9 26.9 : 18.4 : : 33.6 37.1 27.9
1995 : 28.1 17.2 31.9 28.2 : 22.3 22.1 30.3 18.8 24.8 : : : 23.7 : 17.5 30.9 28.9 : 21.3 : 18.7 31.4 34.6 28.2
2001 27.1 27.7 19.5 29.2 29.3 13.6 27 19.4 29.5 15 25.6 15.2 14.3 14.7 21.3 19.8 17.7 26.5 28.6 21.5 22.8 25.3 19.1 25.5 31.5 27.5
2003 28 29.7 20.1 30.9 30.2 13.4 26.3 19.7 30.9 16.5 26.4 : 13.4 13.6 23.8 21.4 18.5 28.1 29.5 21.6 24.3 24.6 18.4 26.9 33.5 26.7
Total social protection expenditure (in PPS per capita)
1992 : 4913 : 5404 4993 : 2343 2860 5076 2616 4473 : : : 5850 : : 5598 5172 : 2012 : : 5185 6063 4298
1995 : 5148 1835 6123 5260 : 2450 2931 5382 2862 4393 : : : 6468 : 1892 5658 5678 : 2465 : 1267 5109 6235 4696
2001 5576 6641 2637 7610 6731 1247 4084 3767 7006 4025 5825 2777 1093 1234 9302.6 2287 2669 7018 7289 2014 3789 3896 1924 6001 7501 6441
2003 6012 7476 2964 8115 7087 1411 4567 4186 7434 4814 6024 : 1174 1342 10905 2783 2879 7605 7700 2121 4076 4076 2063 6560 8258 6812
2002 data are provisional.
Source: Eurostat   ESSPROS database. 
  17 
Social protection benefits by group of functions (as a percentage of GDP)
Old age and survivors benefits
1995 : 11.4 6.6 11.7 11.6 : 11.2 9.4 12.5 4.8 15.2 : : : 10.3 : 8.8 11.1 13.2 : 7.9 : 6.9 10 12.8 11.6
2001 12.1 11.7 8.2 10.8 12.1 5.9 13.5 8.6 12.2 3.5 15.3 7 7.9 6.8 7.8 8.2 9.4 10.4 13.5 11.8 9.1 11.3 7.1 9.1 12.1 12.2
2003 12.3 12.6 8.2 11.1 12.4 5.9 12.9 8.5 12.6 3.7 15.7 : 6.9 6.3 8.7 8.6 9.5 10.6 13.8 12.4 10.5 10.8 7 9.7 12.9 11.6
Sickness, health care
1995 : 6.3 6.4 5.5 8.4 : 5.6 6.1 8.1 6.5 5.5 : : : 5.7 : 4.2 8.3 7.1 : 7 : 6 6.4 7.5 6.5
2001 7.3 6.3 6.6 5.8 8.1 4.3 6.8 5.7 8.2 6.1 6.4 4 2.7 4.3 5.3 5.3 4.4 7.5 7 4.1 6.3 7.7 6.5 6.1 8.1 7.3
2003 7.6 7.6 7.1 6.1 8.1 4.2 6.7 5.9 8.9 6.6 6.5 : 3 3.9 5.8 6.2 4.8 8.2 7.1 4.3 6.5 7.8 5.8 6.5 8.5 7.7
Disability
1995 : 2.4 1.4 3.3 1.9 : 1 1.6 1.7 0.9 1.7 : : : 2.9 : 0.8 3.7 2.5 : 2.3 : 1.2 4.6 4.2 2.9
2001 2.1 2.4 1.6 3.5 2.2 1.1 1.3 1.4 1.3 0.7 1.4 0.6 1.3 1.3 3 2 1 2.8 2.4 2.8 2.5 2.2 1.5 3.4 4 2.5
2003 2.1 1.9 1.6 4 2.3 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.4 0.8 1.6 : 1.1 1.3 3.1 2.2 1.2 2.9 2.4 2.6 2.6 2 1.6 3.5 4.6 2.4
Unemployment 
1995 : 3.5 0.4 4.6 2.4 : 1 3.5 2.3 2.8 0.7 : : : 0.7 : 0.9 2.9 1.6 : 1 : 0.6 4.4 3.7 1.5
2001 1.6 3 0.6 2.8 2.3 0.2 1.6 2.4 2 1.2 0.4 1 0.5 0.3 0.8 0.7 1.1 1.2 1.4 0.9 0.7 0.9 0.7 2.4 1.9 0.9
2003 1.8 3.5 0.8 2.9 2.5 0.2 1.5 2.6 2.3 1.3 0.5 : 0.4 0.2 1 0.6 1.2 1.6 1.7 0.9 1.2 0.7 1 2.6 1.9 0.7
Family and children
1995 : 2.3 2 3.8 2 : 1.9 0.4 2.9 2.1 0.8 : : : 3 : 2 1.3 3.1 : 1 : 2.5 4.1 3.9 2.4
2001 2.1 2.2 1.6 3.8 2.9 1.5 1.8 0.5 2.6 2.1 1 1.2 1.5 1.2 3.3 2.5 1.1 1.1 2.9 1.1 1.1 2.2 1.5 3 2.9 1.8
2003 2.1 2.2 1.5 4 3.1 1.3 1.9 0.6 2.6 2.5 1 : 1.4 1 4.1 2.7 1 1.3 3.1 1 1.5 2.1 1.5 3 3.1 1.8
Housing and social exclusion n.e.c.
1995 : 0.7 0.2 2.2 0.8 : 0.8 0.3 1.3 0.9 0 : : : 0.2 : 0.5 1.9 0.4 : 0.1 : 0.8 1.1 2.1 2.1
2001 0.9 0.4 0.6 1.7 0.7 0.4 1.3 0.4 1.3 0.8 0 1.1 0.2 0.5 0.7 0.7 0.3 1.6 0.5 : 0.3 : 1.3 0.8 1.3 1.7
2003 0.9 0.5 0.7 1.7 0.7 0.3 1.2 0.4 1.3 0.9 0 : 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.5 1.6 0.5 : 0.3 : 0.9 0.9 1.3 1.6
Social protection benefits by group of functions (as a percentage of total benefits)
Old age and survivors benefits
1995 : 43.1 38.8 37.7 42.8 : 52.1 43.9 43.5 26.5 63.4 : : : 45.1 : 51.4 38.0 47.2 : 41.1 : 38.1 32.8 37.5 43.1
2001 46.3 44.9 42.7 38.0 42.8 44.2 51.4 45.2 44.2 24.4 62.3 46.9 56.3 47.6 37.4 42.4 54.0 41.9 48.8 56.9 45.8 45.5 38.3 36.6 39.9 46.3
2003 45.7 44.5 41.3 37.2 42.9 44.8 50.8 43.8 43.3 23.2 61.8 49.4 53.1 47.4 37.2 41.3 52.3 40.3 48.2 58.5 46.2 45.0 39.4 37.0 40.1 44.9
Sickness, health care
1995 : 23.6 37.5 17.8 31.0 : 26.0 28.6 28.3 36.2 23.2 : : : 24.9 : 24.4 28.5 25.5 : 36.2 : 33.0 20.9 22.0 24.0
2001 27.9 24.2 34.6 20.3 28.5 31.9 25.8 30.0 29.7 42.2 26.1 26.6 19.1 30.1 25.6 27.6 25.5 30.4 25.4 19.8 31.3 31.4 35.0 24.5 26.8 27.6
2003 28.3 27.0 35.6 20.5 27.7 31.8 26.5 30.7 30.5 41.8 25.7 25.2 22.9 29.8 24.8 29.7 26.0 31.4 24.8 20.5 28.8 32.4 32.8 25.1 26.3 29.6
Disability
1995 : 8.8 8.2 10.6 6.8 : 4.8 7.4 5.9 4.8 7.0 : : : 12.7 : 4.8 12.6 9.1 : 11.8 : 6.8 15.0 12.2 10.9
2001 8.0 9.3 8.2 12.5 7.8 8.2 5.0 7.7 4.8 5.1 5.7 3.7 9.4 8.9 14.4 10.2 5.9 11.5 8.7 13.6 12.3 8.7 8.1 13.7 13.3 9.3
2003 8.0 6.6 8.2 13.5 7.8 9.3 5.1 7.4 4.8 5.1 6.4 3.8 8.5 9.7 13.4 10.3 6.5 11.1 8.6 12.2 11.5 8.2 8.9 13.3 14.2 9.4
Unemployment 
1995 : 13.0 2.3 14.8 9.0 : 4.5 16.5 7.9 15.3 3.0 : : : 3.1 : 5.0 9.9 5.8 : 5.3 : 3.5 14.4 10.8 5.6
2001 6.3 11.6 3.1 10.0 8.2 1.4 6.0 12.8 7.2 8.5 1.6 6.8 3.3 1.8 3.6 3.4 6.1 5.0 5.0 4.4 3.6 3.7 3.6 9.8 6.1 3.5
2003 6.6 12.4 3.9 9.8 8.6 1.8 5.7 13.3 7.9 8.4 1.8 5.7 3.2 1.8 4.2 2.8 6.7 6.2 6.0 4.0 5.5 3.1 5.8 9.9 5.9 2.7
Family and children
1995 : 8.8 11.8 12.4 7.5 : 8.8 2.0 10.0 12.0 3.2 : : : 13.1 : 11.8 4.6 11.2 : 5.2 : 14.0 13.4 11.3 8.9
2001 8.0 8.5 8.1 13.3 10.4 11.5 6.7 2.6 9.5 14.4 4.1 8.2 10.5 8.3 16.0 12.9 6.6 4.4 10.5 5.1 5.6 8.9 8.2 12.1 9.6 6.8
2003 8.0 7.8 7.5 13.2 10.5 10.0 7.3 3.0 9.0 16.0 4.1 8.0 10.8 7.9 17.7 13.0 5.6 4.9 10.8 4.7 6.5 8.6 8.3 11.5 9.5 6.9
Housing and social exclusion n.e.c.
1995 : 2.7 1.3 6.8 2.9 : 3.8 1.6 4.5 5.2 0.1 : : : 1.2 : 2.5 6.5 1.3 : 0.4 : 4.6 3.6 6.2 7.5
2001 3.5 1.6 3.3 6.0 2.4 2.9 5.1 1.7 4.7 5.3 0.3 7.8 1.4 3.3 3.0 3.5 2.0 6.8 1.7 : 1.3 : 6.8 3.3 4.3 6.4
2003 3.5 1.7 3.5 5.7 2.5 2.2 4.6 1.7 4.5 5.6 0.2 7.9 1.5 3.3 2.8 2.9 2.9 6.2 1.7 0.2 1.6 2.6 4.9 3.3 4.0 6.5
2003 data are provisional.
Source : Eurostat   ESSPROS database. 
  18 
Table 5.  Common indicators of social exclusion and poverty 
EU BE CZ
1  DK DK
2 DE EE EL ES FR IE IT CY LV LT LU HU MT
3 NL AT PL
At-risk-of-poverty threshold (illustrative values), PPP
  One person household 7716 s 8963 4382 i 9176 9224 9175 i 2352 i 6272 7254 8643 8502 7450 7822 i 2064 i 2298 i 15522 3722 i 5711 i 9869 pi 9630 2662 i
  Two adults with two dep. children 16204 s 18822 9202 i 19270 19370 19268 i 4939 i 13171 15233 18150 17854 15645 16426 i 4334 i 4826 i 32596 7816 i 11993 i 20725 pi 20223 5590 i
At-risk-of-poverty rate by age and gender
Incidence
  Total population 16 s 15 8 i 11 10 16 i 18 i 20 20 14 21 19 15 i 16 i 15 i 11 12 i 15 i 12 pi 13 17 i
  Children aged 0 15 years 20 s 17 15 i 9 9 20 i 20 i 20 24 14 22 26 11 i 19 i 17 i 18 17 i 21 i 18 pi 15 23 i
 
People aged 16 years and 
more 
Total 16 s 14 7 i 11 10 15 i 18 i 20 19 13 21 18 16 i 16 i 14 i 10 11 i 13 i 11 pi 12 15 i
Men 14 s 13 6 i 11 10 12 i 16 i 19 18 12 18 16 14 i 15 i 13 i 10 10 i 13 i 10 pi 11 16 i
Women 17 s 15 8 i 12 10 17 i 20 i 22 21 14 23 19 18 i 17 i 15 i 10 11 i 14 i 11 pi 14 14 i
  People aged 16 24 years Total 21 s 16 9 i 27 27 24 i 21 i 24 19 20 18 25 9 i 19 i 15 i 12 14 i 10 i 20 pi 13 21 i
Men 19 s 15 8 i 25 25 20 i 19 i 23 18 18 16 24 9 i 19 i 14 i 14 14 i 10 i 18 pi 11 21 i
Women 22 s 17 10 i 30 30 27 i 24 i 24 21 21 21 26 9 i 20 i 16 i 10 14 i 10 i 22 pi 15 20 i
  People aged 25 49 years Total 14 s 12 8 i 9 9 13 i 18 i 16 16 11 14 18 9 i 15 i 14 i 12 11 i 14 i 11 pi 11 17 i
Men 13 s 11 7 i 9 9 11 i 18 i 15 15 10 13 17 8 i 16 i 15 i 12 11 i 13 i 10 pi 11 17 i
Women 15 s 12 9 i 8 9 16 i 19 i 17 16 12 16 20 9 i 15 i 14 i 12 11 i 14 i 12 pi 12 17 i
  People aged 50 64 years Total 13 s 13 5 i 4 5 12 i 16 i 19 17 12 22 14 13 i 16 i 15 i 7 9 i 12 i 7 pi 10 11 i
Men 13 s 11 5 i 5 5 11 i 18 i 18 16 12 22 14 9 i 17 i 15 i 6 9 i 10 i 7 pi 9 13 i
Women 13 s 15 4 i 4 4 13 i 15 i 19 17 12 23 15 17 i 16 i 14 i 8 9 i 14 i 7 pi 11 10 i
 
People aged 65 years and 
more  Total 18 s 21 4 i 17 8 15 i 17 i 28 30 16 40 16 52 i 14 i 12 i 6 10 i 20 i 7 pi 17 6 i
Men 15 s 20 1 i 16 8 10 i 7 i 26 27 14 34 13 48 i 7 i 5 i 6 6 i 19 i 6 pi 13 4 i
Women 20 s 21 6 i 18 8 18 i 22 i 30 32 17 45 18 55 i 17 i 15 i 6 12 i 21 i 7 pi 20 7 i
Distribution of at-risk-or-poverty population
  Total population 100 s 100 100 i 100 100 100 i 100 i 100 100 100 100 100 100 i 100 i 100 i 100 100 i 100 i 100 pi 100 100 i
  Children aged 0 15 years 23 s 22 32 i 17 18 : 20 i 15 19 21 23 21 17 i 19 i 23 i 30 25 i 30 i 30 pi 21 30 i
 
People aged 16 years and 
more 
Total 78 s 78 68 i 83 82 : 80 i 85 81 80 77 79 83 i 81 i 77 i 70 75 i 70 i 70 pi 79 70 i
Men 75 s 77 64 i 82 80 : 77 i 83 78 78 75 77 78 i 77 i 74 i 68 71 i 66 i 68 pi 77 70 i
Women 79 s 80 71 i 84 83 : 83 i 86 84 81 78 81 87 i 84 i 79 i 71 79 i 74 i 72 pi 80 71 i
  People aged 16 24 years Total 15 s 12 14 i 24 28 : 17 i 13 11 17 14 13 8 i 15 i 14 i 12 14 i 9 i 18 pi 11 19 i
Men 15 s 13 14 i 23 26 : 19 i 13 11 17 14 14 9 i 17 i 14 i 63 16 i 10 i 17 pi 11 20 i
Women 14 s 12 13 i 25 29 : 15 i 12 11 17 13 12 7 i 14 i 13 i 10 13 i 8 i 18 pi 11 18 i
  People aged 25 49 years Total 31 s 29 35 i 29 33 : 34 i 30 31 28 22 37 19 i 33 i 35 i 41 33 i 31 i 34 pi 33 35 i
Men 32 s 30 33 i 32 34 : 36 i 30 33 28 22 37 19 i 37 i 39 i 39 34 i 31 i 33 pi 37 35 i
Women 31 s 28 37 i 26 31 : 32 i 29 30 28 22 36 20 i 31 i 32 i 42 31 i 31 i 34 pi 31 36 i
  People aged 50 64 years Total 14 s 15 12 i 8 9 : 15 i 17 13 16 20 14 14 i 18 i 16 i 10 16 i 16 i 11 pi 15 12 i
Men 15 s 14 14 i 9 10 : 17 i 17 14 16 22 14 11 i 18 i 17 i 9 15 i 13 i 12 pi 15 12 i
Women 14 s 16 10 i 7 8 : 13 i 16 13 15 18 14 17 i 18 i 16 i 11 16 i 19 i 10 pi 15 11 i
 
People aged 65 years and 
more  Total 18 s 22 7 i 23 12 : 15 i 26 26 19 21 16 42 i 14 i 12 i 7 12 i 14 i 8 pi 20 4 i
Men 14 s 20 2 i 19 10 : 5 i 22 21 16 18 12 40 i 5 i 4 i 6 6 i 12 i 6 pi 14 2 i
Women 21 s 24 11 i 27 14 : 22 i 28 30 22 24 19 43 i 21 i 18 i 8 18 i 16 i 9 pi 24 6 i
1) Data for the Czech Republic refer to income year 2002 
2) Including imputed rent. See methodological note for an explanation
3) Data for Malta refer to income year 2000, and they are not analysed in Chapter 1 of the Technical Annex. 
Source : Eurostat   See Annex IA. i = national source harmonised ex post for maximum consistency with EU SILC methodology.  p = provisional.  s = estimated by Eurostat.  u = result based on small sample (20 49 observations)   
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Table 5.  Common indicators of social exclusion and poverty (cont) 
At-risk-of-poverty rate by most frequent activity status and by gender and selected age group
Incidence
  Total Total  16 s 14 7 i 11 9 15 i 18 i 20 19 13 21 18 16 i 16 i 14 i 10 11 i 13 i 11 pi 12 15 i
Men 14 s 13 6 i 10 9 12 i 17 i 18 18 12 18 16 14 i 15 i 13 i 10 10 i 13 i 10 pi 11 16 i
Women  17 s 16 8 i 11 10 17 i 20 i 22 21 14 23 19 18 i 17 i 15 i 10 11 i 14 i 11 pi 14 14 i
  At work Total  9 s 4 3 i 5 5 9 i 10 i 13 11 5 7 10 6 i 9 i 10 i 8 6 i 6 i 6 pi 7 12 i
Men 9 s 5 3 i 5 5 6 i 9 i 14 12 6 7 12 6 i 9 i 10 i 8 7 i 7 i 6 pi 8 13 i
Women  8 s 4 3 i 4 4 9 i 10 i 12 9 5 6 7 5 i 8 i 10 i 8 5 i : 6 pi 7 10 i
* Wage/salary employees Total  : : 2 i : : : 9 i : : : : : 6 i 7 i 7 i : 6 i 6 i 5 pi : 8 i
Men : : 1 i : : : 8 i : : : : : 6 i 7 i 7 i : 6 i 8 i 4 pi : 9 i
Women  : : 3 i : : : 10 i : : : : : 5 i 8 i 7 i : 5 i : 5 pi : 6 i
* Self employed Total  : : 7 i : : : 16 i : : : : : 8 i 23 i 24 i : 10 i : 17 pi : 21 i
Men : : 7 i : : : 16 i : : : : : 8 i 26 i 25 i : 11 i : 17 pi : 21 i
Women  : : 6 i : : : : : : : : : 5 i 17 i 24 i : 9 i : 15 pi : 21 i
  Not at work Total  23 s 23 11 i 19 15 21 i 27 i 26 30 21 36 24 30 i 23 i 19 i 12 14 i 20 i 17 pi 18 18 i
Men 23 s 23 11 i 19 16 20 i 26 i 25 30 21 37 22 30 i 23 i 18 i 12 14 i 23 i 18 pi 16 19 i
Women  24 s 24 12 i 19 15 22 i 28 i 27 30 21 36 25 30 i 23 i 19 i 11 14 i 19 i 16 pi 19 17 i
*  Unemployed Total  42 s 28 36 i 33 34 46 i 49 i 31 40 34 44 49 22 i 51 i 40 i 46 37 i 52 i 42 pi 31 38 i
Men 46 s 29 39 i 34 35 50 i 49 i 34 50 41 49 54 31 i 52 i 42 i 48 39 i 58 i 42 pi 35 38 i
Women  37 s 27 34 i 32 33 41 i 49 i 29 33 26 31 44 12 i 50 i 36 i 42 34 i : 41 pi 26 38 i
* Retired Total  16 s 18 4 i 19 20 14 i 19 i 26 25 13 35 11 50 i 15 i 13 i 5 10 i 18 i 6 pi 14 7 i
Men 15 s 19 2 i 25 23 11 i 15 i 23 26 14 36 11 46 i 9 i 6 i 5 9 i 19 i 6 pi 11 7 i
Women  17 s 17 5 i 14 16 17 i 22 i 30 22 13 34 11 53 i 17 i 16 i 6 11 i 18 i 7 pi 16 8 i
* Other inactive Total  26 s 26 13 i 14 8 24 i 31 i 26 30 27 36 27 16 i 21 i 20 i 12 16 i 18 i 21 pi 21 21 i
Men 26 s 25 11 i 13 7 25 i 30 i 27 27 26 34 26 12 i 18 i 20 i 16 14 i 11 i 27 pi 21 21 i
Women  26 s 27 15 i 15 9 24 i 31 i 25 31 28 36 27 18 i 22 i 20 i 11 17 i 19 i 19 pi 21 21 i
Distribution of at-risk-or-poverty population
  Total Total  100 s 100 100 i 100 100 100 i 100 i 100 100 100 100 100 100 i 100 i 100 i 100 100 i 100 i 100 pi 100 100 i
Men 100 s 100 100 i 100 100 100 i 100 i 100 100 100 100 100 100 i 100 i 100 i 100 100 i 100 i 100 pi 100 100 i
Women  100 s 100 100 i 100 100 100 i 100 i 100 100 100 100 100 100 i 100 i 100 i 100 100 i 100 i 100 pi 100 100 i
  At work Total  27 s 14 22 i 26 30 : 28 i 32 26 21 17 25 20 i 28 i 38 i 44 27 i 20 i 33 pi 34 37 i
Men 36 s 20 28 i 33 37 : 34 i 46 40 25 24 41 28 i 37 i 46 i 55 37 i 38 i 41 pi 48 45 i
Women  19 s 9 19 i 19 24 : 24 i 20 14 17 12 12 14 i 22 i 32 i 34 18 i 4 i 27 pi 24 29 i
* Wage/salary employees Total  : : 14 i : : : 24 i : 15 : : : 16 i 21 i 21 i : 20 i 19 i 23 pi : 18 i
Men : : 12 i : : : 27 i : 22 : : : 20 i 24 i 24 i : 27 i 38 i 25 pi : 23 i
Women  : : 15 i : : : 22 i : 9 : : : 13 i 19 i 18 i : 15 i 4 i 21 pi : 13 i
* Self employed Total  : : 8 i : : : 4 i : 11 : : : 4 i 7 i 17 i : 6 i 0 i 10 pi : 19 i
Men : : 16 i : : : 7 i : 18 : : : 7 i 13 i 22 i : 10 i 1 i 16 pi : 22 i
Women  : : 3 i : : : 2 i : 5 : : : 1 i 3 i 14 i : 4 i 0 i 6 pi : 17 i
  Not at work Total  73 s 86 78 i 75 70 : 72 i 68 74 79 83 75 80 i 72 i 62 i 56 73 i 81 i 67 pi 66 63 i
Men 51 s 80 72 i 67 63 : 66 i 54 60 75 76 59 72 i 63 i 54 i 45 63 i 62 i 59 pi 52 55 i
Women  64 s 91 81 i 81 76 : 76 i 80 86 83 88 88 86 i 78 i 68 i 66 82 i 96 i 73 pi 76 71 i
*  Unemployed Total  12 s 16 32 i 31 38 : 19 i 8 14 14 8 16 3 i 28 i 15 i 9 15 i 14 i 19 pi 9 22 i
Men 14 s 19 41 i 31 37 : 24 i 8 16 20 14 19 6 i 38 i 21 i 12 20 i 25 i 18 pi 13 24 i
Women  12 s 14 26 i 32 39 : 16 i 8 12 10 3 14 1 i 20 i 11 i 7 12 i 4 i 20 pi 6 21 i
* Retired Total  17 s 25 13 i 6 7 : 29 i 27 18 25 15 12 53 i 24 i 20 i 7 33 i 22 i 11 pi 28 11 i
Men 21 s 29 5 i 8 8 : 19 i 30 28 27 26 15 54 i 11 i 7 i 10 26 i 29 i 9 pi 23 8 i
Women  21 s 22 18 i 4 6 : 35 i 25 10 23 6 9 53 i 33 i 30 i 4 39 i 16 i 13 pi 31 14 i
* Other inactive Total  37 s 45 32 i 37 25 : 24 i 33 42 41 60 47 24 i 20 i 27 i 40 25 i 45 i 36 pi 30 30 i
Men 24 s 32 25 i 28 18 : 23 i 16 17 28 35 24 13 i 14 i 27 i 24 17 i 7 i 32 pi 16 23 i
Women  47 s 55 37 i 45 32 : 24 i 47 64 50 79 65 32 i 24 i 27 i 55 31 i 77 i 40 pi 40 36 i
1) Data for the Czech Republic refer to income year 2002 
2) Including imputed rent. See methodological note for an explanation
3) Data for Malta refer to income year 2000, and they are not analysed in Chapter 1 of the Technical Annex. 
Source : Eurostat   See Annex IA and IB. i = national source harmonised ex post for maximum consistency with EU SILC methodology.  p = provisional.  s = estimated by Eurostat.  u = result based on small sample (20 49 observations) 
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Table 5.  Common indicators of social exclusion and poverty (cont) 
At-risk-of-poverty rate by household type
Incidence
 
Households without 
dependent children Total 15 s 14 4 i 14 12 14 i 17 i 20 19 13 24 14 28 i 15 i 13 i 8 9 i 12 i 9 pi 13 :
* One person households Total 24 s 21 13 i 24 21 23 i 33 i 29 39 19 55 23 50 i 25 i 24 i 13 18 i 25 i 18 pi 21 12 i
M en  22 s 18 13 i 25 22 20 i 29 i 20 28 18 49 17 31 i 21 i 29 i 13 18 i 17 i 20 pi 16 21 i
W omen 26 s 23 13 i 23 20 26 i 35 i 34 46 20 60 26 57 i 26 i 23 i 13 17 i 29 i 17 pi 25 9 i
Aged  < 65 yrs 22 s 19 16 i 26 26 23 i 32 i 21 23 20 39 21 25 i 21 i 25 i 15 17 i 24 i 24 pi 20 18 i
Aged  65+ 26 s 23 9 i 20 10 23 i 35 i 37 52 19 68 25 73 i 28 i 24 i 8 18 i 25 i 7 pi 23 7 i
* Two adult households Both < 65 yrs 10 s 11 3 i 5 5 8 i 13 i 14 12 9 19 11 12 i 14 i 12 i 7 8 i 11 i 6 pi 11 10 i
At least one 65+ 15 s 20 2 i 13 6 11 i 9 i 29 30 13 29 12 51 i 10 i 6 i 5 6 i 24 i 6 pi 14 8 i
* Other households 9 s 5 1 i 3 3 11 i 11 i 15 11 9 9 12 10 i 12 i 11 i 5 5 i 3 i 4 pi 5 8 i
 
Households with dependent 
children Total 18 s 15 11 i 7 7 17 i 19 i 20 23 14 19 24 9 i 18 i 15 i 14 14 i 17 i 15 pi 13 :
* Single parents at least 1dep child 34 s 36 30 i 16 16 38 i 33 i 38 40 30 56 36 22 i 35 i 27 i 21 16 i 59 i 39 pi 25 22 i
* Two adult households 1 dep. child 12 s 10 7 i 4 4 14 i 15 i 15 14 10 13 15 10 i 13 i 11 i 6 8 i 14 i 8 pi 10 12 i
2 dep. children 15 s 9 8 i 4 3 10 i 18 i 19 24 9 10 24 6 i 13 i 12 i 17 10 i 16 i 10 pi 9 17 i
3+ dep. children 27 s 18 20 i 14 13 24 i 24 i 32 39 17 23 36 15 i 32 i 28 i 18 23 i 31 i 24 pi 22 35 i
* Other households 18 s 17 9 i 4 5 18 i 16 i 26 22 17 12 24 6 i 18 i 14 i 12 17 i 5 i 12 pi 10 19 i
Distribution of at-risk-or-poverty population
 
Households without 
dependent children Total 42 s 47 25 i 68 64 : 41 i 50 45 b 46 b 45 38 b 58 i 38 i 35 i 29 32 i 71 i 39 pi 50 17 i
* One person households Total 17 s 19 15 i 48 48 : 21 i 11 12 b 20 b 20 13 b 15 i 14 i 15 i 13 14 i 9 i 23 pi 24 4 i
M en  7 s 8 6 i 24 50 : 6 i 3 3 b 8 b 8 4 b 3 i 3 i 30 i 6 4 i 2 i 11 pi 7 2 i
W omen 11 s 11 9 i 24 50 : 16 i 8 9 b 12 b 12 10 b 12 i 10 i 70 i 7 9 i 7 i 12 pi 17 2 i
Aged  < 65 yrs 9 s 11 10 i 35 84 : 11 i 4 3 b 13 b 7 6 b 4 i 6 i 51 i 10 6 i 4 i 20 pi 14 3 i
Aged  65+ 8 s 8 5 i 13 16 : 10 i 7 9 b 8 b 13 7 b 11 i 8 i 49 i 3 7 i 4 i 3 pi 10 1 i
* Two adult households Both aged  < 65 yrs 8 s 10 6 i 9 10 : 8 i 6 6 b 10 b 9 6 b 5 i 10 i 9 i 8 8 i 6 i 8 pi 12 5 i
At least one age  65+ 10 s 14 2 i 11 5 : 6 i 17 15 b 11 b 10 8 b 30 i 5 i 4 i 4 5 i 11 i 5 pi 9 6 i
* Other households 7 s 4 2 i 1 1 : 5 i 16 12 b 4 b 6 11 b 7 i 8 i 8 i 4 6 i 3 i 3 pi 5 3 i
 
Households with dependent 
children Total : 53 75 i 32 36 : 59 i 50 55 b 55 b 55 63 b 42 i 62 i 65 i 71 68 i 71 i 62 pi 50 0 i
* Single parents at least 1 dep. child 9 s 14 20 i 9 11 : 12 i 3 3 b 12 b 16 5 b 3 i 8 i 9 i 7 5 i 6 i 14 pi 7 5 i
* Two adult households 1 dep. child 9 s 7 10 i 4 5 : 13 i 9 9 b 10 b 6 10 b 6 i 12 i 13 i 7 8 i 11 i 7 pi 9 9 i
2 dep. children 16 s 10 20 i 6 6 : 15 i 25 22 b 14 b 8 22 b 9 i 11 i 16 i 28 14 i 22 i 14 pi 11 17 i
3+ dep. children 12 s 14 12 i 12 13 : 8 i 2 7 b 12 b 16 10 b 17 i 9 i 12 i 18 15 i 26 i 17 pi 12 24 i
* Other households 13 s 9 13 i 1 1 : 11 i 12 15 b 7 b 10 16 b 8 i 22 i 14 i 11 25 i 6 i 10 pi 10 28 i
At-risk-of-poverty rate by accom modation tenure status and by gender and selected age group
Incidence
  Owner occupier or rent free Total 13 s 11 : 8 5 10 i 18 i 20 19 10 18 17 15 i 14 i 14 i 8 11 i 11 i 5 pi 10 :
M en : : : : 7 i : : : : : : 13 i 14 i 14 i : 11 i 11 i 5 pi : :
W omen : : : : 12 i : : : : : : 16 i 15 i 15 i : 11 i 12 i 5 pi : :
  Tenant Total 25 s 27 : 18 19 22 i 23 i 20 31 19 37 30 21 i 26 i 24 i 23 15 i 29 i 22 pi 18 :
M en : : : : 20 i : : : : : : 19 i 26 i 22 i : 14 i 29 i 22 pi : :
W omen : : : : 23 i : : : : : : 23 i 26 i 27 i : 15 i 29 i 22 pi : :
Distribution of at-risk-or-poverty population
  Owner occupier or rent free Total 63 s 53 : 46 37 : 87 i 81 84 49 70 71 87 i 68 i 92 i 52 90 i 61 i 23 pi 51 69 i
M en : : : : : : : : 83 : : : 38 i 30 i 92 i : 91 i 30 i 11 pi : :
W omen : : : : : : : : 84 : : : 49 i 38 i 91 i : 90 i 32 i 12 pi : :
  Tenant Total 37 s 47 : 54 63 : 13 i 19 16 51 30 29 13 i 32 i 8 i 48 10 i 39 i 77 pi 49 31 i
M en : : : : : : : : 17 : : : 6 i 15 i 8 i : 9 i 19 i 37 pi : :
W omen : : : : : : : : 16 : : : 7 i 17 i 9 i : 10 i 20 i 40 pi : :
1) Data for the Czech Republic refer to income year 2002 
2) Including imputed rent. See methodological note for an explanation
3) Data for M alta refer to income year 2000, and they are not analysed in Chapter 1 of the Technical Annex. 
Source : Eurostat   See Annex IA and IB. i = national source harmonised ex post for maximum consistency with EU SILC methodology.  p = provisional.  s = estimated by Eurostat.  u = result based on small sample (20 49 observations)   
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Table 5.  Common indicators of social exclusion and poverty (cont) 
At-risk-of-poverty rate by work intensity of the household
Incidence
 
Households without 
dependent children WI = 0 : 30 : 21 21 37 i : 29 48 26 62 27 : : : 13 : 31 i 28 pi 20 :
0 < WI < 1 : 7 : 7 7 13 i : 14 15 10 10 12 : : : 9 : 3 i 6 pi 10 :
WI = 1 : 3 : 5 5 6 i : 10 7 3 5 4 : : : 6 : 0 i 4 pi 6 :
 
Households with dependent 
children WI = 0 : 70 : 40 43 78 i : 52 68 71 80 66 : : : 27 : 78 i 64 pi 39 :
0 < WI < 0.5 : 28 : 7 7 45 i : 46 57 40 35 51 : : : 28 : 27 i 45 pi 44 :
0.5 <= WI < 1 : 14 : 9 8 13 i : 22 26 13 16 24 : : : 17 : 16 i 19 pi 13 :
WI = 1 : 4 : 5 4 8 i : 11 11 5 4 6 : : : 7 : 1 i 6 pi 6 :
Distribution of at-risk-or-poverty population
 
Households without 
dependent children WI = 0 : 24 : 24 25 : : 13 14 19 21 15 : : : 7 : 17 i 22 pi 14 100 i
0 < WI < 1 : 7 : 10 9 : : 17 13 10 8 12 : : : 10 : 4 i 4 pi 16 :
WI = 1 : 3 : 14 15 : : 7 4 4 3 3 : : : 8 : 0 i 8 pi 10 :
 
Households with dependent 
children WI = 0 : 30 : 14 15 : : 7 8 21 28 14 : : : 5 : 24 i 22 pi 6 :
0 < WI < 0.5 : 9 : 1 1 : : 9 14 11 7 17 : : : 10 : 3 i 3 pi 14 :
0.5 <= WI < 1 : 20 : 15 14 : : 33 38 22 26 33 : : : 44 : 51 i 23 pi 28 :
WI = 1 : 8 : 23 21 : : 15 10 14 6 7 : : : 17 : 1 i 18 pi 13 :
Inequality of income : S80/S20 income quintile share ratio
4.8 s 4.0 3.4 i 3.4 3.4 4.4 i 5.9 i 6.0 5.1 4.2 5.0 5.6 4.1 i 6.1 i 4.5 i 3.7 3.3 i 4.6 i 4.0 pi 3.8 5.0 i
Relative median at-risk-of-poverty gap by gender and selected age group
  Total population 23 s 23 15 i 19 20 25 i 24 i 25 25 19 20 25 19 i 23 i 20 i 17 20 i 17 i 20 pi 20 23 i
  Children aged 0 15 years 24 s 22 15 i 19 20 31 i 24 i 19 26 19 24 28 12 i 25 i 21 i 15 19 i 20 i 18 pi 18 25 i
 
People aged 16 years and 
more Total 23 s 23 15 i 19 20 24 i 24 i 25 24 19 18 25 21 i 22 i 20 i 17 20 i 17 i 20 pi 21 23 i
Men 23 s 24 17 i 22 24 22 i 27 i 25 26 19 19 25 19 i 24 i 23 i 17 22 i 18 i 22 pi 19 24 i
Women 22 s 21 14 i 17 19 24 i 22 i 26 23 19 17 25 22 i 21 i 19 i 19 18 i 17 i 19 pi 22 22 i
  People aged 16 64 years Total 25 s 24 16 i 24 23 25 i 28 i 25 27 22 22 28 17 i 26 i 23 i 19 22 i 18 i 22 pi 20 23 i
Men 25 s 25 17 i 27 26 23 i 29 i 25 27 22 21 28 15 i 25 i 24 i 17 23 i 19 i 24 pi 18 24 i
Women 25 s 24 15 i 21 20 27 i 27 i 25 27 22 23 29 18 i 26 i 22 i 20 22 i 17 i 21 pi 23 23 i
 
People aged 65 years and 
more Total 16 s 18 7 i 8 9 19 i 11 i 26 21 11 11 13 24 i 8 i 13 i 14 10 i 14 i 7 pi 21 15 i
Men 15 s 19 6 i 7 8 17 i : 23 24 10 13 13 23 i 6 i 11 i 14 9 i 18 i 8 pi 26 16 i
Women 16 s 17 8 i 9 10 19 i 10 i 27 20 12 10 13 25 i 8 i 14 i 14 11 i 17 i 7 pi 20 15 i
1) Data for the Czech Republic refer to income year 2002 
2) Including imputed rent. See methodological note for an explanation
3) Data for Malta refer to income year 2000, and they are not analysed in Chapter 1 of the Technical Annex. 
Source: Eurostat   See Annex IA and IB. i = national source harmonised ex post for maximum consistency with EU SILC methodology.  p = provisional.  s = estimated by Eurostat.  u = result based on small sample (20 49 observations) 
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Table 5.  Common indicators of social exclusion and poverty (cont) 
At-risk-of-poverty rate before and after social transfers by gender and selected age group
Before all social transfers except old-age/survivors' pensions
  Total population 26 s 28 21 i 31 : 24 i 25 i 23 25 26 33 23 20 i 24 i 23 i 22 17 i 19 i 23 pi 25 31 i
  Children aged 0 15 years 33 s 32 33 i 26 : 30 i 28 i 22 29 35 38 32 16 i 31 i 27 i 34 31 i 28 i 29 pi 37 37 i
 
People aged 16 years and 
more
Total 24 s 27 18 i 32 : 22 i 22 i 23 24 24 32 21 20 i 23 i 21 i 19 14 i 17 i 21 pi 23 30 i
Men 22 s 25 16 i 31 : 19 i 26 i 21 23 23 29 20 18 i 22 i 20 i 19 14 i 16 i 19 pi 21 30 i
W omen 26 s 28 19 i 33 : 25 i 25 i 25 26 25 34 23 23 i 23 i 22 i 20 14 i 19 i 22 pi 24 29 i
  People aged 16 64 years Total 24 s 27 19 i 29 : 22 i 25 i 20 22 25 28 22 14 i 24 i 22 i 21 15 i 16 i 22 pi 23 32 i
Men 23 s 26 18 i 28 : 19 i 24 i 19 22 24 27 21 12 i 24 i 22 i 21 15 i 15 i 20 pi 22 32 i
W omen 25 s 28 20 i 31 : 24 i 25 i 21 23 26 30 24 16 i 24 i 23 i 22 15 i 17 i 23 pi 24 31 i
 
People aged 65 years and 
more
Total 24 s 25 9 i 44 : 24 i 22 i 33 32 21 51 18 56 i 18 i 17 i 10 8 i 26 i 15 pi 19 18 i
Men 20 s 23 6 i 45 : 19 i 11 i 30 29 19 45 15 51 i 9 i 7 i 9 7 i 23 i 14 pi 15 15 i
W omen 26 s 25 12 i 42 : 28 i 28 i 36 35 23 57 19 59 i 23 i 22 i 11 10 i 28 i 17 pi 23 19 i
Before all social transfers including old-age/survivors' pensions
  Total population 42 s 42 39 i 39 39 36 i 41 i 40 41 44 39 45 28 i 43 i 39 i 38 32 i 30 i 37 pi 42 49 i
  Children aged 0 15 years 35 s 33 35 i 26 27 26 i 31 i 23 32 36 38 35 17 i 37 i 31 i 36 23 i 29 i 31 pi 40 44 i
 
People aged 16 years and 
more
Total 43 s 44 39 i 42 42 38 i 43 i 43 43 46 39 47 31 i 44 i 41 i 39 33 i 30 i 38 pi 42 51 i
Men 40 s 41 36 i 39 39 33 i 39 i 40 41 43 37 44 27 i 41 i 38 i 36 30 i 27 i 34 pi 38 49 i
W omen 46 s 47 43 i 45 45 43 i 46 i 46 45 49 42 50 33 i 47 i 43 i 41 36 i 33 i 42 pi 46 52 i
  People aged 16 64 years Total 32 s 33 30 i 30 30 25 i 32 i 31 32 33 31 36 20 i 35 i 31 i 29 24 i 24 i 27 pi 33 45 i
Men 30 s 30 27 i 28 29 21 i 30 i 29 31 31 30 34 17 i 34 i 30 i 27 22 i 21 i 25 pi 30 44 i
W omen 35 s 35 33 i 31 32 29 i 33 i 34 34 35 33 39 22 i 36 i 31 i 32 25 i 26 i 30 pi 36 46 i
 
People aged 65 years and 
more
Total 88 s 92 89 i 95 95 86 i 87 i 85 85 95 87 85 88 i 81 i 83 i 86 79 i 70 i 91 pi 86 86 i
Men 88 s 93 92 i 93 93 84 i 88 i 83 86 95 86 84 85 i 81 i 83 i 88 81 i 65 i 90 pi 86 88 i
W omen 88 s 91 88 i 96 96 88 i 86 i 86 84 95 89 85 90 i 80 i 83 i 84 78 i 74 i 92 pi 86 85 i
Inequality of income distribution : Gini coefficient
30 s 26 25 i 24 24 28 i 34 i 33 31 28 32 33 27 i 36 i 29 i 26 27 i 30 i 27 pi 26 31 i
1) Data for the Czech Republic refer to income year 2002 
2) Including imputed rent. See methodological note for an explanation
3) Data for Malta refer to income year 2000, and they are not analysed in Chapter 1 of the Technical Annex. 
Source: Eurostat   See Annex IA and IB. i = national source harmonised ex post for maximum consistency with EU SILC methodology.  p = provisional.  s = estimated by Eurostat.  u = result based on small sample (20 49 observations)   
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Table 5.  Common indicators of social exclusion and poverty (cont) 
EU BE CZ DK DE EE EL ES FR IE IT CY LV LT LU HU MT NL AT PL PT SL SK FI SE UK
Long-term unemployment rate by gender, selected years (% of the labour force 15+)
1999
Total 4.1 4.9 3.2 1 4.1 5 6.5 5.9 4.1 2.4 6.7 : 7.6 5.3 0.7 3.3 : 1.2 1.2 5.8 1.8 3.2 8 3 1.9 1.7
Male 3.4 4.1 2.4 0.9 3.2 5.5 3.8 3.6 3.4 3 5.2 : 7.6 6.1 0.6 3.6 : 0.9 0.9 4.5 1.6 3.4 7.5 3.2 2.2 2.2
Female 5 5.9 4.2 1.2 5.2 4.5 10.7 9.4 4.9 1.6 9 : 7.6 4.4 0.8 2.9 : 1.5 1.5 7.4 2.1 3 8.5 2.8 1.4 1
2002
Total 3.9 3.6 3.7 0.9 3.9 5 5.3 3.9 3.1 1.3 5.1 0.8 5.7 7.2 0.8 2.4 3.4 0.7 1.1 10.8 1.7 3.4 12.2 2.3 1 1.1
Male 3.3 3.2 3 0.8 3.3 5.9 3.1 2.3 2.6 1.7 4 0.6 6.5 7.3 0.6 2.7 3.6 0.6 1 9.7 1.4 3.4 11.9 2.5 1.2 1.4
Female 4.6 4.1 4.6 1 4.8 4.1 8.6 6.2 3.5 0.7 6.9 1.2 4.8 7.1 0.9 2.1 2.6 0.9 1.2 12.2 2.1 3.4 12.6 2 0.8 0.7
2004
Total 4.1 3.9 4.2 1.2 5.4 4.8 5.6 3.5 3.9 1.6 4 1.4 4.3 5.6 1.1 2.6 3.5 1.6 1.3b  10.2 3 3.1 11.8 2.1 1.2 1
Male 3.6 3.5 3.4 1.1 4.8 5.6 3 2.3 3.5 2 2.9 1 4.2 5.3 0.8 2.7 3.9 1.5 1.3b  9.5 2.6 3 11.2 2.3 1.4 1.2
Female 4.7 4.4 5.3 1.3 6.1 4 9.4 5.3 4.3 0.9 5.5 1.8 4.3 5.8 1.5 2.6 2.8 1.6 1.4b  11 3.4 3.2 12.5 2 1 0.6
Source: Eurostat   Labour Force Survey, Annual averages, based on 1990 census
Long-term unemployment share by gender, selected years (% of the unemployed population)
1999
Total 45.2 56.9 36.7 21.6 51.2 44.4 54.3 45.5 39.2 42.9 61.5 : 54.2 38.4 30.4 48.1 : 36.3 30.3 43.1 39.3 44.8 47.8 29.3 28.1 28.3
Male 43.6 56.1 32.4 21.2 49.6 44.4 47.2 39.6 38 52.4 61.9 : 52.8 40.1 36.2 49.1 : 40 28.4 37.8 38.6 48.5 45.4 32.4 33.6 33.5
Female 46.7 57.6 40.5 22 53 43.9 59 49.9 40.2 28.8 61.1 : 55.8 36.1 25.6 46.7 : 33.7 32.6 48.3 40 40.6 50.6 26.1 21 20.1
2002
Total 44.3 48.8 50.2 19.1 48.2 52.4 51.3 33.7 34.4 30.1 59.6 21.1 45.3 53.5 26.8 43.4 44 26.5 26.7 54.7 34.6 55.6 65.2 24.9 19.9 21.7
Male 42.7 47.4 50 17.4 46.3 58.3 45.6 28.4 33.3 37.1 59.4 18.1 47.6 53.8 29.9 45.5 53.3 24.9 26.2 51 33.3 58.3 63.9 27.9 22.2 25.5
Female 45.9 50.2 50.4 20.8 50.7 45.6 55.1 37.7 35.4 18.8 59.8 23.5 42.3 53.1 24.2 40.6 26.1 28.1 27.4 58.8 35.6 52.8 66.8 21.7 16.9 16
2004
Total 45.3 49 51 21.5 56.3 52.2 53.1 32 40.4 34.9 49.2 26.2 43.8 51.2 22.6 44 46.7 34.2 27.5b  54 44.4 51.5 64.7 24 19.3 20.6
Male 44.5 48.9 48.4 21 55.3 54.2 44.9 27.8 40.1 41.7 46.1 25.1 45 50.2 24.1 45.7 55.4 35.6 28.6b  52.7 43.7 53.4 64.9 25.9 21.4 24.3
Female 46 49.2 53.3 21.9 57.5 49.7 57.9 35.2 40.7 23.6 51.9 27 42.6 52.2 21.6 41.9 32.9 32.6 26.3b  55.5 45 49.5 64.5 22 16.6 15.3
Source: Eurostat   Labour Force Survey, Annual averages, based on 1990 census   
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Table 5.  Common indicators of social exclusion and poverty (cont) 
Very long-term unemployment rate by gender, selected years (% of the labour force 15+)
1999
Total 2.5 3.5 1.4 0.5 2.6 3 3.8 3.9 2.3 1.7 4.8 : 5.3 2.6 0.4 1.6 : 0.7 0.6 2.2 0.9 2.4 4.6 1.7 : 1
Male 2 2.9 1.1 0.4 2 3.4 2.1 2.3 1.9 2.2 3.8 : 5.3 3.1 0.3 1.8 : 0.6 0.6 1.6 0.7 2.6 4.2 1.9 : 1.4
Female 3.1 4.4 1.9 0.5 3.5 2.6 6.4 6.4 2.8 0.9 6.3 : 5.3 2.1 0.5 1.4 : 0.8 0.7 3.1 1.1 2.2 5.2 1.4 : 0.5
2002
Total 2.2 2.4 2.3 0.3 2.4 3.2 3.1 2.2 1.6 0.7 3.7 0.4 4 4.8 0.3 1.1 1.8 0.4 0.4 4.8 0.9 2.2 7.6 1.2 0 0.6
Male 1.9 2.1 1.9 0.3 2 4 1.7 1.2 1.4 1 2.9 0.3 5 5 0.2 1.3 2 0.3 0.4 4 0.7 2.2 7.3 1.5 0 0.8
Female 2.7 2.8 2.8 0.4 3.1 2.5 5.3 3.6 1.9 0.3 4.9 0.4 3 4.5 0.3 0.9 1 0.4 0.4 5.6 1.1 2.2 7.9 0.9 0 0.4
2004
Total 2.3 2.5 2.6 0.4 3.5 3.1 3.1 1.9 1.8 0.8 2.6 0.4 2.5 3.5 0.3 1.2 2 0.6 0.5b  5 1.6 1.7 8.2 1 0 0.5
Male 2 2.2 2.1 0.4 3 3.6 1.6 1.2 1.7 1.1 2 0.3 2.4 3.2 0.3 1.3 2.3 0.6 0.5b  4.6 1.3 1.7 7.7 1.1 0 0.6
Female 2.7 2.9 3.2 0.4 4 2.7 5.3 2.9 2 0.4 3.6 0.6 2.5 3.8 0.3 1.2 1.4 0.7 0.5b  5.5 1.8 1.8 8.9 0.8 : 0.3
Source: Eurostat   Labour Force Survey, Annual averages, based on 1990 census
People living in jobless households: children (0-17 years) and prime-age adults (18-59 years), selected years (% of population in the relevant age group)
1999
Children : 11.3b  7.2 : 9.5 10.2 5.2 7.3 9.9 11.7 8.3 : 12b  : 4 15.5 : 6.9 4.2 : 4.5 4.1 10.6 : : 18.4
Adults:
  Total : 13b  7.2 : 10.5 10.4 9.6 8.5 11.3 9.8 11.7 : 14.9b  8.8 6.7 14.2 : 7.8 8.2 : 4.7 9.6 9.8 : : 11.8
  Male : 11.2b  5.6 : 9.5 10.5 7 7.7 10.1 8.5 9.8 : 13.4b  9 5.1 12.8 : 6.3 6.5 : 4.1 8.7 8.8 : : 9.6
  Female : 14.8b  8.8 : 11.4 10.4 12.1 9.3 12.5 11.1 13.5 : 16.4b  8.5 8.4 15.6 : 9.4 9.8 : 5.3 10.5 10.9 : : 13.9
2002
Children 9.8e  13.8 7.6 5.6 9.3 10.1 5.1 6.6 9.6 10.8 7.2 3.9 10.6b  8.4 2.8 14.3 7.6 6 4.4 : 4.2 3.8 12.1 : : 17.4
Adults:
  Total 10.2e  14.2 7.3 7.6 10 10.8 8.9 7.3 10.4 8.5 10.2 5.3 10.5b  9.1b  6.3 13 7.2 6.7 7.5 15.1 4.6 8 10.9 : : 11.3
  Male 8.9e  11.9 5.6 7.2 9.4 10.6 6.5 6.6 9.1 7.3 8.6 3.9 10.7b  8.5b  5.6 12 5.8 5.3 6.2 14.1 3.9 7 10.4 : : 9.2
  Female 11.4e  16.6 9.1 8 10.7 10.9 11.2 8 11.8 9.7 11.8 6.5 10.3b  9.7b  7 14 8.6 8.1 8.8 16.1 5.2 8.9 11.4 : : 13.3
2004
Children 9.8e  13.2 9 6 10.9 9.6 4.5 6.3 9.6 11.8 5.7 2.6 7.2 6.5 3 13.2 9.2 7 5.6i  : 4.3 3.8 12.8 5.7 : 16.8
Adults:
  Total 10.3e  13.7 8 8.5 11.1 9.5 8.5 7.3 10.8 8.6 9.1 5 7.8 8.1 6.5 11.9 8.6 8 8.8i  15.8 5.3 7.5 10.8 11 : 11
  Male 9.3e  11.3 6.4 8.3 10.8 10.2 6.2 6.7 9.5 7.2 7.9 3.8 7.1 8.3 5 11.1 6.8 6.7 7.6i  14.8 5 7 10 11.2 : 9
  Female 11.4e  16 9.6 8.8 11.4 8.7 10.7 7.9 12.1 10.1 10.4 6.1 8.4 8 8.1 12.7 10.4 9.3 10i  16.8 5.7 8 11.6 10.9 : 13
2005
Children 9.6e  12.9 8.1 6p  10.9p  9.1 4.1 5.4 9.5 12 5.6 3.5 8.3 6.2 3p  14.2 8.9 6.9 6.4 : 4.3 2.7u  13.8 5.7p  : 16.5
Adults:
  Total 10.2e  13.5 7.4 8.5p  11.1p  8.5 8.5 6.7 10.7 8.4 9.5 5.2 8.1 6.6 6.5p  12.3 8.2 7.9 8.8 15.3 5.5 6.7 10.2 11p  : 11
  Male 9.2e  11.6 5.8 8.3p  10.8p  10.2 6.4 6.2 9.6 7.2 8.3 4.2 8.7 6.9 5p  11.6 6.5 6.9 7.8 14 5.1 6.3 9.5 11.2p  : 9.2
  Female 11.2e  15.4 9 8.8p  11.4p  7 10.7 7.2 11.8 9.8 10.8 6.2 7.6 6.4 8.1p  13.1 9.9 9 9.7 16.6 5.8 7.1 10.9 10.9p  : 12.8
Source: Eurostat, Labour Force Survey   Spring results (except DK, LU (2003) and FI: annual average)  
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Table 5.  Common indicators of social exclusion and poverty (cont) 
Dispersion of regional employment rates*, selected years (%)
1999  13.4 8 5.6   5.4   5.2 10.7 7.1   17.4         9.1   2.3 2.3 4.8 2.6   8.1 6.7 5 7.1
2004  12.2 8.7 5.6   6.2   4.1 8.7 7.1   15.6         9.4   2.3 3.5 6.4 3.5   9 5.5 4.4 5.8
* Coefficient of variation of employment rates across regions at NUTS2 level
e = estimate; p = provisional figure
Source: Eurostat   Labour Force Survey, Annual averages   
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Table 5.  Common indicators of social exclusion and poverty (cont) 
 
EU BE CZ DK DE EE EL ES FR IE IT CY LV LT LU HU MT NL AT PL PT SI SK FI SE UK
Early school-leavers  (% of the total population aged 18 24 who have at most lower secondary education and not in further education or training)
1999
Total : 15.2b  : 11.5 14.9 14 18.6 29.5 14.7 : 27.2 17.5 : : 19.1b  13 : 16.2 10.7 : 44.9 : : 9.9 6.9 19.7
Female : 12.7b  : 9.1 15.6 9.2 15.4 23.6 13.4 : 24.2 12.3 : : 19.4b  12.7 : 14.9 11.9 : 38.9 : : 7.9 6.1 19.3
Male : 17.7b  : 14.2 14.2 19 22.1 35.3 16 : 30.3 24.6 : : 18.9b  13.3 : 17.5 9.6 : 50.8 : : 12 7.7 20.2
2004
Total 15.6i  11.9b  6.1 8.5 12.1 13.7 14.9 31.7 14.2 12.9p  22.3 20.6 15.6 9.5b  12.9 12.6 42b  14 8.7i  5.7b  39.4b  4.2u  7.1 8.7 8.6 14.9i 
Female 13.1i  8.3b  6.5 6.7 11.9 :u  11.6 24.6 12.3 9.7p  18.4 14.9 10.7 7.4u  13 11.4 39.5b  11.9 7.9i  3.7b  30.6b  2.6u  6.4 6.9 7.9 14.2i 
Male 18i  15.6b  5.8 10.4 12.2 20.5 18.3 38.5 16.1 16.1p  26.2 27.2 20.5 11.6u  12.8 13.7 44.2b  16.1 9.5i  7.7b  47.9b  5.8u  7.8 10.6 9.3 15.7i 
2005
Total 14.9i  13 6.4 8.5 : 14 13.3 30.8b  12.6 12.3p  21.9 18.1 11.9 9.2 12.9p  12.3 44.5p  13.6 9.1 5.5 38.6 4.3u  5.8 8.7p  8.6p  14p 
Female 12.7i  10.6 6.6 7.5 : 10.7u  9.2 25b  10.7 9.6p  17.8 10.6 8.2 6.2u  13p  11.1 42.8p  11.2 8.7 4 30.1 2.8u  5.7 6.9p  7.9p  13.2p 
Male 17.1i  15.3 6.2 9.4 : 17.4u  17.5 36.4b  14.6 14.9p  25.9 26.6 15.5 12.2u  12.8p  13.5 46.2p  15.8 9.5 6.9 46.7 5.7u  6 10.6p  9.3p  14.7p 
u = data lack reliability due to low sample size / : = not available or unreliable data / b = break / p = provisional
In DK, LU, IS, NO, EE, LV, LT, CY, MT and SI, the high degree of variation of results over time is partly influenced by a low sample size. 
In CY, the reference population (denominator) excludes students abroad. In DE (2003 and 2004), participation to personnel interest courses is excluded
Source: Eurostat, Labour Force Survey   Quarter 2 results (except FI 2004 and 2005: Q1, AT 1999: Q1)
Percentage of low-achieving (level 1 and lower) 15 years old in reading literacy
2000 19.4 19.0 17.5 17.9 22.6 : 24.4 16.3 15.2 11.0 18.9 : 30.1 : 35.1 22.7 : 9.5 14.6 23.2 26.3 : : 7.0 12.6 12.8
2003 19.8 17.8 19.4 16.5 22.3 : 25.2 21.1 17.5 11 23.9 : 18 : 22.7 20.5 : 11.5 20.7 16.8 22 : 24.9 5.7 13.3 :
Note: Luxembourg, Netherlands: results not fully comparable between surveys, therefore not  included in EU average.
Source: OECD, PISA survey 
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Table 5.  Common indicators of social exclusion and poverty (cont) 
Persons with low educational attainment by age and gender, 2005 (% of total population in the relevant age group)
25 34 years
Total 22.0 19.9 6.1 13.1 14.7 11.5 23.1 36.7 19.5 18.3 33.7 20.6 20.1 12.6 26.5 15.4 56.6 18.6 12.6 8.3 57.7 8.6 7.5 10.6 9.4 22.5
Female 20.5 17.5 6.7 13.3 16.2 8.5u 19.2 31.5 18.1 15.3 29.7 20.2 15.6 10.1 26.5 14.6 61.7 17.7 14.4 7.7 51.5 7.7 7.8 7.6 8.4 23.5
Male 23.5 22.2 5.5 13.0 13.3 14.6u 26.8 41.6 21.0 21.3 37.6 21.1 24.6 15.2 26.5 16.2 51.8 19.5 10.9 8.8 63.8 9.6 7.3 13.4 10.5 21.5
35 44 years
Total 27.5 28.4 7.0 15.2 13.8 4.7u 32.3 46.3 28.6 30.4 45.3 24.4 6.8 5.1 36.0 19.2 69.3 24.2 15.7 10.5 74.1 16.3 7.5 13.7 10.5 29.2
Female 27.9 26.3 8.6 14.3 15.7 0.0 31.7 45.2 29.2 26.7 42.4 24.7 5.3 3.4u 38.8 21.5 77.4 25.2 20.0 10.6 71.5 15.8 8.6 11.3 8.8 32.3
Male 27.1 30.4 5.4 16.1 11.9 0.0 32.9 47.4 27.8 34.2 48.2 24.0 8.3 7.0u 33.3 16.8 61.6 23.2 11.5 10.4 76.8 16.7 6.4 16.1 12.1 26.0
45 54 years
Total 33.4 40.5 11.7 22.7 15.6 9.0 46.6 59.2 40.0 44.5 53.8 42.2 11.7 7.7 41.6 24.3 82.9 30.9 23.3 16.5 81.0 25.3 14.6 24.1 18.1 30.0
Female 36.5 42.3 16.9 24.1 19.4 7.5u 49.2 61.6 43.4 41.6 55.9 45.2 10.0 6.8u 47.8 30.2 88.9 35.6 29.3 17.3 80.5 28.6 18.8 22.1 15.1 36.7
Male 30.2 38.8 6.4 21.4 11.9 10.8u 43.9 56.8 36.6 47.4 51.8 39.2 13.8 8.7u 35.7 17.9 76.7 26.2 17.2 15.7 81.6 22.2 10.2 26.2 21.0 23.2
55 64 years
Total 44.2 52.7 16.7 25.3 21.1 20.3 66.8 74.9 49.4 59.9 70.8 60.3 29.5 31.3 49.5 39.9 86.6 41.1 30.6 30.3 87.2 30.3 24.1 41.4 28.4 34.7
Female 50.2 57.0 24.1 30.1 28.9 19.0 73.1 79.8 54.0 57.9 75.2 67.7 26.0 32.3 61.5 46.3 91.3 51.0 38.5 34.0 88.5 39.7 31.3 41.7 25.9 44.9
Male 38.2 48.3 8.5 20.4 13.2 22.1u 60.0 69.8 44.5 61.9 66.0 52.5 34.1 30.0 37.7 32.2 81.4 31.3 22.1 26.0 85.8 20.8 15.5 41.0 30.8 27.5
65+ years
Total 66.1 73.1 36.5 54.4 38.0 35.7 83.0 88.7 74.6 74.9 86.1 78.2 50.1 70.8 64.3 72.2 91.9 58.2 48.9 58.3 94.3 51.3 58.8 70.9 44.1 37.4
Female 73.1 77.2 48.6 64.5 52.2 35.3 87.7 92.2 79.1 75.3 89.3 85.5 51.5 73.1 76.9 75.8 94.7 68.4 58.6 64.8 95.5 63.7 69.6 73.4 45.3 53.3
Male 56.4 67.3 17.6 40.9 18.6 36.4 77.2 83.9 68.4 74.4 81.8 69.3 47.9 66.4 47.3 66.7 88.1 44.8 34.7 47.6 92.5 31.5 40.8 67.1 42.8 27.7
25 64 years
Total 31.1 34.5 10.1 18.9 16.1 10.9 40.3 51.6 33.6 35.4 49.7 34.7 16.4 12.9 37.7 23.9 73.8 28.2 19.9 15.4 73.8 19.5 12.4 22.4 16.6 28.8
Female 32.9 34.9 13.8 20.2 19.8 9.0 41.5 51.5 35.4 32.3 49.5 36.8 13.8 12.1 42.3 27.7 80.1 31.6 24.9 16.5 71.7 22.0 15.4 20.8 14.6 33.2
Male 29.2 34.2 6.4 17.6 12.5 13.0 39.2 51.7 31.8 38.4 50.0 32.5 19.2 13.8 33.2 20.0 67.5 24.8 14.9 14.3 75.9 17.1 9.2 24.1 18.5 24.5
u = data lack reliability due to low sample size
CY: students usually living in the country but studying abroad are not yet covered by the survey. DE, LU, FI 2005: 2004 data. IE, provisional
Source: Eurostat, Labour Force Survey   Quarter 2 results (except FR: Q1)   
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Table 5.  Common indicators of social exclusion and poverty (cont) 
EU BE CZ DK DE EE EL ES FR IE IT CY LV LT LU HU MT NL AT PL PT SL SK FI SE UK
Life expectancy by age and gender, selected years
1970 Women 74.4 74.2 73 75.9 74.14 73.8 74.8 75.9 73.5 74.9 74.4 74.75 73.4 72.08 72.56 76.5 73.44 73.3 70.8 72.35 72.92 75 77.06 75
Men 68 67.8 66.1 70.7 65.5 70.1 69.2 68.4 68.8 69 66 66.92 67.1 66.31 68.4 70.7 66.52 66.6 64.2 65.04 66.73 66.5 72.2 68.7
1980 Women 76.8 76.8 73.9 77.3 76.1 74.11 76.8 78.6 78.4 75.6 77.4 77 74.2 75.36 75.9 72.7 72.71 79.3 76 75.4 75.2 75.21 74.25 77.58 78.81 76.2
Men 69.8 70 66.8 71.2 69.6 64.14 72.2 72.5 70.2 70.1 70.6 72.3 63.6 65.49 69.1 65.45 68.49 72.7 69 66.9 67.7 67.42 66.75 69.16 72.76 70.2
1990 Women 78.8 79.4 75.4 77.72 78.43 74.9 79.45 80.3 80.9 77.61 80.13 78.6 74.6 76.2 78.51 73.71 78.09 80.89 78.8 76.3 77.36 77.38 75.44 78.88 80.38 78.6
Men 71.7 72.7 67.6 72 71.96 64.7 74.64 73.3 72.8 72.08 73.64 74.1 64.3 66.4 72.33 65.13 73.7 73.83 72.2 66.7 70.41 69.54 66.64 70.94 74.81 72.9
1995 Women 79.7 80.2 76.6 77.8 79.7 74.5 80.3 81.5 81.8 78.4 81.3 79.8 73.1 75 80.2 74.5 79.5 80.4 79.9 76.4 78.7 77.8 76.3 80.2 81.4 79.2
Men 72.8 73.4 69.7 72.7 73.3 61.9 75 74.3 73.9 72.9 74.9 75.3 60.3 63.3 73 65.3 74.9 74.6 73.3 67.6 71.6 70.3 68.4 72.8 76.2 74
2002 Women 81.2 81.1 78.7 79.5 81.2 77.1 81.1 82.9 83 80.3 82.9 81.4 76 77.5 81.5 76.7 81 80.7 81.7 78.7 80.5 80.5 77.7 81.5 82.1 80.5
Men 75 75.1 72.1 74.8 75.4 65.3 76.4 76.2 75.8 75.2 76.8 77 64.8 66.3 74.9 68.4 75.9 76 75.8 70.4 73.8 72.6 69.8 74.9 77.7 75.9
2004 Women 81.2* 81.7* 79 79.9 81.4 76.9* 81.4 83.8 83.8 80.7* 82.5* 81.4* 77.2p 77.8 81* 76.9 80.7* 81.1p 82.1 79.2 80.5* 80.4* 77.8 82.3 82.7 80.7*
Men 75.1* 75.9* 72.6 75.2 75.7 66* 76.6 77.2 76.7 75.8* 76.8* 77* 65.5p 66.4 75* 68.6 76.7* 76.4p 76.4 70 74.2* 72.6* 70.3 75.3 78.4 76.2*
1970 Women : 74.5 73.3 75.9 : 74.2 74.3 75.6 76.1 73.8 75.8 : 74.5 : 73.7 73.4 73.3 76.3 74.1 74.5 73.4 73 73.8 : 76.8 75.2
Men : 68.4 66.7 71 : 65.9 72.2 70.4 68.8 69.2 70.1 : 66.4 : 67.7 68.1 69.4 70.8 67.5 68.2 67.2 65.9 67.8 : 72.1 69.1
1980 Women : 76.6 73.9 76.8 : 74.2 76.7 78.4 78.1 75.3 77.4 76.8 74.1 75.4 75.7 73.2 72.6 78.9 76 75.8 76 75.2 74.8 77.1 78.3 76.1
Men : 70 67.1 69.9 : 64.4 72.8 72.5 70 69.9 70.7 72.4 63.7 65.7 68.9 66.2 68.8 72.4 69.2 67.5 68.7 67.5 67.5 68.7 72.4 70.2
1990 Women : 78.8 75 77.2 77.9 74.7 79.2 79.9 80.4 77.2 79.7 78.4 74.4 75.9 78.1 73.7 77.7 79.6 78.3 76.3 77.1 76.9 75.5 78.3 79.8 78.1
Men : 72.3 67.4 71.6 71.5 64.7 74.4 72.9 72.4 71.7 73.3 74 64.3 66.2 71.9 65.2 73.5 73.4 71.9 66.9 70.3 69.3 66.7 70.3 74.3 72.6
1995 Women : 79.6 76.1 77.2 79.1 74.4 79.8 80.9 81.2 77.9 80.7 79.4 73.3 74.9 79.7 74.2 79 79.7 79.3 76.3 78.2 77.2 76 79.5 80.7 78.7
Men : 73 69.3 72.1 72.7 61.9 74.7 73.7 73.3 72.4 74.4 75 60.5 63.2 72.3 65 74.7 74.1 72.8 67.6 71.2 69.7 68.2 72.1 75.5 73.5
2002 Women 80.4 80.4 78 78.8 : 76.5 : : : 79.7 : : 75.7 77.1 80.9 76.3 80.3 80.1 80.9 78.2 79.9 79.7 77.4 80.7 81.4 :
Men 74.2 74.5 71.5 74.2 : 64.7 : : : 74.6 : : 64.5 65.8 74.3 67.9 75.2 75.4 75.2 70 73.2 72.1 69.4 74.1 77 :
2003 Women 80.5 : 77.9 79.2 80.7 : : : : 80 : : 75.5 77.2 80.3 76.2 79.8 80.3 : 78.3 79.8 79.7 77.3 : 81.7 :
Men 74.4 : 71.4 74.4 75.1 : : : : 75.3 : : 65.5 66 74.4 67.9 76.1 75.6 : 70 73.5 71.9 69.5 : 77.2 :
Life expectancy at birth
Life expectancy at age 1
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Table 5.  Common indicators of social exclusion and poverty (cont) 
1970 Women 19.7e 19.2 18 20.6 : 19.4 19.1 20 20.8 18.7 20.2 : 19.9 : 18.8 : : 20.5 18.8 : 18.9 : 18.7 : 20.9 19.8
Men 15.8e 15.2 14.1 17.1 : 15.2 17.5 16.8 16.2 15.6 16.7 : 16.5 : 15.2 : : 16.8 14.9 : 15.5 : 15.7 : 17.8 15.2
1980 Women 20.9e 20.9 18.2 21.4 : 19.4 20.8 22.1 22.4 19.5 21.2 : 19.7 20.5 19.9 : : 22.6 20.2 : 20.6 : 19.2 20.5 22.1 20.4
Men 16.5e 16.3 14.3 17 : 14.8 18.2 18.4 17.3 15.9 16.8 : 15.1 16.5 15.5 : : 17.5 16.3 : 16.3 : 15.5 15.6 17.9 15.9
1990 Women 22.1e 22.7 19.1 21.6 21.7 19.5 22.3 23.3 24.1 20.9 23 : 19.6 20.7 22.4 : : 23.1 22 : 21.3 : 20 21.9 23.2 21.8
Men 17.7e 17.9 14.6 17.4 17.4 14.8 19.4 19.1 19 16.7 18.6 : 14.9 16.2 17.8 : : 18.1 17.8 : 17.5 : 15.2 17.1 19.1 17.5
1995 Women 22.8e 23.3 20 21.3 22.7 19.9 22.8 24.2 24.9 21.4 24 22.9 19.7 20.6 23.2 : : 23.2 22.8 : 22 : 20 22.9 23.9 22.2
Men 18.3e 18.5 15.9 17.6 18.2 14.4 19.8 19.7 19.7 17.3 19.5 20.1 13.8 15.5 18.2 : : 18.5 18.5 : 18.2 : 15.6 18.1 19.8 18.3
2002 Women 23.8e 23.9 21.5 22.4 : 21.3 : : : 22.9 : : 20.8 21.7 24.2 20.9 23.3 23.5 24.1 22 23.3 23.1 21 24 24.3 :
Men 19.6e 19.6 17.3 19.1 : 15.4 : : : 19.2 : : 15.2 16.1 19.6 16.1 19 19.5 20.2 17.1 19.4 18 16.4 19.5 20.9 :
2003 Women 23.9 : 21.4 22.7 23.9 : : : : 23.1 : : 20.6 21.9 23.2 20.8 22.7 23.7 : 22 23.3 23.1 21 : 24.6 :
Men 19.8 : 17.3 19.3 19.9 : : : : 19.6 : : 15.4 16.2 19.3 15.9 19.8 19.7 : 17.1 19.4 17.9 16.4 : 21 :
p = provisional value; e = Eurostat estimate * = 2003
Source: Eurostat   Demographic statistics
Life expectancy at age 60
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Table 6.  Common indicators of adequate and sustainable pensions* 
EU BE CZ DK DE EE EL ES FR IE IT CY LV LT LU HU MT NL AT PL PT SL SK FI SE UK
Employment rate of older workers (% of population aged 55 64), selected years
1998
Total 35.8 22.9 37.1 52 37.7 50.2 39 35.1 28.3 41.7 27.7 : 36.3 39.5 25.1 17.3 : 33.9 28.4 32.1 49.6b  23.9 22.8 36.2 63 49
Male 46.6 32.1 53.2 61.3 47.2 62 56 52.6 32.5 60.2 41.4 : 48.1 54.4 35.2 27 : 47.5 40.5 41.5 62.9b  31.8 39.1 38.4 66.1 59.1
Female 25.5 14 22.9 42 28.3 41.6 23.5 18.8 24.4 23.1 15 : 27.5 28.3 15.5 9.6 : 20.3 17.1 24.1 38b  16.1 9.4 34.1 60 39.2
2000
Total 36.6 26.3 36.3 55.7 37.6 46.3 39 37 29.9 45.3 27.7 49.4 36 40.4 26.7 22.2 28.5 38.2 28.8 28.4 50.7 22.7 21.3 41.6 64.9 50.7b 
Male 46.9 36.4 51.7 64.1 46.4 55.9 55.2 54.9 33.6 63.2 40.9 67.3 48.4 50.6 37.2 33.2 50.8 50.2 41.2 36.7 62.1 32.3 35.4 42.9 67.8 60.1b 
Female 26.9 16.6 22.4 46.6 29 39 24.3 20.2 26.3 27.2 15.3 32.1 26.7 32.6 16.4 13.3 8.4 26.1 17.2 21.4 40.6 13.8 9.8 40.4 62.1 41.7b 
2002
Total 38.7 26.6 40.8 57.9 38.9 51.6 39.2 39.6 34.7 48 28.9 49.4 41.7 41.6 28.1 25.6 30.1 42.3 29.1 26.1 51.4 24.5 22.8 47.8 68 53.4
Male 48.8 36 57.2 64.5 47.3 58.4 55.9 58.4 38.7 65 41.3 67.3 50.5 51.5 37.7 35.5 50.8 54.6 39.6 34.5 61.9 35.4 39.1 48.5 70.4 62.6
Female 29.2 17.5 25.9 50.4 30.6 46.5 24 21.9 30.8 30.8 17.3 32.2 35.2 34.1 18.4 17.6 10.9 29.9 19.3 18.9 42.2 14.2 9.5 47.2 65.6 44.5
2004
Total 41 30 42.7 60.3 41.8 52.4 39.4 41.3 37.3 49.5 30.5b  49.9 47.9 47.1 30.8 31.1 31.5 45.2 28.8b  26.2 50.3 29 26.8 50.9 69.1 56.2
Male 50.7 39.1 57.2 67.3 50.7 56.4 56.4 58.9 41 65 42.2b  70.8 55.8 57.6 38.5 38.4 53.4 56.9 38.9b  34.1 59.1 40.9 43.8 51.4 71.2 65.7
Female 31.7 21.1 29.4 53.3 33 49.4 24 24.6 33.8 33.7 19.6b  30 41.9 39.3 22.9 25 11.5 33.4 19.3b  19.4 42.5 17.8 12.6 50.4 67 47
Source: Eurostat   Labour Force Survey, Annual averages.
Average exit age from the labour force, selected years
2002
Total 60.4 58.5 60.2 60.9 60.7 61.6 61.3 61.5 58.8 63.1 59.9 61.4 : : 59.3 59.1 58.2 62.2 59.3 56.9 63 56.6 57.5 60.5 63.3 62.3
Male 60.8 58.6 62.2 61.9 61.1 : 61.1 61.4 58.9 62.8 60.2 : : : : 59.6 : 62.9 59.4 58.1 62.9 : 59.6 60.6 63.4 62.7
Female 60 58.4 58.4 59.8 60.3 : 61.5 61.6 58.7 63.5 59.7 : : : : 58.8 : 61.6 59.2 55.8 63.1 : 55.7 60.4 63.1 61.8
2004
Total 60.7p  59.4 60 62.1 61.3 62.3 59.5 62.2 58.9 62.8 : 62.7 62.9 60.8 57.7 60.5 57.7 61.1 : 57.7 62.2 : 58.5 60.5 62.8 62.1
Male 60.9p  59.1 61.3 62.6 61.4 : 60.3 61.5 58.4 63.4 : : : : : 60.3 : 61.1 : 60 61.2 : 60.3 60.2 63.1 62.9
Female 60.4p  59.6 58.9 61.6 61.1 : 58.8 62.9 59.4 62.3 : : : : : 60.7 : 61.1 : 55.8 63.1 : 57 60.8 62.4 61.4
e = Eurostat estimate; p = provisional figure
Source: DG Employment / Eurostat, Labour Force Survey   Annual average  
* Selection of the common indicators of adequate and sustainable pensions that were presented in the Commission Staff working paper: Synthesis Report on Adequate and 
Sustainable Pensions (SEC(2006)304 of 27 February 2006). 
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Table 6.  Common indicators of adequate and sustainable pensions* (cont.) 
Pension expenditure, selected years (% of GDP)
1995 : 12.1 7.3 11.3 12.5 : 11.2 10.3 13.4 5.0 14.5 : : : 12.7 : 8.1 14.1 14.3 : 9.8 : 7.4 12.7 12.8 11.9
2000 12.5 11.1 8.7 10.5 13.0 6.9 12.5 9.6 13.0 3.6 14.7 : 9.6 7.8 9.7 8.7 8.2 13.0 14.2 13.0 10.5 11.4 7.5 10.7 11.7 12.2
2003 12.6 11.5 8.8 11.1 13.4 6.3 12.9 9.2 13.0 3.9 15.1 : 7.5 6.8 10.9 9.3 9.4 12.6 14.7 14.3 11.9 11.2 7.5 11.4 12.7 11.0
Source: Eurostat   ESSPROS database
Risk of poverty of people aged 60+, 65+, 75+ and <60, <65, <75 (%), 2003 
Total
Total 16 15 8 11 15 18 20 20 14 21 19 15 16 15 11 12 15 12 13 17 21 10 21 11 11 18
Men 15 14 7 11 13 17 19 19 13 19 18 14 16 14 11 12 15 12 11 17 20 9 21 11 10 17
Women 17 16 9 11 17 20 21 21 14 23 20 17 17 15 11 12 15 12 14 16 22 11 21 11 12 19
0-64
Total 16 14 9 10 15 19 18 18 13 19 20 10 17 15 12 12 14 13 12 18 19 9 22 10 11 17
Men 16 13 8 10 13 18 18 18 13 17 19 10 17 15 12 12 14 12 11 19 18 8 22 10 11 16
Women 17 15 9 10 17 19 19 18 14 20 21 11 17 15 12 12 14 13 13 18 20 9 22 10 11 17
65+
Total 18 21 4 17 16 17 28 30 16 40 16 52 14 12 6 10 20 7 17 6 29 19 13 17 14 24
Men 15 20 1 16 11 7 26 27 14 34 13 48 7 5 6 6 19 6 13 4 29 11 12 11 9 21
Women 20 21 6 18 19 22 30 32 17 45 18 55 17 15 6 12 21 7 20 7 30 23 13 20 18 27
75+
Total : 21 7 23 17 18 35 34 18 44 15 67 16 15 8 14 21 7 18 6 35 25 20 25 20 30
Men : 20 2 25 9 3 35 32 15 35 12 67 5 6 7 11 18 7 10 4 35 17 20 15 14 28
Women : 21 9 22 20 24 34 35 19 50 17 67 21 19 9 15 24 7 21 7 36 28 20 30 24 32
Source: Eurostat   See Annex IB
Relative income of people aged 65+ (relative to the complementary age groups) (%), 2003
Total : 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.6 1.0 0.6 0.8 0.9 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.9 1.1 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.7
Men : 0.8 0.9 0.7 : 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.6 1.0 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.0 0.9 1.0 0.9 1.0 1.2 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.8
Women : 0.8 0.8 0.7 : 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.6 0.9 0.5 0.8 0.9 1.0 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.9 1.1 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.7 0.7 0.7
Source: Eurostat   See Annex IB
Inequality of income distribution (S80/S20) among people aged 60+, 65+, 75+ and <60, <65, <75 in 2001 (%) 
65+ : 3.4 2.1 2.8 3.9 4.7 5.1 4.2 4.2 3.4 4.2 4.3 3.5 3 3 2.5 4.5 3.2 4.5 3.3 6.5 3.3 5.8 2.8 2.7 4
0 64 : 4.1 3.5 3.4 4.4 6.1 6 5.2 4.2 5.1 6 3.7 6.6 4.8 3.8 4 4.6 4.2 3.7 5.2 7.3 3.1 3.2 3.6 3.3 5.9
Source: Eurostat   See Annex IB  
 
* Selection of the common indicators of adequate and sustainable pensions that were presented in the Commission Staff working paper: Synthesis Report on Adequate and 
Sustainable Pensions (SEC(2006)304 of 27 February 2006). 